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"[T] he process.., is not discovery, but creation;... the doubts and
misgivings... are.., part of the travail of mind .... in which principles that have served their day expire, and new principles are born."'
I.

PREFACE

All of us, lawyers and nonlawyers, are exposed to situations
where good faith and fair dealing are at issue. The question addressed in this Article involves the extent to which the province of
ethics becomes co-extensive with the mandates of law. Drawing
this line is particularly troublesome when good faith disclosures
during the formation of a contract are the issue. I had a revealing
experience some years ago. At the negotiation table with American counterparts, in the sale of a business, statements were made to
me that were inconsistent with my understanding of the law as a
civil lawyer. Wall Street lawyers of world fame, echoed by their clients, told me that good faith disclosures during negotiations are
not required in the world of sophisticated businessmen during negotiations in the United States. The concept of good faith, they
conceded, was not unknown, but its application was limited to the
phase of contract performance. During contract negotiations,
neither good faith dealing nor good faith disclosures was required,
and everyone was free to take advantage of the ignorance or misperceptions of another, no matter how unfair or unethical, except
** Editor's note. Citation in the Appendix conforms to Italian and German rules
of citation, rather than to The Bluebook.
I BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 166-67 (1921).
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in the context of a special relationship where the parties repose
trust and confidence in each other (as, for instance, in a fiduciary
relation), which usually does not apply to arm's length business
transactions. Moreover, I was told, even cases of outright fraud lead
to no liability where one negates reliance with a skillfully drafted
integration or disclaimer clause.
Much of my background is in the law system of Italy. After
graduating from the University of Bologna, I practiced law in Milan
for many years. Although I subsequently studied the common law
of England, the notions of my original training in the law still permeate my mind, profoundly and indelibly. In Italian law, the
precontractual duty of good faith is embodied in the law itself.2 No
Italian lawyer would ever think that the duty only applies to the
phase of contractual performance. Although I was told by my
American colleagues that caveat emptor still applied to arm's
length transactions, and that an American judge would tell a plaintiff, who in the negotiation of a contract had been circumvented,
that he should have been "more circumspect and astute," I could
not believe that this was really true. In any event, it was not possible
for me to adapt to this novel legal culture and, of necessity, I kept
acting in accordance with the principles that I had been taught,
which I knew had stood firm for many years, and which had so far
guided my professional life.
The "American" approach as described to me was, I sensed,
out of touch with today's reality of the law. I undertook an in depth
research of the duty of good faith, and especially of good faith disclosures during contract negotiations, in the law of the United
States. Upon closer scrutiny, I found that the developments which
formed the basis of the doctrine of caveat emptor, and the historical context in which this doctrine took hold during the latter part
of the nineteenth century, along with the establishment of a powerful and selfish industrial and merchant class, were also the doctrine's limitation. I discovered that recent political and social
2 See Articles 1337, 1338 codice civile (c.c.). In Italian law, the parties owe each
other a duty of good faith in the negotiation and formation, as well as in the execution, of the contract, and they are obliged to disclose all material information of
which they have actual or constructive knowledge. See Francesco Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, in CoNTrmraro E ImPeSA, 1987, 287, in particular at 296, 308. It has been
noted that through the concept of good faith the rules of social fairness and of loyalty
in business, which taken by themselves would be outside the field of both contract
and torts, have entered into the legal order as sanctioned duties. Angelo DeMartini &
Giovanni Ruoppolo, RASSEGNA Di GIURISPRUDENZA SUL CODICE CIvnLE, IV.2, Milano
1972, at 177 with further references. See infra,Appendix, Notes on the Precontractual
Duty of Good Faith in Italian Law.
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developments, and a wealth of scholarly writing and judicial interest in the possibility of limiting (or eliminating) caveat emptor,
were shaking the foundations of this widely accepted theoretical
framework. More recent cases, which allegedly established the
"predominant" authority of the "old" law of caveat emptor, merely
turned out to recite the old precedents in summary form, thereby
revealing serious weaknesses in their analyses. And I discovered a
wealth of authorities that showed, in fact, that the old doctrines
were being eroded, that the traditional analyses were being challenged, that more and more exceptions were being carved out
from the old precedents, and that new avenues, where ethics have
their place "even" in arm's length commercial transactions, were
being pursued.
Some years have passed since my encounter described above.
My learned colleagues continue to write opinions stating that there
is no duty of good faith disclosures during contract negotiations in
the law of the United States. I thus hope that by sharing the results
of my research, and through fruitful discussion of my conclusions,
this troublesome area of the law, and of life in society, may become
clearer.
II.

INTRODUCIION

Good faith and fair dealing has been, from time immemorial,
a fundamental commandment of social behavior. In many legal
systems, where no distinction is made between good faith during
negotiations' or contract performance, the law imposes the duty of
good faith and fair dealing, irrespective of whether a contract exists. This is not so clear, however, in the law of the United States,
where the requirements of precontractual good faith disclosures
have been, and still are, the subject of much debate.
Traditionally, United States law has not required full disclosure of material facts between sophisticated parties to commercial
transactions, including the sale of businesses, unless there is a contract or agreement to provide such information.4 As Professor E.
3 The duty of good faith and fair dealing, when applied to contract negotiations,
has at least two distinct applications: first, it has been used to determine what facts or
information should be disclosed between the parties; and second, it may require parties to negotiate in a fair manner to consummate a final agreement. This Article deals
with the issue of good faith disclosures. Although many American courts have recognized that contemporary notions of good faith and fair dealing dictate disclosure requirements during negotiations, the type and extent of these requirements have been
reduced and expanded as understanding of good faith requirements has changed.
4 See, e.g., Market St. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 594, 595 (7th
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Alan Farnsworth, perhaps the most pessimistic of commentators on
the topic, 5 has noted, "the courts have had great difficulty in dealing with the extent to which candor, as distinguished from honesty,
is required [in dealing with concealment or non-disclosure]."'
Courts are generally reluctant to acknowledge and enforce a
precontractual duty of candor among businessmen dealing at
arm's length 7 primarily because of the doctrine of caveat emptor,8
under which there is a presumption that the purchaser is capable
of assessing, and ought to be responsible for investigating all information necessary to satisfy his own self-interests.
This Article rejects the position that there is no duty of disclosure in an arm's length business transaction. A careful analysis of
the common law of disclosures reveals that, regardless of the contractual transaction involved, the unifying principle behind required disclosures is the dictate of good faith and fair dealing, the
violation of which permits tort remedies.9 A duty of good faith and
fair dealing applies whether there is a contract or not, and therefore also applies to precontractual negotiations as well as to contract performance. This duty generally requires the seller of a
business to disclose all material facts.' ° A party, however, will be
Cir. 1991) (stating that the parties confront each other during the precontractual
stage with a natural wariness thus calling for a "minimal" duty of good faith
disclosure).
5 Compare the views of Professor Farnsworth, who sees no reason to require disclosures beyond those agreed to by the parties, with those of Robert-Joseph Pothier,
who believed that parties to a transaction must disclose all material facts. For a further examination of Farnsworth and Pothier's divergent views, see infra Section IV. F.
1 and 6.
6 E. ALAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CoNTRACTs § 4.11 (1990).
7 An "arm's length transaction" is one "negotiated by unrelated parties, each acting in his or her own self-interest." BLAcK's LAw DlCrIONARY 109 (6th ed. 1990).
8 Black's Law Dictionarydefines caveat emptor as "[1]et the buyer beware" and explains that "[t ] his maxim summarizes the rule that a purchaser must examine, judge,
and test for himself." Id. at 222. The failure to require broader disclosure requirements is also based on the tort concept that mere nonfeasance is not actionable. William B. Goldfarb, Fraudand Nondisclosure in the Vendor-PurchaserRelation, 8 WEST. REs.
L. REv. 5, 13 (1956); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 106, at 737 (5th ed. 1984).
9 See infra Section IV. F. for a discussion of the duty of good faith as it relates to
disclosures.
10 A buyer of a business may also be under duty to make good faith disclosures.
But see Wsu-s.,m L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 698 (4th ed.
1971) ("There seems to be no corresponding tendency in the case of special information in the hands of one who buys rather than sells. The buyer is permitted to reap
the advantage which his industry in discovering the facts, and his business acumen,
can bring him.") See also PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 8, at § 106, at 739 ("It is
much more likely that a seller will be required to disclose information than a pur").
chaser ..
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liable for a failure to disclose facts he is aware of only if the other
11
elements of a tort for non-disclosure of facts are established.
In arguing that parties involved in precontractual negotiations
have a good faith duty to disclose, this Article does not mean to
suggest that the parties ought to forego their own independent investigation of the facts. While such an investigation may impact on
the duty of disclosure,' 2 it is always advisable to be as informed as
possible before entering any transaction.
Although the thesis of this Article, that businessmen owe each
other a good faith duty of disclosure, seems foreclosed by some
older cases dating from the landmark decision of Laidlaw v. Organ,'" this Article examines the modem legal trends that support a
heightened duty of good faith and fair dealing in precontractual
negotiations. Such trends include the rise of the doctrine of good
faith in the context of contract performance, the recognition that
the duty of good faith and fair dealing is not limited solely to postcontractual dealings, the statutory use of the duty of good faith, the
application of the doctrine of good faith as a duty imposed by law,
the increasing application of ethics and morality in the law and the
decline of caveat emptor doctrine. 4 Consistent with those trends,
requiring disclosure of all material
a modem movement toward
5
facts can be discerned.'
See infra note 307 (discussing the elements of the tort of nondisclosure).
See infra note 319 and accompanying text, for a discussion pertaining to independent investigations.
'3 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). For a discussion of Laidlaw, see notes infra 18398 and accompanying text.
14 See infraSection III. C to H, for an extended discussion on the modem ascent of
good faith and fair dealing.
15 See, e.g., Heineman v. S&S Machinery Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (E.D.N.Y.
1990) (quoting WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 698
(4th ed. 1971)) (' 'The law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that
full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct
demands it.'"); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 706 (Idaho 1966) (quoting W.
Page Keeton, Fraud-ConcealmentAnd Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31 (1937)) (noting that "courts have drawn away from the doctrine [of caveat emptor] in favor of a
rule which would 'impose on parties to the transaction a duty to speak whenever
justice, equity, and fair dealing demand it'"); Eric M. Holmes, A Contextual Study Of
Commercial Good Faith: Good-Faith Disclosure in Contract Formation, 39 U. Prrr. L. REv.
381, 452 (1978) (advocating that in the formation stage of a contract parties should
exhibit good faith and fair conduct which translates into a duty to disclose material
facts in good faith); Friedrich Kessler & Edith Fine, Culpa in Contrahendo, Bargaining
In Good Faith,And Freedom Of Contract: A ComparativeStudy, 77 HARv. L. REv. 401, 444
(1964) (stating that the law is working toward "'full disclosure of all material facts...
whenever elementary fair conduct demands it'") (quoting PROSSER, TORTS 535 (2d
ed. 1955)); W. Page Keeton, Fraud-ConcealmentAnd Non-disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31
(1936) (noting that courts have undergone a change in attitude towards non-disclo11
12
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This Article surveys the law of disclosure and demonstrates
that courts have added exceptions, over time, to the traditional
rule that silence is not actionable. The addition of exceptions to
the traditional rule permitting nondisclosures, along with the
broadening of those exceptions, suggests that courts have become
increasingly uncomfortable with caveat emptor. One of the most
striking examples of this discomfort is the decision, by many
courts, to abandon the requirement that a plaintiff perform an independent investigation before justifiable reliance on an omission
or misrepresentation will be found. The modem trend is to permit
reliance by plaintiffs on representations or omissions, as long as
that reliance is in good faith.
Next, this Article demonstrates that the requirements of good
faith and fair dealing are the reason why disclosures are required.
The most important positions on good faith and fair dealing disclosure requirements are set forth and these standards are then applied in the specific context of the sale of a business. The Article
concludes with a discussion of the reasons why caveat emptor is not
applicable to the sale of a business and why there is an obligation
on the part of the seller to reveal all material facts.
The Article will show that upon closer scrutiny the concepts of
the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and of good faith disclosures as understood in the United States, are not that dissimilar
from those in the nations of continental Europe-described, for
convenience, as the civil law systems. 6 A brief survey of Italian law
sure by imposing a "duty to speak whenever justice, equity, and fair dealing demand
it"). Professor Keeton added that the duty to speak was not derived from an implied
silence, but rather, from the belief that the refusal to speak is tantamount to unfair
conduct. Id. See also Frona M. Powell, The Seller's Duty to Disclose in Sales of Commercial
Property, 28 Am. Bus. L.J. 245, 274 (1990) (concluding that disclosure of defects
should be required in the sale of either residential or commercial property when
"standards of good faith and fair conduct demand it"); PROSSER AND KEETON, supra
note 8 § 106, at 739 (observing that courts have found, in recent years, a duty to
disclose when an "ordinary ethical person would have disclosed"); Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith"In General Contract Law And The Sales Provisions Of The Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. Ruv. 195, 203, 228 (1968) (generating a list of "good faith"
behavior that included "fully disclosing material facts," Professor Summer stated that
there is evidence that caveat emptor is being put "to rest in some fields.") [hereinafter
General Contract Law); 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 16(a) (1943) ("It is well settled that the suppression of a material fact which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is
equivalent to a false representation.").
16 Without attempting to describe, in a brief footnote, all the differences between
the civil law and the common law, it should be understood that the civil law. (1) is
characterized by a tendency for abstraction in order to capture entire aspects of the
law in broad categories or systems; (2) has developed through the reception of Roman law and the interpretation of the CoRvus Juus of Justinian, and is to a great
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(and, less extensively, German law), as the law of representatives of
the tradition of Roman jurisprudence in Europe, is included in the

Appendix for further support of this thesis.
III. THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FArrH AND FAIR DEALING
Public policy standards of good faith and fair dealing determine legal disclosure requirements. Accordingly, to appreciate
what conduct good faith and fair dealing requires and to understand the evolution and direction of the law in this area, it is helpful to address the history and development of the legal duty of
good faith and fair dealing and its relationship to, and impact
upon, the doctrine of caveat emptor. First, however, we shall turn
to the definition of "good faith and fair dealing."
A.

Defining the Duty of Good Faith and FairDealing

There is no uniformly recognized definition of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing that can be utilized in the negotiation
context. For instance, the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) defines "good faith" as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned."' 7 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts, however,
extent codified; (3) is scholastic in nature; (4) is the law of professors; (5) is abstract
thinking in institutions and works with concepts (which often develop a life of their
own); and (6) focuses the interpretive process on the identification of what the abstract norms intend to say about an unknown and unforeseen problem. The common
law, intended as the Anglo-American law: (1) is characterized by a prophecy of what
judges will do based on precedents, and is empirical, casuistic and skeptical of generalizations; (2) has developed through a continuing tradition, advancing from case to
case on the notion that as life is unpredictable so is the law, and case law responds,
therefore, more adequately to the needs of society; (3) is forensic; (4) is the law of
judges; (5) is concrete thinking in cases, relations, rights and duties; and (6) is pictorial and based on experience of life. See OLIvER W. HoLMEs, THE COMMON LAW 11
(1881) (observing that "[tihe life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience"); W.W. BucKsAND & ARNOLD D. McNAnt, ROMAN LAw & COMMON LAw, A COMPARISON IN OUTUNE, xiv (2d ed. 1952) (suggesting that "it may be a paradox, but it
seems to be the truth that there is more affinity between the Roman jurist and the
common lawyer than there is between the Roman jurist and his modem civilian successor [because] [b]oth the common lawyer and the Roman jurist avoid generalizations and, so far as possible, definitions"); cf KoNR~AD ZwEIGERT & HEIN K6-rz, 1
EINFfJHRUNG IN DIE RECHTSVERGLEICHUNG 75-76 (1971) (noting also that the civil law
is moving towards a greater emphasis on case law, while the common law is moving
towards increased statutory systematization).
17 UCC § 1-201(19) (1989). This definition is expanded to include "honesty in
fact and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the
trade" when a merchant is involved. Id. § 2-103(1)(b). According to the UCC, a
merchant is:
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
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provides a more expansive definition of good faith than does the
UCC. 18 According to the Second Restatement good faith means
more than honesty, and it proscribes conduct that violates community standards as defined by the court or jury.
Moreover, legal commentators have differed with regard to
the manner in which good faith and fair dealing should be defined. Accordingly, the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing has
been defined variously as requiring reasonableness or fair conduct,1 9 reasonable standards of fair dealing,2" decency as well as
fairness and reasonableness,2 1 fairness,2 2 and community standards
of fairness, decency and reasonableness.2 3 Despite this plethora of
definitions, Professor Robert S. Summers has argued that it is inappropriate to ascribe any particular definition to the term "good
faith and fair dealing."2 4 He contended that the concept of good
faith and fair dealing was an "excluder" in that it simply excluded
certain bad faith behavior.
As a majority of commentators seem to recognize, however, it
is probably better that the definition of good faith and fair dealing
remains amorphous so that the doctrine can be applied on a caseby-case basis. Nonetheless, some commentators have criticized expansive definitions of good faith and fair dealing as being too
vague. 2' Although the concept of good faith and fair dealing will
or goods involved in that transaction to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
Id. § 2-104(1).
18 Comment a to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 states that:
Good faith performance or enforcement of a contract emphasizes faithfulness to an agreed common purpose and consistency with thejustified
expectations of the other party; it excludes a variety of types of conduct
characterized as involving "bad faith" because they violate community
standards of decency, fairness or reasonableness.
RxsTATEmENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 205 cmt. a (1979).
19 Holmes, supra note 15, at 451.
As PROMISE 83 (1981).
20 C. FRIED, Coracr
21 E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith PerformanceAnd Commercial Reasonableness Under
The Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 666, 671 (1963) [hereinafter Good Faith
Performance].
22 Robert A. Hillman, Policing Contract Modifications under the UCC: Good Faith and
the Doctrine of Economic Duress, 64 IOwA L. REv. 849, 877 (1979).
23 Richard Thigpen, Good FaithPerformance UnderPercentageLeases, 51 Miss. L.J. 315,
320 (1981).
24 General Contract Law, supra note 15, at 206.
25 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Limitations On The Obligations Of Good Faith, 1981
DUKE L.J. 619, 621 (1981). See Christianne Dubreuil, L'assurance: un contrat de bonnefoi
d l'tape de/a formation et de l'exicution 1992 McGiL L.J. 1087, 1089 (1992).

80
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require additional exposition when applied to negotiations, such
imprecision in its definition is not unworkable and is common in
the law.
B.

The Historical and Cultural Context

In social life, long before the intervention of legal systems, individuals dealt with each other with scrupulous fairness, as imposed
by ancient and rigid customs. Good faith in dealings and negotiation practices was the element of binding value in these ancestral
societies, and served as the religious basis for maintaining the word
given. 2 1 As civilization progressed, however, the individual acquired a greater freedom through contract.27 Nevertheless, good
faith and fairness remained the highest criterion for evaluating
contractual obligations.28
The primordial recognition that parties have an obligation to
act in good faith and to deal fairly in their relations with one another, and the notion that contracts had to be entered into and
performed in good faith (oportere exfide bona)29 were well known in
26 See EMILo BETn, TEORIA GENERALE DEL NEGOzio GIURIDICO, Torino 1955, at 41
& n.4. An interesting example was given by Herodotus when he described how the
savages handled negotiations preceding conclusion of a contract:
The Carthaginians also relate the following: There is a country in
Libya, and a nation, beyond the Pillars of Heracles, which they are wont
to visit, where they no sooner arrive but forthwith they unlade their
wares, and, having disposed them after an orderly fashion along the
beach, leave them, and, returning aboard their ships, raise a great
smoke. The natives, when they see the smoke, come down to the shore,
and, laying out to view so much gold as they think the worth of the
wares, withdraw to a distance. The Carthaginians upon this come
ashore and look. If they think the gold enough, they take it and go
their way; but if it does not seem to them sufficient, they go aboard the
ship once more, and wait patiently. Then the others approach and add
to their gold, till the Carthaginians are content. Neither party deals
unfairly by the other: for they themselves never touch the gold till it
comes up to the worth of their goods, nor do the natives ever carry off
the goods till the gold is taken away.
1 THE GREEK HsIORLANs 292 (Francis RIB. Godolphin ed. & George Rawlinson trans.
Random House 1942). See also Betti, supra, at 41 & n.4 (providing a similar account
attributed to the Venetian sailor of the 15th century, Alvise da Ca' da Mosto).
27 ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS (1952). In a well known passage,
Professor Corbin explained that this change from "status to contract" means the individual acquired greater freedom expressed as "increasing forbearance by organized
society to forbid his bargains and increasing readiness to enforce them, thus making
his condition in the world more dependent on his own free-willed action than on the
action of his ancestors." Id. at 1166.
28 BET, supra note 26, at 42.
29 See Gai - Inst. 4, 62-63, in ARANGio-RuIz/GuAINo, BREVIARIUM IuRis RoMAmn 68
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Roman law." ° In the classical time, enforcement of good faith took
place through the judicia bonaefidei. If a defendant in one of these
contracts cases was unsuccessful in justifying his nonperformance,
he would be obligated to pay the plaintiff whatever the court believed was owed ex bona fide, i.e., in accordance with the requirements of good faith."1 The court was bound to decide what the
defendant ought to have done had he performed the contract in
good faith using the express as well as the implied terms. But by
the time ofJustinian, with the abandonment of the formulae (forms
of action), the notion had become inherent to the contract itself
(contractus bonae fidet) .2
The idea of bona fides, conceived as "loyalty and fairness," was
the basis for trade in the ius gentium. Although one of the most
easily perceived aspects of bona fides was its negation of bad faith,
it was well recognized that the scope of bona fides was much
broader, "manat latissime"; the duty "permeates throughout," according to the great Roman jurist Quintus Mucius Scaevola. 3
The opinion of the Roman statesman, orator, and stoic philosopher, Cicero, has been frequently referred to as setting forth the
(Milano 1962). Typical contracts subject to the iudicium bonaefidei were, e.g., the sale
of goods, lease, bailment, agency, and partnership.
30 BioDi, IsTrrUzIoNi Di Dirrro ROMANO 457 (Milano 1972). See also LONGO,
MA'uAi_ EL MyjrrF Di Dnrro ROMANO, 77 (Torino 1939) ("these contracts are
based on a spirit of honesty and loyalty"). For further references, see Benatti, supra
note 2, at 1. Roman law evolved over a long period of time and, although any classification is somewhat arbitrary, the following time frames have been suggested: (i)
archaic period (from the most ancient times to the 5th century B.C., 753-367 B.C.);
(ii) Republican period (to the end of the Republic, 367 B.C.-27 A.D.); (iii) classical
period (to the 3rd century A.D., 27-284 A.D.); (iv) post-classical period (to the 6th
century, 284-527 A.D.); and (v) the period ofJustinian (527-565 A-D.). Biondi, id., at
5. During the Republican period, ius civi/e came to signify the law that applied exclusively in the Roman civitas,as opposed to ius gentium which signified the law applicable in Rome and to other people.
31 Good Faith Performance,supra note 21, at 669 (quoting F.H. LAwSON, A COMMON
LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CivIL LAw 124-25 (1953)).
32 See D. 2, 14, 7 (Ulpianus, IV ad edictum) ("solemus enim dicere pacta conventa inesse
bonaefidei iudiciis"), Arangio-Ruiz/Guarino, supra note 29 at 674-75. In Roman law, as
in the medieval Common Law, no one could bring an action without a form of action
(writ). This had as a consequence that the jurists did not think in terms of substantive
law (claims) but rather in terms of "adjective" law ("Remedy comes before Right").
Thus it is understandable that only after abolishment of the forms of action did the
concept of good faith become a requirement of the substantive law rather than an
instrument of procedure. For the common law, see F.W. MArrLAND, THE FoRms OF
ACION AT COMMON LAw 1 (1971) ("So great is the ascendancy of the Law of Actions
...that substantive law has at first the look of being gradually secreted in the interstices of procedure.") (quoting MAINE, EARLY LAw AND CUSTOM).
33 Franco Pastori, GLi IsTrrru-l RoMAIsrIc COME STORiA E VrrA DEL DIrrro 74041 (3d ed. Milano 1992).
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requirements of good faith disclosures in commercial sales transactions.' Cicero believed that good faith prohibited a seller of a
commodity from concealing facts affecting the market price of the
commodity, even though the seller made no affirmative
misrepresentations.' 5
The jurists of the post-classical time believed that the contractual good faith requirements applied to the precontractual phase,
though the remedy could only be sought through a contractual
action (e.g., the actio ex empto), which is understandable because of
the still strong influence of the classical tradition of prescribed
causes of action. 6
E.g., Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 185 n.2 (1817); 3A ARThuR L.
at 86 (1951 & West Supp. 1992); Saul
Litvinoff, Vices Of Consent, Error,Fraud,DuressAnd Epilogue On Lesion, 50 LA. L. REv. 1,
59 (1989).
35 Cicero provides an example that illustrated his opinion on the duty of disclosure in commercial transactions:
Let it be set down as an established principle, then, that what is morally
wrong can never be expedient .... But... cases often arise in which
expediency may seem to clash with moral rectitude .... The following
are problems of this sort: suppose, for example, a time of dearth and
famine at Rhodes, with provisions at fabulous prices; and suppose that
an honest man has imported a large cargo of grain from Alexandria and
that to his certain knowledge also several other importers have set sail
from Alexandria, and that on the voyage he has sighted their vessels
laden with grain bound for Rhodes; is he to report the fact to the
Rhodians or is he to keep his own counsel and sell his own stock at the
highest market price? I am assuming the case of a virtuous, upright
man, and I am raising the question how a man would think and reason
who would not conceal the facts from the Rhodians if he thought that it
was immoral to do so, but who would be in doubt whether such silence
would really be immoral.
M.T. CICERO, DE OrIcits III, 319 (Walter Miller trans. 1938).
Cicero stated, upon this question, the sentiments of two stoic philosophers, Diogenes and Antipater. Diogenes thought that the merchant might lawfully withhold the
knowledge which he had of the vessels on the point of arriving, and sell his corn at
the current price (aliud est celare, aliud tacere). Antipater, his disciple, whose decision
Cicero apparently adopted, thought, to the contrary, that this dissimulation was contrary to good faith: all the facts should be disclosed, that the buyer may not be uninformed of any detail which the seller knows (omnia patefacienda, ut ne quid omnino,
quod venditor norit,emptor ignoret). Id. at 319, 321; see also Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at
185 n.2 (quoting PoTmER, TRArrE Du CoNTRAT DE VENTE, Art. III, No. 241).
36 The actioex empto was the cause of action available to the buyer against the seller.
The duties arising from the sale of goods were subject to oportere exfide bona, meaning
that both the seller and the buyer had to conduct themselves according to good faith,
and any breach of this duty would be subject to the iudicium bonaefidei, with broad
.equitable" discretion of the court. The use of the actio ex empto for breaches of the
duty of good faith in the context of the sale of goods contributed to the confusion
(that has lasted to this day) that a "contractual" ("sale") action could give rise only to
a contractual liability for breach. See Biondi, supra note 30, at 489. See also Benatti,
34

CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNrTRArs § 654A(D),
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Thereafter, no significant development occurred until the
18th and 19th centuries. In the civil law, Jhering "discovered," in
1861, culpa in contrahendo." The concept of good faith disclosures
also found its way into the English common law, where it made its
most explicit appearance in the area of insurance law. The notion
of good faith and fair dealing to measure disclosures was used in
an English case of the 18th century, Carter v. Boehm 38 which became the leading case to articulate this duty of disclosure in contract formation. The case concerned an insurance contract
indemnifying the owner of an island for its loss from foreign takeover. The carrier sought to avoid payment by claiming that certain
material facts, regarding the insecurity of the island and the insured's fear of an invasion, were not disclosed at the time the contract was made.
According to Lord Mansfield, a contract for insurance is voidable if there is a non-disclosure of a material fact, since the risk run
is different from the risk insured.39 Lord Mansfield enunciated the
following principle of all contracts and dealings: "Good faith forbids either party from concealing what he privately knows, to draw
the other into a bargain, from his ignorance of that fact, and his
believing the contrary."4
supra note 2, at 2 (providing an excellent summary of this concept and further
references).
37 See generally Benatti, supra note 2, at 3-9. See also Kessler & Fine, supranote 15, at
401. "Culpa in contrahendo"means "fault in negotiating." Kessler & Finenoted thatJhering, a German legal scholar of the 19th Century "advanced the thesis that damages
should be recoverable against the party whose blameworthy conduct during negotiations for a contract brought about its invalidity or prevented its perfection." Kessler &
Fine, supra note 15, at 401.
38 97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (KB. 1766).
39 Id. at 1164.
40 This broad duty, however, was not without limitations. Lord Mansfield continued: "But either party may be innocently silent, as to grounds open to both, to exercise their judgment upon." Id. Further, an insured did not need to reveal what the
insurer should know, or could reasonably discover. Id. at 1165. The reason for placing the burden of knowledge on the insurer was to prevent an insurer from writing a
contract that he knew he could later void. Id. at 1169. The insurer could promise
indemnity and collect the premium, and then deny payment should the circumstance
insured against occur, or, should the circumstance not occur, profit from the paid
premium.
Lord Mansfield presented the central question as "whether there was, under all
the circumstances at the time the policy was underwritten, a fair representation; or a
concealment; fraudulent, if designed; or though not designed, varying materially the
object of the policy, and changing the risque understood to be run." Id. at 1165. Lord
Mansfield reviewed the facts and held that there was no concealment in Carter v.
Boehm because the underwriter was in a better position than the insured to judge the
safety of the island, and the insured's fears of invasion were the reasons for purchasing the policy and were not based on any facts not known or not ascertainable to the
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Despite Lord Mansfield's early application of good faith to
precontractual disclosures, the common law evolved in the 19th
Century so that notions of good faith and fair dealing were either
divorced from contract negotiations and disclosure requirements,
or required very little in the way of candor. Early in the 19th century, the United States Supreme Court opined that a buyer who
had exclusive information, which was about to be made public and
that would substantially affect the price of a commodity, was not
required to inform the seller as long as the buyer did nothing to
deceive the seller.4
Likewise, the English bench ruled that in sales transactions,
"whatever may be the case in a court of morals, there is no legal
obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under
a mistake, not induced by the act of the vendor."4 2 Nevertheless,
good faith and fair dealing increasingly became a part of the common law of contract performance and enforcement. Furthermore,
late nineteenth century courts also began to apply standards of
good faith and fair dealing to measure disclosure requirements in
contract formation, although application of the doctrine of caveat
emptor inhibited the significance of this later trend.
To set the stage for an assault on the doctrine of caveat
emptor in arm's length transactions, it is helpful to examine modem doctrines and trends in American law indicating that our sociunderwriter. Id. at 1166-69. This early appearance of good faith disclosure during
negotiation of a contract remained, for a long time, restricted to marine insurance
contracts. Holmes, supra note 15, at 426-35.
41 Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817). For a discussion of Laidlaw,
see infra notes 183-98.
42 Smith v. Hughes, (1871) L.R. 6 Q.B. 597, 607. This case dealt with a sale of oats.
On appeal, the court assumed that the buyer of the oats believed he was purchasing
"old oats" even though the oats were not old, but new, and the seller was aware that
the buyer was mistaken about the age of the oats. The seller did nothing to bring
about this mistake or to correct it, but gave the buyer a sample of the oats prior to the
sale. Chief Judge Cockburn explained that "[t]he question was not what a man of
scrupulous morality or nice honour would do under such circumstances." Id. at 603.
Chief Judge Cockburn relied on Justice Story for the applicable legal principle:
"'[t]he general rule, both of law and equity, in respect to concealment, is that mere
silence with regard to a material fact ... will not avoid a contract, although it operate
as an injury to the party from whom it is concealed.'" Id. at 604 (citation omitted).
The court also noted that with regard to intrinsic facts, those relating to the nature or
quality of the item, mere silence was not actionable as long as the condition of the
item may be discovered by the other party in the exercise of proper diligence. Id.
(citation omitted). As for extrinsic facts (environmental or market conditions),
neither party was bound to disclose them. Id. at 660 (citation omitted). See Peek v.
Gurney, (1873) L.R. 6 H.L. 377, 403 (asserting that "[m]ere non-disclosure of material
fact, however morally censurable . . . form[s] no ground for an action . . . for
misrepresentation.").
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ety's concepts of the law are changing, and that notions of good
faith and morality are increasingly being recognized as necessary
ingredients for the determination of legal obligations. First, it is
now widely recognized that there is a duty of good faith implied in
every contract. Second, although the UCC and the Restatement
(Second) of Contracts appear to limit use of the doctrine of good
faith and fair dealing to contract performance and enforcement, in
fact, both the UCC and the Restatement indicate that the requirement of good faith and fair dealing may apply to precontractual
negotiations. Third, the requirement of good faith and fair dealing is increasingly being used in statutes. Fourth, the notion that
the duty of good faith is a duty imposed by law is gaining acceptance. Fifth, in numerous areas of the law, morality and ethical
standards are playing a significant role in forming and applying the
law. Finally, the doctrine of caveat emptor has been abandoned or
mollified in many transactions because it has been deemed to be
inconsistent with modem ethics and practices. Each of these
trends will be discussed seriatim.
C.

The Development of the Duty of Good Faith as a Duty Implied in
Every Contract

To uphold the duty of good faith performance in his dealings,
a party is required to conform his behavior to reasonable established trade practices and norms. In 1893, the New York Court of
Appeals announced that courts, when interpreting contracts,
should infer that the contracting parties fully contemplated good
faith in performance.43 This inference of good faith was to be a
43 Genet v. President of Delaware & Hudson Canal Co., 32 N.E. 1078 (N.Y. 1893);
Hilleary v. Skokum Root Hair-Grower Co., 23 N.Y.S. 1016 (C.P. 1893). Earlier cases
from New York's highest court also referred to the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Masterson, 5 N.E. 59, 63 (N.Y. 1886) (ruling that defendant, who
had a contract employing plaintiff to work as a mason, was "bound to act in good
faith"); Uhrig v. Williamsburg City Fire Ins. Co., 4 N.E. 745, 746 (N.Y. 1886) (examining an arbitration clause for the appraisement of property subject to an insurance
policy, the court ruled that "it was duty of each party to act in good faith to accomplish the appraisement"). Earlier in the 19th century, the United States Supreme
Court also referred to the contract duty of good faith. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R.R v. Howard, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 392, 413 (1868). The Howard court noted:
[C]orporations as much as individuals are bound to good faith and fair
dealing, and the rule is well settled that they cannot, by their acts, representations or silence, involve others in onerous engagements and then
turn round and disavow their acts and defeat just expectations which
their own conduct has superinduced.
Id.; see also Bush v. Marshall, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 284, 291 (1848) (declaring that a vendee owes vendor a duty of "good faith and fair dealing").
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guide for the courts in determining the meaning of the contract
terms. The focus subsequently shifted, however, to the parties' duties in performance of contractual obligations. In Industrial& General Trust, Ltd. v. Tod," for example, the bondholders of an
insolvent railway formed a re-organization committee with complete discretion to create and adopt a plan of reorganization.4' In
carrying out its mandate, the committee allowed the property to be
foreclosed prior to the submission of a reorganization plan.6 Despite the wide powers granted to the committee, the court found
that the committee had violated its duty to act in good faith.47
Although the committee's actions were not fraudulent or "willfully
wrong," their actions violated the underlying agreement with the
bondholders and, therefore, violated the duty to act in good
faith. 4
The current framework of the doctrine in New York was put
forward in Kirke La Shelle Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co.49 In Kirke La
She/le, a party to a theatrical licensing agreement attempted to sell
the production's movie rights. The court, which prohibited the
sale of the movie rights, reasoned that production of a movie
would make the theatrical rights worthless. In finding a breach of
the duty of good faith when one party purposefully devalues the
other party's contractual rights, the court ruled that:
[I] n any contract there is an implied covenant that neither party
44

73 N.E. 7 (N.Y. 1905).

45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Id. at

10.

Id. at 10-11. The New York Court of Appeals continued to refine the doctrine
over the next ten years. In interpreting an insurance agreement, the court stated that
"there is a contractual obligation of universal force which underlies all written agreements. It is the obligation of good faith in carrying out what was written." Brassil v.
Maryland Casualty Co., 104 N.E. 622 (N.Y. 1914); see also Lyon v. Lyon, 233 P. 988, 990
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1925) ("It is assumed that every party to a contract acts in good
faith in performing their contractual duties. A violation of the duty of good faith
must be shown by extrinsic evidence."); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bectel Brewing Co.,
118 N.E. 618, 620 (N.Y. 1918) (finding that a duty of good faith required company to
pay independent contractor despite dissolution of company because independent
contractor had right to assume long term relationship). This duty of good faith required parties to perform their contractual obligations in a reasonable time and in a
reasonable manner. Ratzlaff v. Trainor-Desmond Co., 183 P. 269, 271 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1919); People ex reL Wells & Newton Co. v. Craig, 133 N.E. 419, 426 (N.Y. 1921);
Simon v. Etgen, 107 N.E. 1066, 1067 (N.Y. 1915).
49 188 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1933). Kirke La Shelle is widely cited as the first declaration of
the modem duty of good faith and fair dealing. Centronics Corp. v. Genicom Corp.,
562 A.2d 187, 191 (N.H. 1989); Steven J. Burton, Breach Of ContractAnd The Common
Law Duty To Perform In Good Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369, 379-80 nn.42-43 (1980);
Corbin, supra note 34, at § 654A (D).
48
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shall do anything which shall have the effect of destroying or
injuring the rights of the other party, to receive the fruits of the
contract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.5 °
A significant number of other jurisdictions did not follow the
Kirke La Shelle decision, however,5 1 until the California Supreme Court
elaborated on the doctrine of good faith and fair dealing in Comunale
v. Traders & General Insurance Co.52 and Mattei v. Hopper.5" By that
time, the UCC had also adopted the duty of good faith. Subsequently,
during the late 1960s and early 1970s, a large number of courts began
to accept the concept of a duty of good faith and fair dealing as necessary to protect the expectations of parties to a contract. Presently,
courts in the vast majority of American jurisdictions agree that a general obligation of good faith and fair dealing is implied in every contract.5 4 This contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing arises as
50 Kirk La Shee, 188 N.E. at 167.

51 For the most part, only New York courts referred to the duty of good faith and
fair dealing during the two decades following the Kirke La Shelle case. E.g., Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Tailored Woman, Inc., 128 N.E.2d 401, 403 (N.Y. 1955); M O'Neal
Supply Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 19 N.E.2d 676, 678 (N.Y. 1939); Price v.
Spielman Motor Sales Co., 26 N.Y.S.2d 836, 839 (N.Y. App. Div. 1941); Lutz v. Bayberry Huntington, Inc., 148 N.Y.S.2d 762, 767 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1956); Mezz v. Swim
Products Co., 138 N.Y.S.2d 643, 646 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1955); Halstead v. General Ry.
Signal Co., 51 N.Y.S.2d 372, 374 (N.Y. Sup. CL 1945); Vineyard v. Martin, 29 N.Y.S.2d
935, 938 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1941). A few California cases also referred to the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract. Brown v. Superior Court, 212
P.2d 878, 881 (Cal. 1949); Bergum v. Weber, 288 P.2d 623, 625 (Cal. Ct. App. 1955);
Matzen v. Horwitz, 228 P.2d 841, 845 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951); Wilson v. Wilson, 216 P.2d
104, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950); Brawley v. Crosby Research Found., 166 P.2d 392, 397
(Cal. Ct. App. 1946).
52 328 P.2d 198 (Cal. 1958). For a more complete discussion of Comunale, see infra
notes 102-04 and accompanying text.
53 330 P.2d 625 (Cal. 1958).
54 E.g., Hilley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 562 So.2d 184, 190 (Ala. 1990); Guin v. Ha, 591
P.2d 1281, 1291 (Alaska 1979); Savoca Masonry Co., Inc. v. Homes & Son Const. Co.,
Inc., 542 P.2d 817, 821 (Ariz. 1975); Wilgus v. Salt Pond Inv. Co., 498 A.2d 151, 159
(Del. 1985); Crooks v. Chapman Co., 185 S.E.2d 787, 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971); Idaho
First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 824 P.2d 841, 862 (Idaho 1991); Martindell
v. Lake Shore Nat'l Bank, 154 N.E.2d 683, 690 (Ill. 1958); Daniels v. Army Nat'l Bank,
822 P.2d 39, 43 (Kan. 1991); Ranier v. Mount Sterling Nat'l Bank, 812 S.W.2d 154,
156 (Ky. 1991); Food Fair Stores, Inc. v. Blumberg, 200 A.2d 166, 174 (Md. 1964);
Kerrigan v. City of Boston, 278 N.E.2d 387, 393 (Mass. 1972); Burkhardt v. City Nat'l
Bank of Detroit, 226 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975); Morris v. Macione, 546
So. 2d 969, 971 (Miss. 1984); Faust & Forden, Inc. v. Greenbaum, 421 S.W.2d 809, 813
(Mo. Ct. App. 1967); U.V. Inds., Inc. v. Danielson, 602 P.2d 571, 581 (Mont. 1979); K
Mart Corp. v. Ponsock, 732 P.2d 1364, 1370 (Nev. 1987); Griswold v. Heat, Inc., 229
A.2d 183, 187 (N.H. 1967); Palisades Properties, Inc. v. Brunetti, 44 N.J. 117, 130, 207
A.2d 522, 531 (1965); Watson Truck & Supply Co., Inc. v. Males, 801 P.2d 639, 642
(N.M. 1991); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Godwin Bldg. Supply Co., 253 S.E.2d 625, 627-28
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979); Miles v. N. J. Motors, Inc., 338 N.E.2d 784, 787-88 (Ohio Ct.
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soon as the contract is executed, even though there may be a subsequent closing.
The general recognition of the duty of good faith and fair dealing has been substantiated by the dozens of commentators who, in the
last thirty years, have written articles in many different areas of the law
concerning this duty. 5 The two most influential commentators on
App. 1975); Western Natural Gas Co. v. Cities Serv. Gas Co., 507 P.2d 1236, 1241
(Okla.), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972); Perkins v. Standard Oil
Co., 383 P.2d 107, 112 (Or. 1963) (en banc); Ide Farm & Stable, Inc. v. Cardi, 297
A.2d 643, 645 (R.I. 1972); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Nelson Motors, Inc., 147
S.E.2d 481, 484 (S.C. 1966); Garrett v. BankWest, Inc., 459 N.W.2d 833, 841 (S.D.
1990); TSC Indus., Inc. v. Tomlin, 743 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tenn. CL App. 1987); Zion's
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Heins,
205 A.2d 561, 566 (Vt. 1964); Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 410 P.2d 33, 34 (Wash.
1966) (per curiam); In re Chayka v. Santini, 176 N.W.2d 561, 564 (Wis. 1970); see also
In re Stevenson Ass'n, Inc., 777 F.2d 415, 421 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Minnesota
law); Makofsky v. Cunningham, 576 F.2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir. 1978) (applying Louisiana law); Rees v. Bank Bldg. & Equip. Corp. of America, 332 F.2d 548, 551-52 (7th
Cir.) (applying Missouri law), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 932 (1964); National Safe Corp. v.
Benedict & Myrick, Inc., 371 So. 2d 792, 795 (La. 1979) (applying LA. CIv. CODE ANN.
art. 1901 (West 1987)). Contra Childers v. Pumping Sys., Inc., 968 F.2d 565, 568-69
(5th Cir. 1992) ("Texas law does not imply a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract."); English v. Fischer, 660 S.W.2d 521, 522 (Tex. 1983).
55 Many articles, most of which deal with the contractual duty of good faith and
fair dealing, have been written concerning the duty: Eric G. Andersen, Good Faith in
the Enforcement of Contracts,73 IOWA L. REv. 299 (1988); Neal Batson, The Lender's Obligation of Good Faith and FairDealing and Other Implied Provisions in Commercial Transactions, Practicing Law Institute (1990);John P. Bermingham, Extending Good Faith: Does
the UCC Impose a Duty of Good Faith Negotiation Under Changed Circumstances?, 61 ST.
JoHN's L. REV. 217 (1987); Steven J. Burton, More on Good FaithPerformance of a Contract: A Reply to ProfessorSummers, 69 IowA L. Rv. 497 (1984); StevenJ. Burton, Good
Faith Performance of a Contract Within Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, IOwA L.
Rxv. 1 (1981); Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform
in Good Faith, 94 HIv. L. REv. 369 (1980); Hon. H. Walter Croskey, Bad Faith In
California: Its History, Development And Current Status, 26 ToRT & INSURANCE L.J. 561
(1991); Robert Dugan, Good FaithAnd The Enforceabilityof Standardized Terms, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1 (1980); Russell A. Eisenberg, Good Faith Under The Uniform Commercial
Code - A New Look At An Old Problem, 54 MARQ. L. REv. 1 (1971); E. Allen Farnsworth,
PrecontractualLiability And Preliminary Agreements: FairDealingAnd Failed Negotiations,
87 COLUM. L. REv. 217 (1987); Gillette, supranote 25 at 619; Patricia K. Gillette, The
Implied Covenant of Good Faith and FairDealing: Are Employers the Insurers of the Eighties?,
11 EMPLOYEE RELATIONS LJ. 438 (1985); Dr. Tariq Hassan, The PrincipleOf Good Faith
In The FormationOf Contracts,5 SuFFoLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 1 (1980); Hillman, supra note
22; Holmes, supra note 16; Kessler & Fine, supra note 15; Guy 0. Kornblum, Recent
Cases Interpretingthe Implied Covenant of Good Faithand FairDealing 30 DEFENSE LJ. 411
(1981); Christina L. Kunz, Frontispieceon Good Faith:A FunctionalApproach Within The
UCC, 16 WM. MrrCHELL L. Rzv. 1105 (1990); Gerard Mantese, The UCC and Keeping the
(Good) Faith, MICH. BARJ., March 1991, at 270; Ralph A. Newman, The Renaissance Of
Good FaithIn Contractingin Anglo-American Law, 54 CoRNELL L. REv. 553 (1969); Rafael
M. Powell, Good Faith In Contracts, 9 CuURENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 16 (1956); BJ. Reiter,
Good Faith In Contracts, 17 VAL. U. L. REv. 705 (1983); Rochelle B. Spandorf, et al.,
Implications of the Covenant of Good Faith: Its Extension to Franchising,5 FRANCHISE LJ. 3
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American contract law, Corbin and Williston, have also recognized
and discussed the duty of good faith and fair dealing. 6
The duty of good faith and fair dealing has become so widely
accepted that it has been recognized in areas where there has been a
traditional reluctance to apply the duty. For example, the concept has
been applied in employment-at-will contracts.5 7 Likewise, a duty of
(1985); General Contract Law, supra note 15; Robert S. Summers, The GeneralDuty Of
Good Faith-Its Recognition And Conceptualization, 67 CORNmL L. REV. 810 (1982);
Thigpen, Good Faith Performance Un4er Percentage Leases, supra note 23; Steven W.
Thomas, Utmost Good Faith In Reinsurance: A Tradition In Need of Adjustment, 41 DUKE
L.J. 1548 (1992); Daniel E. Toomey, et al., Good Faith and FairDealing: The Well-Nigh
IrrefragableNeed for a New Standard in Public Contract Law, 20 CONTRACT L.J. 87 (1990);
Glen E. Tremper, Commercial Bad Faith: Tort Recovery ForBreach Of Implied Covenant In
Ordinary Commercial Contracts, 48 MONT. L. REv. 349 (1987); Raymond Wallenstein,
Breach Of The Implied Covenant Of Good FaithAnd FairDealingIn Commercial Contracts: A
Wrong in Search Of A Remedy, 20 U. WEST L.A. L. REv. 113 (1989);Jeffrey Willis, The
Substantive Law Of Lender Liability, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 742 (1991). Numerous student
notes and comments concerning the duty of good faith and fair dealing have also
been published. See Theresa V. Agee, Note, Breach of an Insurer's Good FaithDuty to Its
Insured: Tort or Contract?, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 135 (1988); Kelly H. Anderson, Casenote, 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 173 (1992); MathewJ. Barrett, Note, "Contort": Tortious Breach of Applied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Non-insurance,
Commercial Contracts-Its Existence and Desirability,60 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 510 (1985);
Michael H. Cohen, Note, ReconstructingBreach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and
FairDealing as a Tort, 73 CAL. L. REv. 1291 (1985); James H. Cook, Comment, Seaman's Direct Buying Service, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co.: Tortious Breach of the Covenant of
Good Faith and FairDealingin a Non-insurance Commercial Contract Case, 71 IOWA L. REv.
893 (1986); David M. Erickson, Case Note, 26 DRAKE L. REv. 883 (1976-77); Patricia A.
Milon, Recent Developments, Implied Covenants of Good Faith and FairDealing: Loose
Cannons of Liability for FinancialInstitutions, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1197 (1987); Harold D.
Jones, Case Note, 21 TEx. TECH. L. Rv. 801 (1990); Rayne Rasty, Note, Extending Good
Faith and FairDealing To Employment Contracts: A Proposal, 22 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 211
(1991); Cary Smith, Note, Breach of Good Faith as an Expansive Basis for Lender Liability
Claims: An Idea Whose Time Has Come - And Gone, 42 RUTGERS L. REv. 177 (1989);
Carolyn S. Smith, Note, 42 OKLA. L. REv. 607 (1989).
56 CORBIN supra note 34, § 654A; 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF
CONTRACTS, § 670, at 159 (3d ed. 1961); see also 17 AM. JuR. 2d Contracts§ 380 (2d ed.
1991).
57 Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 389-90 (Cal. 1988) (the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing is implied in all contracts, even employment-at-will contracts, but tort damages are not available for breach of the duty); Morriss v. Coleman
Co., 738 P.2d 841, 849 (Kan. 1987); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d
1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 552 (N.H.
1974). Other courts have rejected application of the duty of good faith to employment-at-will contracts believing that the duty is incompatible with such contracts. See
Spann v. Springfield Clinic, 577 N.E.2d 488, 492 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Moriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987); Suburban Hosp., Inc. v. Dwiggins, 596 A.2d
1069, 1076-77 (Md. 1991); D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206, 211-12 (Nev. 1991);
Pyle v. Ledex, Inc., 551 N.E.2d 205, 212 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Avey v. Hillcrest Medical Ctr., 815 P.2d 1215, 1217 (Okla. Ct. App. 1991); Casas v. Wornick Co., 818 S.W.2d
466, 468-69 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Hatfield v. Rochelle Coal Co., 813 P.2d 1308, 1309
(Wyo. 1991). Only one of the aforementioned courts has rejected the duty of good
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good faith and fair dealing to consummate a transaction has been applied to precontractual negotiations when there has been a letter of
intent or other agreement to negotiate.5" Finally, the duty of good
faith and fair dealing has been implied in public contracts, despite the
strong governmental interest in protecting its representatives, which
leads courts to almost always presume "good faith" conduct on their
behalf.5 9
D.

The Uniform Commercial Code and the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts

The duty of good faith and fair dealing as applied to the enforcement and performance of contracts in the UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts demonstrates that good faith and
fair dealing is a workable legal concept that should not cause uncertainty when applied to contract negotiations. Although the
UCC and the Restatement (Second) of Contracts imply a duty of
good faith and fair dealing only in contract performance, one cannot infer from this that there is no precontractual duty of good
faith in all employment contracts. Hatfil4 813 P.2d at 1309. Two other cases recognized the duty in general employment contracts. Julian v. Christopher, 575 A.2d 735,
739 (Md. 1990); D'Angelo, 819 P.2d at 211-12.
58 See infra notes 584-85 and accompanying text.
59 Courts have long held that whenever the government was a party to a contract,
its performance under the contract was presumed to be in good faith. E.g., Squirrel
Creek Assocs. v. United States, 11 Cl. Ct. 212, 218 (1986); Kalver Corp. v. United
States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1976); Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630,
631 (Ct. CI. 1954); Struck Constr. Co. v. United States, 96 Ct. Cl. 186 (1942). Accordingly, it has been quite difficult to demonstrate that the government has not satisfied
the presumption of good faith and fair dealing. E.g., Kalver Corp., 543 F.2d at 1302
(an incorrect reading of a contract by government officials is not tantamount to bad
faith); Struck Const. Co., 96 CL Cl. 186 (bad faith only found after determining that the
government's conduct was "designedly oppressive"). Although some recent cases
continue this trend, e.g., Embrey v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 617, 626 (1989) (the
court held that the "plaintiff must present specific evidence of intent to retaliate
against or injure plaintiff to support an allegation of bad faith"), other recent decisions have shown that the courts are beginning to follow more modem rules of good
faith and fair dealing, Malone v. United States, 849 F.2d 1441, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
(principles of RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d applied to government contract); Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1988)
("the need for mutual fair dealing is no less required in contracts to which the government is a party, than in any other commercial arrangement"); Industrial Constructors Corp. & Firemen's Fund Ins. Co. v. United States, Nos. 472-85C and 140-86C, slip
op. at 48 (Cl. Ct. Jan. 1990) ("[T] he duty of fair dealing should be applied at least as
strictly to government employees and agencies as it is applied to private parties."). At
least one relatively early decision of the United States Court of Claims also supports
this later view. Commerce Int'l Co. v. United States, 338 F.2d 81, 85 (CL Cl. 1964)
(the government has the same obligation as all other contracting parties "to carry out
its bargain reasonably and in good faith"). See generally Toomey, supra note 55, at 87.
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faith and fair dealing. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
and, to a lesser extent, the UCC, contemplated the potential application of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to contract negotiations and did not intend, by negative inference, to foreclose such
application. In any event, the general recognition in the UCC and
the Second Restatement that parties must perform their contracts
in good faith evidences the continuing evolution of business ethics
towards recognizing that standards of good faith and fair dealing
should measure all dealings, even those between businessmen, and
even those of a precontractual nature.
1.

The UCC

The UCC, which every state has adopted,6 has confirmed the
viability of the doctrine of good faith performance. Specifically,
UCC section 1-203 provides that: "Every contract or duty within
this Act imposes a duty of good faith in its performance or enforcement."6 1 At least one court, however, has held that there is a duty
of good faith during negotiations.6 2 The UCC refers to good faith
60 The following states adopted the UCC on the date indicated: Alabama 1966,
Alaska 1963, Arizona 1967, Arkansas 1961, California 1965, Colorado 1966, Connecticut 1961, Delaware 1967, Florida 1967, Georgia 1964, Hawaii 1967, Idaho 1967, Illinois 1962, Indiana 1964, Iowa 1966, Kansas 1965, Kentucky 1960, Louisiana (although
Louisiana has not adopted the UCC as such, articles 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 have been
adopted in substance as Tide 10 Commercial Laws of the Louisiana Revised Statutes,
Chapters 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 effective January 1, 1975; article 9 was adopted by Act No.
528 of 1988 effective July 1, 1989, with the effective date extended to January 1, 1990
by Act No. 12 of the 1989 extraordinary session), Maine 1964, Maryland 1964, Massachusetts 1958, Michigan 1964, Minnesota 1966, Mississippi 1968, Missouri 1965, Montana 1965, Nebraska 1965, Nevada 1967, New Hampshire 1961, NewJersey 1963, New
Mexico 1962, New York 1964, North Carolina 1967, North Dakota 1966, Ohio 1962,
Oklahoma 1963, Oregon 1963, Pennsylvania 1954-1960, Rhode Island 1962, South
Carolina 1968, South Dakota 1967, Tennessee 1964, Texas 1966, Utah 1965, Vermont
1966, Virginia 1966, Washington 1967, West Virginia 1964, Wisconsin 1965, and Wyoming 1962. See Uniform Commercial Code Reporting Service (Clark Boardman Callaghan 1991).
61 The definition of "good faith" in UCC section 1-203 explicitly refers only to
performance or enforcement of contracts. See Rigby Corp. v. Boatmen's Bank & Trust
Co., 713 S.W.2d 517, 525 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
62 Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, No. 0053810, 1991 WL 204359 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Oct. 1, 1991). The court reasoned that because section 1-201(19) of the
UCC defined good faith in terms of conduct or transaction, the duty of good faith is
required in precontractual dealings, notwithstanding the language in code section 1203. A similar result was reached in a case involving the negotiations for the sale of a
used car. Underwood v. Monte Asti Buick, Co., 20 UCC Rep. Serv. 657, 661 (Pa. Coin.
P1. 1976). A car dealer sold, as new, a car that had been seriously damaged and repaired. The court rescinded the contract of sale, ruling that: "The purchase of motor
vehicles by naive and nonmechanic oriented consumers is, of necessity, based upon
the reliance of the buyer on the good faith of the dealer or seller." Id. In addition the
court explained that "[tihe duty placed on the seller was not limited to stated repre-
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in at least 54 of its 400 sections, and it is specifically referred to in
each of its nine substantive articles. 63
The UCC does not have a general requirement of objective
good faith for all dealings.6 4 Under the UCC, merchants are held
sentations but may also include concealment or nondisclosure of a material fact relating to the vehicle, particularly where the buyer is not competent or able to determine
the defect from inspection." Id. at 661. The court did not define more generally,
however, what would constitute a material fact. Major damage, amounting to 25% of
the value of the car, was a material fact. While it cannot be inferred from this decision that a more knowledgeable buyer would be protected by this extended duty of
good faith, especially in light of the court's emphasis on plaintiff's inexperience and
lack of competence, it is still noteworthy that the concept of good faith and fair dealing has been held applicable to precontractual negotiations.
63 The following sections from the UCC refer to "good faith": (1) three sections
from article 1 on general provisions (1-201(19), 1-203, 1-208); (2) 14 sections from
article 2 on sales (2-103(1)(b), 2-305(2), 2-306(1), 2-311(1), 2-323(2)(b), 2-328(4), 2402(2), 2-403(1), 2-506(2), 2-603(3), 2-615(a), 2-706(1), 2-706(5), 2-712(1)); (3) 11
sections from article 3 on commercial paper (3-302(1)(b), 3-404(1), 3-406, 3-410(3),
3-417(1), 3-417(2), 3-417(4), 3-418, 3-419(3), 3-506(1), 3-802(2)); (4) five sections
from article 4 on bank deposits and collections (4-103(1), 4-207(1), 4-401(2), 4406(1), 4-503(b)); (5) two sections from article 5 on letters on credit (5-109(1) and 5114(2)(b)); (6) one section from article 6 on bulk transfers (6-110(2)); (7) ten sections from article 7 on warehouse receipts, bills of lading, and other documents of
title (7-203, 7-209(3) (a), 7-210(5), 7-301 (1), 7-308(4), 7-404, 7-501 (4), 7-504(2)(c), 7508, 7-601(2)); (8) five sections from article 8 on investment securities (8-302(1), 8306(3), 8-311(a), 8-318, 8-406(1)(b)); and (9) three sections from article 9 on secured transactions, sales of accounts, and chattel paper (9-206(1), 9-208(2), 9504(4)).
64 The 1949 draft of the UCC, however, imposed an objective obligation of good
faith applicable to all contracts and dealings within the Code: "'Unless otherwise
agreed, in this Act... 'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned. Good faith includes good faith toward all prior parties and observance by a person of the reasonable commercial standards of any business or trade in
which he is engaged.'" General ContractLaw, supra note 15, at 207 (quoting UCC § 1201(18) (May 1949 Draft)). In 1950, the committee on the Proposed Commercial
Code of the section on Corporation, Banking and Business Law of the American Bar
Association recommended that the general definition of good faith should be restricted to the subjective duty of honesty in fact. Id. at 208-09 (quoting Malcolm, The
ProposedCommercial Code, 6 Bus. LAw. 113, 128 (1951)). The committee reasoned that
the average businessman or lawyer would define good faith as honesty in fact rather
than commercial reasonableness. The drafters of the Code followed the committee's
recommendations, removing the latter portion of the draft provision in 1952, and
leaving the present definition of good faith set forth in section 1-201(19): "'Good
faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned." UCC § 1201(19) (1989). As noted above, this subjective obligation of good faith was made
applicable to contracts and duties within the UCC by section 1-203. Although some
sections of the UCC make an objective obligation of good faith applicable in certain
situations, the general requirement remains that the parties behave honestly in fact.
Many courts have considered the UCC definition of good faith as "honesty in
fact." The consensus is that the mental state of the party who allegedly performed the
action in bad faith determines "honesty in fact." Regardless of the negligence or imprudence of the action, if the action was performed honestly, it was in good faith. See,
e.g., Frantz v. First Nat'l Bank, 584 P.2d 1125, 1127 (Alaska 1978); Watseka First Nat'l
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Bank v. Ruda, 552 N.E.2d 775, 781 (Il. 1990); Breslin v. NewJersey Investors, Inc., 70
N.J. 466, 471-72, 361 A.2d 1, 3-4 (1976); Lawton v. Walker, 343 S.E.2d 335 337-38 (Va.
1986); see also Farmers Coop. Elevator, Inc. v. State Bank, 236 N.W.2d 674, 678 (Iowa
1975) (citing numerous other authorities). In most jurisdictions, the duty of subjective good faith applies to all contractual dealings within the UCC. Although there
have been attempts to apply commercial reasonableness to all UCC cases, the subjective formulation of good faith remains dominant. For example, a bona fide purchase
of goods requires subjective good faith. So long as the purchaser honestly believes
what he is buying is legitimately owned by the seller, his purchase is not in bad faith.
See Balon v. Cadillac Auto. Co., 303 A.2d 194, 196 (N.H. 1973); Tumber v. Automation
Design and Mfg. Corp., 130 N.J. Super. 5, 12, 324 A.2d 602, 606 (Law Div. 1974).
Similarly, the duty of subjective good faith applies to bona fide purchases of securities
and other instruments under section 8-302(1). See, e.g., Eldon's Super Fresh Stores,
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 207 N.W.2d 282, 287 (Minn.
1973); Lawton, 343 S.E.2d at 337. Banks must fulfill the subjective obligation in the
course of their operations as well. See, e.g., Frantz, 584 P.2d at 1127 (observing that a
bank, in immediately crediting a check that later was revealed to be bad, did not have
to adhere to a standard of commercial reasonableness, and that only subjective honesty was required); Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 N.E.2d at 779, 781-82 (ruling that a
loan acceleration must be done as a result of the creditor's honest belief that he is in
financial trouble, but noting that § 1-205 [course of dealing and usage of trade] added
an objective dimension to the analysis); Sievert v. First Nat'l Bank, 358 N.W.2d 409,
414 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (refusing to classify a bank as a merchant, the court declined to impose a standard of commercial reasonableness upon a bank negotiating a
loan refinancing, and held that the applicable standard was subjective good faith);
J.R. Hale Contracting Co., Inc. v. United New Mexico Bank, 799 P.2d 581, 591 (N.M.
1990) (declaring that a loan acceleration must be done with a good faith belief in its
necessity, and was also subject to a reasonableness inquiry). Secured transactions
under section 9-307 of the Code also require adherence to honesty in fact. See, e.g.,
Foy v. First Nat'l Bank, 693 F. Supp. 747, 758 (N.D. Ind. 1988); Frank Davis Buick
AMC-Jeep, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 423 So. 2d 855, 858 (Ala. 1982); Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Holland, 434 N.E.2d 295, 298 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982). In his 1963 article on
the subject of good faith performance, Professor E. Allan Farnsworth criticized the
drafters of the UCC, claiming that the drafters' failure to make the objective formulation of good faith generally applicable "so enfeebled [it] that it could scarcely qualify
at this point as an 'overriding' or 'super-eminent' principle." Good Faith Performance,
supra note 21, at 674. Some courts have recognized the potential for harm that can
result from conduct that would not violate subjective good faith but would be considered commercially unreasonable. In one case, a court found that there was a general
duty of objective good faith applicable to all transactions under the Code, section 1201(19) notwithstanding. In re Martin Specialty Vehicles, Inc., 87 B.R. 752 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1988) (citing Fortune v. National Cash Register, 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass.
1977)) (ruling that Massachusetts courts would find a generally applicable duty of
objective good faith even under UCC § 1-203), rev'd on other grounds, 97 B.IL 721 (D.
Mass. 1989). Another court has recognized that other provisions of the Code, such as
section 1-205, can add elements of objectivity to the test through a course of dealings
analysis. First Nat'l Bank v. Lewco Sec. Corp., 860 F.2d 1407, 1415-16 (7th Cir. 1988)
(ruling that the notice standard for bona fide purchase of securities under §§ 1-205
and 8-302 required a commercially reasonable inquiry into the legitimacy of the securities). Yet another court has turned to the jury trial process to provide objectivity,
relying on the jury's determination of party credibility to test the subjective honesty of
parties, thus preventing "arbitrary or capricious" acceleration of loan payments. Watseka First Nat'l Bank, 552 N.E.2d at 781. One court has also held that "objective evidence" may be used to prove that the subjective standard has not been met. Bank One
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to the duty of objective good faith as well as the duty of subjective
good faith.6 5 The motivation behind requiring merchants to adhere to a higher standard of good faith is that they have expertise
66
with respect to the customs and standards of their trade.
The objective standard of good faith has been applied in many
contexts. For example, it has been used to police "requirements
contracts" so that speculation, hoarding and attempted avoidance
of contractual obligations are discouraged. 6 7 Where merchants are
attempting to prove their status as bona fide purchasers or holders
in due course, the objective standard has also been used rather
than the subjective standard, which is used for less expert purchasers. 8 The commercial reasonableness requirement has been apv. Grantham, Inc., Nos. 90-G-1555, 90-C,1556, 1991 WL 206733, at *7 (Ohio App.
Sept. 30, 1991), vacated and remanded &y, 588 N.E.2d 127 (Ohio 1992).
65 See, e.g., Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 977
(5th Cir. 1976); Swift v.J.I. Case Co., 226 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972);
Oloffson v. Commer, 296 N.E.2d 871, 875 (Ill. App. Ct. 1973); Courtesy Enter. v.
Richards Lab., 457 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983); Kiser v. Lemco Indus., Inc.,
536 S.W.2d 585, 589 (Tex. App. 1976). Missouri appears to be an exception, finding a
breach of good faith only upon a showing of at least constructive fraud or design to
mislead. Bunge Corp. v. Recker, 519 F.2d 449, 452 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying Missouri
Law).
In addition to honesty in fact, merchants are required to observe "reasonable
commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade." UCC § 2-103(1) (1989). This
additional duty applies to all sales transactions (transactions covered by Article 2 of
the UCC), whether or not the actual UCC provision in question contains an explicit
good faith requirement. E.g., Courts Enter., 457 N.E.2d at 576-77 (citing the objective
good faith standard as the impetus behind requiring a reasonable time for notice of
breach of a warranty, even though the actual provision concerning such notice, UCC
Section 2-607, did not explicitly mention good faith); EasternAir Lines, 532 F.2d at 997
("[T]he buyer's good faith is the governing criterion under § 2-607."); Oloffson, 296
N.E.2d at 875 (noting that the definition of the words "commercially reasonable time"
in UCC § 2-160 must be read in relation to the objective good faith requirement of
§ 2-103). What constitutes adherence to reasonable commercial standards necessarily
varies with the facts of the situation and the area of commerce concerned. Courtesy
Enter., 457 N.E.2d at 577; Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 978 ("Therefore, the fact that
dissatisfaction may once have been communicated to the seller should not preclude
an inquiry into the buyer's good faith as evidenced by his entire course of conduct.").
66 For the definition of a merchant, see supra note 17. Courts that have considered the issue of whether a party was a merchant have pointed to experience and
expertise with respect to the good or dealing in question as the most important factors for determining merchant status. E.g., Agristor Leasing v. Hansen, 41 UCC 1660,
1633-34 (D. Minn. 1985); Eichenberger v. Wilhelm, 244 N.W.2d 691,697 (N.D. 1976);
Pecker Iron Works, Inc. v. Sturdy Concrete Co., 410 N.Y.S.2d 251, 253-54 (N.Y. 1978);
Valley Iron and Steel Co. v. Thorin, 562 P.2d 1212, 1215 (Or. 1977) (In Banc).
67 E.g., Homestake Mining Co. v. Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 476 F. Supp.
1162 (N.D. Cal. 1979); Neumiller Farms, Inc. v. Cornett, 368 So. 2d 272, 275 (Ala.
1979); Eastern Air Lines, 532 F.2d at 976.
68 E.g., Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Ct. App. 1972); Brokke v.
Williams, 766 P.2d 1311-12 (Mont. 1989); Touch of Class Leasing v. Mercedes-Benz
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plied by analogy to franchising as well.69
2. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts also applies the duty
of good faith and fair dealing to the performance and enforcement of all contracts. Although that duty was expressly applied
only in contract performance or enforcement, application of the
duty to measure disclosure requirements prior to the consummation of the contract has not been foreclosed.
The American Law Institute acknowledged that all contracts
incorporate a duty of good faith and fair dealing when the Institute
decided to adopt section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts. 7° The First Restatement of Contracts did not, however, contain such a section. The duty of good faith and fair dealing was
first embodied in Tentative Draft no. 5, section 231 (Draft section
231) of the Second Restatement of Contracts. The language of
Draft section 231 was identical with that adopted in 1979 as Restatement section 205. 7 '
The official version of the Restatement made relatively minor
modifications in this language to emphasize the fact that negotiations in bad faith were not within the contemplated scope of section 205. Comment c to section 205 provides: "This Section, like
Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203, does not deal with good faith
in the formation of a contract. Bad faith in negotiation, although
not within the scope of this Section, may be subject to sanctions."72
Credit of Canada, Inc., 248 N.J. Super. 426, 443, 591 A.2d 661, 669-70 (App. Div.
1991).
69 Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370, 1375 (Mass. 1980).
70 See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 205 ("Every contract imposes upon
each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance and its enforcement."). Id. Other sections of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts also refer to
.good faith" and "fair dealing." For example, Section 241(e) provides that "the extent to which the behavior of [a] party failing to perform... comports with standards
of good faith and fair dealing" is a significant factor in determining whether that
party's breach is material. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrv.Acrs § 241(e) (1979).
71 The only relevant change in language between Draft Section 231 and Section
205 is found in the official comments appended to those sections. Comment c, Good
Faith in Negotiation of Draft § 231, reads:
This Section, like Uniform Commercial Code § 1-203, does not deal
with good faith in the formation of a contract, but bad faith in negotiation is also subject to sanctions. Particular forms of bad faith bargaining
are the subjects of rules as to capacity to contract, mutual assent and
consideration and of rules as to invalidating causes such as fraud or
duress.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 231 (Tentative Draft No. 5 (1966)).
72 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF Co-RiACrs § 205 cmt. c (1979).
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The comment to section 205 further states that where a statute
does not impose a duty to bargain in good faith, "remedies for bad
faith in the absence of agreement are found in the law of torts or
7
restitution." 1
Section 205 was included in the Second Restatement under
the topic entitled, Considerationsof Fairness and the Public Interest.
The official Restatement, however, does not include a rationale for
section 205 or a reason why section 205 was limited to contract
performance and enforcement. It is possible that section 205 does
not deal with the application of the duty of good faith and fair
dealing to the negotiation of a contract because this was seen as an
area of tort, not contract law. 74 The drafters of the Second Restatement may also have been reluctant to delve into the area of negotiations because of a perception that a precontractual duty of good
faith was not yet well-recognized.
The Reporter's note to section 205 references two law review
articles, one by Professor Farnsworth, 75 and the other by Professor
Summers, 7 6 which explore the meaning and historical application
of "good faith" in contract law. 77 The reference to Professor Summers's article, in particular, is interesting because Summers argued
that the duty of good faith and fair dealing applied to precontractual negotiations. 78
The thesis of the Farnsworth article was that an objective standard, as reflected in the UCC's reference to commercial reasonableness, should be adopted to evaluate good faith.79 Professor
Farnsworth concluded that, "the lesson is there, and the [UCC's]
concepts of good faith performance and commercial reasonable73 Id.
74 The language in comment c to section 205 supports
75 Good Faith Performance, supra note 21.
76 General Contract Law, supra note 15.
77 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF COrNTRACTS § 205 (1979)

this interpretation.

(Reporter's note).
78 General Contract Law, supra note 15, at 220-32.
79 Good Faith Performanca supra note 21, at 671-74. According to Professor Farnsworth, the UCC used the term "good faith" in two senses. In the first sense, "a party is
advantaged only if he acted with innocent ignorance or lack of suspicion. This meaning of "good faith" is very close to that of lack of notice." Id. at 668. In the second
sense, the UCC used the term:
[T]o describe performance or enforcement rather than purchase. In
this sense, 'good faith' has nothing to do with a state of mind-with
innocence, suspicion, or notice. Here the inquiry goes to decency, fairness or reasonableness in performance or enforcement. This sense of
the term may be characterized as 'good faith performance' . . . and is
the sense in which 'good faith' is used in the general obligation of good
faith.
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ness await development, even beyond the bounds of the [UCC], at
the hands of resourceful lawyers and creative judges."a8 Perhaps in
response to this call, section 205, as adopted, refers to UCC §§ 1201 (19) and 2-103(1) (b) as examples of the meaning of good faith
comprehended by the section.8 1
The second article referred to in the Restatement, written by
Professor Summers, recognized a common law meaning of good
faith that pre-dated and had a scope beyond that found in the
UCC.8 2 Summers maintained that good faith, as revealed in common law jurisprudence of contract, applied a "minimal standard
rather than a high ideal.""5 His thesis was that court decisions that
apply general contract law reveal the term "good faith" as "a phrase
which has no general meaning or meanings of its own, but which
serves to exclude many heterogeneous forms of bad faith," and
that "the duties judges have imposed in the name of contractual
good faith are more varied and numerous [than the scope of UCC
application] ."4
Professor Summers argued that, although the drafters of the
UCC thought of good faith "as a positive concept, with a general,
definable meaning of its own," it was not beneficial to attempt to
articulate a single "good faith" concept in the common law of contract.8 5 Viewed as an "excluder," the article argued that courts imposed a good faith requirement in a broad range of contexts.8 6
The Summers article cited pre-Restatement cases that either
80 Id. at 679.
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs
82 General Contract Law, supra note 15, at
83 Id. at 195.
84 Id. at 196, 197.
85 Id. at 207. Professor Summers further

§ 205 cmt. a (1979).
196.

noted:
To summarize, general definitions of good faith either spiral into the
Charybdis of vacuous generality or collide the Scylla of restrictive specificity. Moreover, the analyst who puts general definitions aside and tries
to focus on the form of bad faith which the given judge intends to exclude by use of the term is likely to get closer to that judge's meaning,
for good faith functions as an 'excluder,' and judges are more interested in what they are proscribing than in characterizing what is generally allowed.
Id. at 206.07.
86 Professor Summers explained that:
Cases have been discovered which, if taken as a whole rather than by
states, require good faith at every stage of the contractual process, from
preliminary negotiation through performance and discharge, and in
nearly all kinds of contracts. This is not to say that all cases agree as to
when a duty of good faith should be imposed, for they do not. Nor, is it
to say that the jurisdictions are more or less uniform in the extent to
which they require good faith. On some questions . . . for example,
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directly or indirectly support the imposition of some type of good
faith standard in negotiations that relate to: negotiating without
serious intent, abusing the privilege to withdraw a proposal or an
offer, entering a deal and not intending to perform or recklessly
disregarding prospective inability to perform, and taking advantage of another in driving a bargain. The article also included a
seller's nondisclosure of known infirmities in goods as an area
where a good faith standard 87
has application, but cited no cases that
impose such a requirement.
By its nature, this older, common law view of good faith as an
"excluder" should be understood primarily as a functional tool for
judges. Therefore, its application is not rigid, but rather, incorporates the idea of evolution that is at work in the common law as a
whole. As such, even if section 205, as originally drafted, was not
intended to apply to contract negotiations, the common law process envisioned in the common law definition of good faith, which
section 205 embraced, does not prohibit the good faith concept
from application during contract negotiations. As already noted,
Professor Summers argued that courts could extend the doctrine
for application to contract negotiations. 88 Unfortunately, some
courts relying upon section 205, comment c, have specifically refused to apply the duty of good faith and fair dealing to precontractual negotiations.89 This conclusion, however, overreads the
comment. Although comment c states that section 205 does not
apply to the negotiation phase, neither that comment nor the text
of section 205 precludes application of a precontractual duty of
good faith. Moreover, section 161 (b) of the Second Restatement
specifically provides for good faith disclosures in the making of a
whether contract negotiations must be conducted in good faith-case
law is scant.
Id. at 216.
87 Id. at 228-30.
88 Id. at 203, 220-21, 228-30.
89 E.g., Local 900, Union of Paperworkers Int'l v. Boise Cascade, 713 F. Supp. 26,
29 (D. Me. 1989); Carrols Corp. v. Canton Joint Venture, No. 88-2115-1, 1990 WL
99047, at *7 (Ohio Comm. P1. June 27, 1990) (rejecting argument that there is an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing in precontractual negotiations by noting,
in part, that Section 205 of the RES-rATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAc'S limited application of the doctrine of the duty of good faith and fair dealing to contract performance
and enforcement); Four Mines Gold, Inc. v. 71 Const., Inc., 809 P.2d 236, 239 (Wyo.
1991) (citing REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. c (1979)) (concluding that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing "does not deal with the
formation of a contract"); Tolbert v. First Nat'l Bank, 823 P.2d 965, 969 (Or. 1991)
(relying in part on comment c to the RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 205,
the court declared that the duty of good faith and fair dealing did not "extend to the
formation of the contract") (footnote omitted).
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contract under certain circumstances. 90
E.

Statutory Good Faith Requirements

The increasing usage of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
is also evidenced by the imposition of the duty through legislation
such as the Federal Automobile Dealers Franchise Act, better
known as the Automobile Dealers' Day in Court Act (ADDA).9 1
Under the ADDA, a dealer may bring suit against a manufacturer if
the manufacturer failed "to act in good faith in performing or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the franchise, or in
terminating, canceling, or not renewing the franchise .... "92 The
90 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161(b) (1979). See infra Section IV. E.
2 for a discussion of the good faith concepts adopted by both The Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Restatement (Second) of Torts.
91 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-1225 (1982). Another example of a statutory requirement of
good faith is found in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d)
(1988) providing that:
[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of
the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment.. . but such obligation does
not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of
a concession.
Despite the language of the statute, no per se test of good faith bargaining exists.
United Packinghouse, Food & Allied Workers' Int'l Union v. N.L.R.B., 416 F.2d 1126,
1131 (1969) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969). The bargaining,
nevertheless, presupposes that the parties attempt to enter into a collective bargaining agreement. N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 484-86
(1960). Tension still exists between the principles that the parties must attempt to
solve their differences and that the parties need not make concessions. There are
many examples of bad faith. An employer is guilty of bad faith bargaining when it
insists on terms which no reasonable union could accept. Tomco Communications,
Inc., 220 N.L.R.B. 636, 637-38 (1975). Taking a position in an effort to destroy or
cripple the union also constitutes bad faith. United Steelworkers of America v.
N.L.R.B., 390 F.2d 846, 849-50 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 904 (1968). Moreover, the
parties must make a serious attempt to reach agreement, not merely go through the
formalities. Continental Ins, Co. v. N.L.R.B., 495 F.2d 44, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1974). The
union, in addition to having a duty to bargain fairly with the employer, also has a duty
of fair representation to its employees. A union breaches this duty of fair representation if its actions are arbitrary, discriminatory, or otherwise in bad faith. Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 190-91 (1967).
92 15 U.S.C. § 1222. The ADDA defined good faith as:
[Tihe duty of each party to any franchise, and all officers, employees, or
agents thereof to act in a fair and equitable manner toward each other
so as to guarantee the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation,
or threats of coercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided,
That recommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or
argument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.
15 U.S.C. § 1221(e). The definition is more limited than the general good faith standard. Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 1978),
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legislative history of the ADDA indicates that Congress was
prompted to enact the law, at least in part, by the failure of courts
to impose a duty of good faith on automobile manufacturers. 93
Some states also regulate the franchise relationship through restrictions upon the franchisor and a requirement that the parties
act in good faith.94
F.

The Nature of the Duty of Good Faith
For the last few decades, courts in the United States have been
wrestling with the nature of the duty of good faith. Some courts
have argued that the duty is simply contractual in nature and arises
only with a contract, while others have posited that the duty is imposed by law. Accordingly, the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing has become the object of a tug-of-war between those who
cert. denied, 436 U.S. 946 (1978); Frank Meador Buick, Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp. (In re Frank Meador Buick, Inc.), 13 B.R. 841, 844 (W.D. Va. 1981). Actual or threatened intimidation determines the presence or absence of good faith.
Francis Chevrolet Co. v. General Motors Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (E.D. Mo.
1978), af'd, 602 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1979). Thus, "an indispensable element of a cause
of action under the Act is a lack of good faith in which coercion, intimidation, or
threats thereof exist .... " Conroy Datson Ltd. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 506 F. Supp.
1051, 1055 (N.D. 111. 1980).
93 See H.R. No. 2850, 84th Cong. 2d Sess. 4599 (1956). Some courts have found
that every franchise contract contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. E.g., Photovest Corp. v. Fotomat Corp., 606 F.2d 704, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 917 (1980). One court, however, has held that the obligation of good
faith and fair dealing does not extend to precontractual negotiations involving a
franchise agreement. Bonfield v. AAMCO Transmission, Inc., 717 F. Supp. 589, 59394 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
94 62B AM. JuR. 2d PrivateFranchiseContracts § 292 (1990). The state of Washington enacted the most comprehensive type of franchise statute. It provides that the
franchisor and franchisee "shall deal with each other in good faith." WASH. REV.
CODE § 19.100.180(1) (1991). The statute also sets forth a list of unfair or deceptive
trade practices, all of which protect the franchisee. Id. § 19.100.180(2) (a-j). Among
other things, Washington's franchise statute protects the franchisee's right to join an
association of franchisees, safeguards the franchisee's ability to purchase goods from
suppliers other than the franchisor, protects the franchisee's business contacts and
governs the termination or renewal of the franchise. Washington's statute therefore
protects the franchisee once the business relationship is established.
Moreover, outside Washington, attempts have been made to pass legislation that
would expand the duty of good faith in franchises. The Unfair Franchise and Business Opportunities Act has been proposed, but the Act has encountered problems
because of its inclusion of a duty of good faith. 62B AM. Jui. 2d PrivateFranchise
Contracts§ 6 (1990). The North American Securities Administrators' Association has
proposed a Model Act that would impose a good faith standard on the general performance of the franchise agreement, but the duty of good faith apparently arises
only when the agreement is in place. Id. § 294. Legislatures have passed franchise
statutes because many of the established remedies, such as breach of contract and
fraud, which are adequate for normal business transactions, do not solve the problem
of franchise contracts. Id. § 292.
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seek its restriction to the realm of contract law, the breach of which
will require contract damages only, and those who envision the
duty as the source of a tort remedy, with consequential damages,
punitive damages and attorney's fees available. 95
The breach of the duty, in the insurance context or otherwise,
led, initially, to recovery of contract damages only, and was not
viewed as a source for an action in tort independent of the contract.9 6 Courts soon recognized the need to protect the rights of
an insured in the face of liability insurers who controlled the insured's defense, but refused to settle claims, thus exposing the insured to judgments in excess of the amount covered by the
insurer.9 7 The tort evolved slowly, however. In Brassil v. Maryland
Casualty Co., the New York Court of Appeals held that a good faith
duty existed in all insurance transactions.9"
A more significant move toward allowing recovery in tort for
breach of the implied covenant occurred in Hilker v. Western Automobile Insurance Co. 9 The court in Hilker did not explicitly recognize a tort, but found that a "good faith" duty attached to the
insurer when the insurer bargained for full control over the insured's defense. 10 0 The court allowed the insured to recover from
the insurer an amount in excess of the policy, where plaintiff obtained a judgment against the insured in excess of the insured's
policy and the insurer previously refused to settle plaintiff's claim
for an amount within the policy limit. The court utilized a negligence standard in determining that the insurer had breached the
covenant of good faith by failing to exercise "that degree of care
and diligence which a man of ordinary care and prudence would
exercise" in deciding whether to settle the claim. 10 1
The use of tort remedies for breach of the duty of good faith
in the United States is usually traced to Comunale v. Traders & General Insurance Co.10 2 In Comunale, plaintiff sued his insurance company for, among other things, refusing to accept a reasonable
95 Croskey, supra note 55, at 562-64.
96 Rumford Falls Paper Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 43 A. 503, 506-07 (Me. 1899).
97 Alan R. Miller & Jordan M. Lewis, The Impact Of The Good FaithRequirement Upon
The Parties, 26 TORT AND INS. LJ. 602, 603-05 (1991).
98 Brassil v. Maryland Cas. Co., 104 N.E. 622, 624 (N.Y. 1914). The court did not
recognize a tort, but allowed an insured to recover the cost of appealing a judgment
against him in excess of his policy, where the insurer had previously refused to settle
for an amount within the policy limit. Id.
99 235 N.W. 413 (Wis. 1930).
100 Id. at 414; see asoJones, supra note 55, at 804.
101 HiAer, 235 N.W. at 415.
102 328 P.2d 198 (1958).
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settlement offer. In holding the insurer liable for the subsequent
courtjudgment, including the amount in excess of the policy limit,
the California Supreme Court stated that "[t] here is an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the benefits
of the agreement."10 In Comunale, the California Supreme Court
explicitly held that a breach of the implied covenant of good faith
could sound in both tort and contract, at least with regard to an
insured's actions against his liability insurer.104
Comunale and its creation of a third-party tort claim-a claim
by the insured against his insurer for refusal to settle a claim by
another party against the insured-was relatively uncontroversial
until it was extended to first party claims-claims brought by the
insured against the insurer for refusal to pay the insured's claim.
In Gruaenberg v. Aetna Insurance Co., the California Supreme Court
expanded the coverage of this tort to include an insurer's wrongful
refusal to settle first party claims.' 5 The court explained that the
law implied an action in tort separate from the contract, and this
action existed independent of the contract: "[T] he insurer's duty is
unconditional and independent of the performance of plaintiffs
contractual obligations." 0 6 Most states trace creation of their firstId. at 200.
Id. at 202. Subsequently, the same court went even further, holding that an
insured could not only recover damages exceeding policy limits incurred in the form
of an excess judgment, but all damages due to emotional distress arising from injury
to property interests. Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173, 179 (Cal. 1967). Some
jurisdictions require substantial economic injury beyond the policy amount arising
from the insurer's refusal to settle or pay a claim in good faith before allowing collection of emotional distress or other extra-contractual damages. Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Wis. 1978). At least in California, proof of
substantial economic harm is not necessary, and the court will evaluate emotional
distress claims on a case-by-case basis. Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal.
Rptr. 843, 853-54 (Cal. CL App. 1979); Thomas A. Diamond, The Tort Of Bad Faith
Breach Of Contract: When, If At AA Should It Be Extended Beyond Insurance Transactions?,
64 MARQ. L. Rxv. 425, 426-27 & nn.5-7 (1981). Additionally, an insurer found to have
acted with malice or reckless disregard as to the validity of a claim in refusing to pay a
claim will be liable for punitive damages. Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d
452, 457 (Cal. 1979); Anderson, 271 N.W.2d at 376, 379. The implied covenant of
good faith, however, may be breached without proof of the positive malicious misconduct essential for recovering punitive damages. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d
980, 986 n.5 (Cal. 1978).
105 Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 510 P.2d 1032, 1037 (1973).
106 Id. at 1040 (footnote omitted). Similarly, the Egan court cited high public expectations, insurance companies superior bargaining power and the need for public
trust in private insurance companies performing an essentially public function as its
rationale for recognizing this tort. Miller & Lewis, supra note 97, at 606; Egan, 598
P.2d at 457. The need to discourage insurance companies from attempting to avoid
payment of claims through wrongful or threatened cancellation also contributed to
103
104
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party insurance tort to Gnsenberg °7 Some states, however, have rejected this tort claim.'
In 1984, the California Supreme Court
caused an uproar when it hinted in dicta that tort remedies may be
available for other commercial contracts. 109 The tentativeness of
the dicta divided the legal community. 10
Those advocating the use of tort remedies for contract
breaches marshalled two simplistic but forceful arguments. The
first argument cited the punitive aspects of the tort remedy as a
the willingness of California's courts to find a tort in the breach of an implied covenant. Spindle v. Travelers Ins. Cos., 136 Cal. Rptr. 404, 408 (Cal. CL App. 1977).
107 Carolyn S. Smith, Note, supra note 55, at 611. Support for recognition of "first
party" claims is more controversial. As of 1990, twenty-eight jurisdictions recognized
first party tort actions, twelve rejected it, seven generally rejected it but allowed some
recovery of extra-contractual damages and two have left the question unanswered.
Jones, supra note 55, at 809-10. Typically, a court evaluates the reasonableness of the
insurer's conduct under the circumstances in refusing to pay a claim to determine
whether a breach of the covenant occurred. Factors generally considered are:
whether the claim was adequately investigated, whether the policy was fairly interpreted and, whether the insurer's conduct was free of abusive or coercive actions.
108 For example, the Utah Supreme Court limited recovery in first party actions to
contract damages after determining that, "there is no sound theoretical difference
between a first-party insurance contract and any other contract ... that justifies permitting punitive damages for the breach of one and not the other." Beck v. Farmer's
Ins. Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). The court permitted extra-contractual
recovery, however, allowing for "general damages," defined as "those flowing naturally
from the breach [as well as] consequential damages, i.e., those reasonably within the
contemplation of, or reasonably foreseeable by the parties at the time the contract
was made." Id. at 801. Although the court found this approach analytically superior to
permitting recovery in tort, the court stated that emotional distress damages could be
recovered as "foreseeable," as well as any damages incurred through violation of the
"reasonable expectations" of the parties. Id. at 802. Some commentators have noted
that such a "reasonable expectations" standard "rejects traditional contract law standards." Miller & Lewis, supra note 97, at 605. The Utah Court's resort to "reasonable
expectations," therefore, is ironic given the court's desire to preserve the purity of
contract doctrine when interpreting insurance contracts.
109 In Seaman's Direct Buying Serv. Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., the court observed that
while an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing has been well settled, the
same cannot be said about a tort action for breach of the covenant. 686 P.2d 1158
(Cal. 1984). The court noted, however, that a tort action for a breach of the covenant
has been available in certain circumstances, such as an insurance contract, because an
insurance contract consists of a "'special relationship' between the insurer and insured, characterized by elements of public interest, adhesion, and fiduciary responsibility." Id. Other relationships, according to the court, may also qualify for similar
legal treatment. Id. at 1166 (footnote omitted).
110 One commentator noted:
A court that avoids ruling on the extension of the cause of action for
bad faith to commercial contract cases by recognizing a new cause of
action for 'stonewalling', citing an inapposite decision from an intermediate appellate court of a sister state, can only be described as out of
balance.
Wallenstein, supra note 55, at 121 n.50 (citation omitted).
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possible tool to deter wrongful conduct and enforce business ethics.' The second argument was rooted in contract compensation
theory. It contended that contract damages, while designed to
make the non-breaching party whole, seldom render adequate
compensation. 1 2 Many argue that tort damages are necessary to
solve this undercompensation problem."'
The critics of tort remedies for breach of commercial contracts also advanced their own forceful arguments. Commentators
pointed out that tort remedies are economically inefficient and
poorly designed to meet the acknowledged under-compensation
problem. 14 Most importantly, commentators noted that tort damages undermine the15system of "efficient breach" that forms the basis of contract law."

111 Barrett, supra note 55, at 523.

112 Tremper, supra note 55, at 366 & n.99. Damages for breach of contract are
ordinarily restricted to those that were foreseeable and contemplated by the parties at
the time of the contract's execution. Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
Some observers have advocated the use of tort law in cases of limitation of damages
available in breach of contract cases. One commentator pointed out that the expanded use of the covenants of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract
could provide a vehicle to impose tort duties. Tremper, supra note 55, at 350. Implied or imposed duties are outside those contained in the contract, and an array of
tort remedies, such as consequential damages, emotional distress, punitive damages
and attorneys fees, are available. Croskey, supra note 55, at 362-63.
113 Tremper, supra note 55, at 368.
"4 Id. at 369.
1"5 Id. at 370-71. Legal scholars who guided the initial development of contract law
believed that liability for breach of contract should not exceed the sum of the
promises given for consideration. Richard E. Speidel, The BorderlandOf Contract 10 N.
Ky. L. REv. 163, 166 (1983). This rule limited the remedial powers of the judicial
system to the four corners of the bargained-for agreement and provided a measure of
predictability that was essential to the "efficient breach" contract system. Id. at 172. At
the same time, most states created the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
to address unexpected contract problems. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d
373, 389 (Cal. 1988). Because the implied covenant served a gap filling function,
courts have treated the covenant as an adjunct obligation of the contract whose
breach is compensable by ordinary contract damages. Wallenstein, supra note 55, at
115 (footnote omitted).
Immediately following the Seaman court's dicta, there was a wave of sentiment
that tort remedies were soon to be available for breach of ordinary commercial contracts. Barrett, supranote 55, at 522. This sense of immediacy dissipated as few courts
moved to adopt Seaman's tort. Tremper, supra note 55, at 355 (footnote omitted). In
fact, the California Supreme Court intentionally impeded the trend towards contract
tort remedies in Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (1988). Foley involved
an effort to extend the Gruenberg insurance tort into the area of employment contracts. In addressing this attempt, the California Supreme Court declared that the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing originated with the aim of "making effective
the agreement's promises," not fulfilling social policy. Id. at 389. The court distinguished some appellate decisions for their "uncritical incorporation of the insurance
model into the employment context, without careful consideration of the fundamen-

19931

GOOD FAITH DISCLOSURES

Any attempt to characterize the duty of good faith as merely
contractual and thus to deny the existence of the duty when there
is no contract is unsustainable because the duty of good faith exists
before any contract is ever entered into. It is a duty imposed by
law, and is outside the contractual freedom of the parties. The
duty of good faith belongs to the prevailing practices of the community of people and their notions as to what constitutes the general welfare." 6 It is a duty permanently present whenever human
beings deal with each other. A breach of this duty is contrary to
public policy and contra bonos mores as these concepts are understood by the community. A man of probity and intelligence knows
that the practices and opinions of his fellow men, "practices and
opinions in the midst of which he was born and by which his own
mind and conscience have been formed and educated"" 7 would
not let breaches of good faith prevail.
Marcel Planiol, a most distinguished French scholar, thus described imposed duties in a celebrated comment to Epoux de
Mol.nes v. Patry.

[T]he contractual liability is added to the liability imposed by
law, which it can neither eliminate nor substitute, the reason
being that the law comes before any contract. The legal obligation pre-exists, and the contracting parties can only add to it;
tal policies underlying the development of tort and contract law." Id. at 393. The
court then remarked that:
[A] n allegation of breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing is an allegation of breach of an "ex contractu" obligation, namely
one arisingout of the contractitself The covenant of good faith is read into
contracts in order to protect the express covenants or promises of the
contract, not to protect some general public policy interest not directly
tied to the contract's purposes. The insurance cases thus were a major departurefrom traditionalprinciples of contract law.
Id. at 394 (emphasis added). This, in a nutshell, was a forceful rejection of the extension of tort remedies to employment contracts. Furthermore, the court clearly held
that the rightful place for the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, barring an
unusual exception, was within the realm of contract law. Foley thus indicated that, at
least in California, the trend towards the application of tort remedies to commercial
contracts has been reversed for now.
Farnsworth described the "rise and fall" of the tort remedy for bad faith breach as
perhaps "the most astonishing development" in the field of contract law in the 1980's.
E. Allan Farnsworth, Essay, Developments In Contract Law In The 1980's: The Tap Ten, 41
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 203, 204 (1990). While Farnsworth did not proclaim the death
of the bad faith tort, he noted that Foley would probably check its expansion in the
1990's. Id. at 206 (footnote omitted). Farnsworth did note, however, that "the specter of bad faith breach promises to haunt contract law until future cases determine its
fate." Id.
116 CoRmaN, supra note 27, at 1157.
117 Id. at 1158.
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but a pre-existing legal obligation cannot become a contractual
one just because private parties have
somehow reproduced it in,
l8
and committed to, their contract."
As a requirement based on public policy, the duty of good faith
establishes the standard of conduct which is exacted from everybody
in order to discourage dishonesty, and encourage loyalty, fairness and
openness, thus fostering trade and commerce, rewarding honesty and
candor and condemning deceit of whatever kind.11 9 Considerations
of meticulous characterization in contract or tort, and sharp systematical distinctions within the two orders of liability, are not important.
There may be good reasons in some cases not to allow tort remedies
for violation of the duty of good faith when a contract exists. This
Article does not address that topic. Nevertheless, what matters is that
some remedy is always available for a breach of the duty of good faith.
Thus, while the cases and legal commentators are not in agreement on whether breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
should be considered to lie in tort or contract, at least when a contract
is involved, the dispute does not affect the thesis of this Article that
there is a tort duty of good faith disclosure in the negotiations leading
up to the sale of a business or the consummation of other business
transactions. Because there is no contract during the negotiation
stage, there is no reason why tort remedies for breach of the duty of
good faith should not be available.
The recognition that there is a duty imposed by law, independent
of contract, to exercise good faith in transactions with others, supports
the conclusion that the duty applies to both the precontractual and
the contractual phase. 2 ° What differs between a breach of the duty
118 Cour d'Appel de Paris 17Jan. 1905, D.P. 1907 2 97: "la responsabiliticonventionelle
vient slajouter d la responsabilitiitablie par la loi et ne peut ni l'liminer,ni se substituer d ele,
par la raison que la loi est antrieure d tous les contrats. L'obligation lgale pr&xte, et les
parties contractantes peuvent seulement y ajouter quelque chose; mais une obligation lUgaleprexistante ne devient pas contractuelle par cela seul que des particuliers l'ont reproduite et verse, en
quelque sorte, dans leur contrat." Louis Josserand (writing, as did Planiol in the above
passage, in the context of cumu4 i.e., concurrence of claims) attacked Planiol's position because he thought that it represented too severe a threat on contractual freedom. In Josserand's own words, "endemic chaos is systematically introduced in the
contractual relations of private law in the name of public policy." ("Si bien qu'en definitive, c'est le rigime contractuel qui va s'effondrer, qui va fairefaillite,de parla volonti unilaterale de Vun de ceux qui l'avaient itabli et librement accepti. au nom de l'ordre public, c'est le
dsordred l'tat endnique qui est port systhnatiquement dans les rapports contractuelsdu droit
priv."). Note to Req. 14 Dec. 1926, D.P. 1927 1 105, at 107.
119 See e.g., Benatti, supra note 2, at 308-09 (discussing Italian law). See also infra
notes 588-611 and accompanying text (discussing the duty of good faith under Italian
law).
120 The traditional definition of a tort, sufficient to allow recovery of consequential
and punitive damages, is that a violation has occurred of a duty that arises independ-
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when there is a contract, and a breach in the precontractual stage, is
the remedy. In the contractual context, contract remedies are
awarded (although concurrent tort remedies should not be ruled
out), and in the precontractual context, tort remedies should be
awarded.
G.

The Application of Ethical Standards in the Marketplace

As Corbin has stated, "bargains are judged by the folkways and
mores of the time." 121 The days of laissez-faire economics and caveat emptor, for instance, in which courts often noted that the law
was not coextensive with ethics and morality, 1 22 but only proscribed
certain egregious behavior, have gone.
A number of trends are commonly referenced in order to substantiate this legal change in the ethics of the marketplace. The
doctrine of promissory estoppel, for example, advances moral and
ethical principals in the marketplace. 12 3 Promissory estoppel is the
basis for enforcement of a promise, even when it is not binding as a
contract under certain circumstances, "if injustice can be avoided
only by enforcement of the promise." 2 4 Another example is the
observation that courts have become increasingly receptive to characterize what had heretofore been considered conventional coment of contract. Palmer v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 945 F.2d 1371, 1375 (6th Cir.
1991); Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., 656 F. Supp. 49, 61 (S.D. Ohio
1986); Cotton v. Otis Elevator Co., 627 F. Supp. 519 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
121 CoRBIN, supranote 27, at 1157. Corbin went on to add: "The mores of a people,
those generally prevailing practices and opinions as to what promotes welfare and
survival, also slowly change with the time and circumstance .... Courts and administrative officers, as well as legislators, cannot fail to be affected by these changes in
times and opinions." Id. at 1162.
In tune with this observation, it is noteworthy to point out that the mores of
society, the prevailing practices and opinions, including commercial transactions, as
to what promotes human welfare and survival, are increasingly turning to moral and
ethical standards. See id. Similarly, for the law of Quebec, see, e.g., Brigitte Lefebvre, La
bonnefoi dans la formation du contrat 1992 McGiL. L.J. 1053, 1055 (1992) ("Depuis les
dernimres dcennies, le droit des obligations est en pleine ivolution, marquipar une nouvelle
philosophie basie sur la notion de justice contractuelle."). Lefebvre emphasizes the
supremacy of contractual justice over contractual freedom. See id. at 1068 ("On constate
donc que le idgislateurquebicois cherche d promouvoir la justice contractuelleau dtriment de la
liberti contractuelle.").
122 E.g., Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933) ("Law in its sanctions is
not as extensive with morality. It cannot undertake to put all parties to every contract
on an equality as to knowledge, experience, skill and shrewdness.").
123 G. Richard Shell, Substituting Ethical Standards For Common Law Rules In Commercial Cases:An Emerging Statutoiy Trend, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 1198, 1206 (1988); Daniel A.
Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppe" ContractLaw and the "Invisible
Handshake", 52 U. CI. L. Rxv. 903, 906 (1985).
124 REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CowrAcrs § 90 (1979).
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mercial relationships as fiduciary or confidential in nature, so that
the parties involved in such relationships
have heightened ethical
1 25
and moral duties to each other.

The UCC's and the Second Restatement's use of unconsciona1 26
bility also reflects the increasing morality of the marketplace.
Section 2-302 of the UCC, which deals with the "Unconscionable
Contract or Clause," reflects the "UCC's sensitivity to the ethical
dimension in business dealings."127 The duty of good faith as

adopted by the UCC, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, and
by the common law, also injects ethical norms into business relationships. 128 Likewise, the recognition of a tort for breach of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, which is now
widely accepted in the area of insurance law,' and perhaps other
areas of the law, 130 as well as the allowance of punitive damages
125 Shell, supra note 123, at 1207-08.
126 Id. at 1208-09.
127 Id. at 1208. Section 208 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts has also
adopted the doctrine of unconscionability. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 208 (1979). While principles of unconscionability are most often applied to consumer contracts, commentators have noted a recent trend towards applying the rule
in cases between businesses. Shell, supranote 123, at 1209 & n.60. See David Frisch, et
al., Uniform Commercial Code Annual Survey: GeneralPrmisions,Sales, Bulk Transfers, and
Documents of Title, 42 Bus. LAw. 1213, 1225-28 (1987); Steven Goldberg, Unconscionability In A Commercial Setting: The Assessment Of Risk In A Contract To Building Nuclear
Reactors, 58 WAsH. L. REv. 343, 346-47 (1983); Ellen R- Jordan, Unconscionabilityat The
Gas Station, 62 MiNN. L. REv. 813, 815-17 (1978);Jane P. Mallor, Unconscionability In
Contracts Between Merchants, 40 Sw. L.J. 1065, 1074-84 (1986).
128 Shell, supra note 123, at 1209. The duty reflects the incorporation of an ethics
standard more common to tort actions than contract law. Speidel, supra note 114, at
181.
129 For example, an insurer found to have acted with malice or reckless disregard as
to the validity of a claim in refusing to pay a claim will be liable for punitive damages.
Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 452, 457 (Cal. 1979); Anderson v. Continental Ins. Co., 271 N.W.2d 367, 374 (Wisc. 1978). The implied covenant of good
faith, however, may be breached without proof of the positive malicious misconduct
essential for recovering punitive damages. Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980,
986 n.5 (Cal. 1978). Support for recognition of tort claims brought by an insured
against his insurer for not paying the insured's claim is more controversial. See supra
notes 107-08. Typically, a breach of the covenant is determined by evaluating the reasonableness of the insurer's conduct under the circumstances in refusing to pay a
claim.
See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (discussing the court's decision in
Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co.).
130 Recognition of a tort for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
was also temporarily extended by two states to the area of lender liability. See, e.g.,
Commercial Cotton Co. v. United California Bank, 209 Cal. Rptr. 551, 554 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1985) (finding that the relationship of bank to depositor is quasi-fiduciary, thus
giving rise to tort liability); First Nat'l Bank in Libby v. Twombly, 689 P.2d 1226, 1230
(Mont. 1984) ("[W] hen the duty to exercise good faith is imposed by law rather than
the contract itself, . . . the breach of that duty is tortious."). Most commentators
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and supercompensatory remedies for egregious conduct and "bad
of the infusion of moral
faith" breaches of contract, are 13indicative
1
marketplace.
the
into
standards
H.

Rise and Decline of Caveat Emptor

The conviction by some that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing does not apply to negotiations, including disclosures made
during contract formation, has marred the development of this
duty. The dichotomy may be explained as the result of the common law emphasis on freedom of contract, i.e., the right to choose
with whom one might wish to deal and to choose the terms of the
deal, coupled with the general position that no wrong can be committed by inaction. The caveat emptor doctrine embodies the foregoing principles.
Caveat emptor means "let the buyer beware" and requires a
purchaser to examine and judge for himself.1 3 2 The history of the
body of legal, economic, religious and social principles encapsulated in the Latin phrase caveat emptor defies any straightforward
agree, however, that California and Montana have since moved away from their position on tort liability. See EDWARD F. MANNINO, LENDER LA.BILrIY BANKING AND LrITGATION, § 5.03[4], at 5-29 and 5-31 (1992). Recently, the Nevada Supreme Court
recognized the covenant of good faith and fair dealing in general employment contracts (other than at-will) and ruled that the tort of bad faith was committed "when an
employer, acting in bad faith, discharges an employee who has established contractual rights of continued employment and who has developed a relationship of trust,
reliance and dependency with the employer." D'Angelo v. Gardner, 819 P.2d 206,
211 (Nev. 1991). The California Supreme Court in 1980 hinted in dicta that breaching the implied covenant of good faith in employment contracts might sound in tort
as well as contract. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12 (Cal.
1980). The court, however, subsequently noted the risk involved in intruding into the
expectations of parties to commercial contracts by allowing the tort remedy. See supra
note 115 (discussing the implications of extending tort law causes of action). Most
jurisdictions, however, do not recognize a breach of the implied covenant of good
faith as a tort outside the insurance context. Jones, supra note 55, at 809. The Ohio
Supreme Court, when explaining why the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing
as an independent tort has been generally restricted to the insurance area, noted that
holding an insurer to the duty of good faith was reasonable because of the relative
bargaining strength of the insurer, and the insured's vulnerability to oppressive insurer tactics. Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1319 (Ohio 1983). The
Utah Supreme Court also declined to recognize a good faith tort in the first party
insurance context, in part, because it believed doing so would require the court to
make the doctrine available to litigants in any contract dispute. Beck v. Farmer's Ins.
Exch., 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah 1985). Even in California, extension of the doctrine
has been limited and controversial; courts have rejected its application to a variety of
circumstances in the past five years. Croskey, supra note 55, at 568.
151 Shell, supra note 123, at 1209-12.
132 See supra note 8 for the definition of caveat emptor.
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and simple explanation.' Widely presumed to be an ancient principle because of its Latin embodiment, caveat emptor actually
emerged in 16th century England." Prior to that time, extremely
limited opportunities for trade resulted in a seller's general unwillingness to offend customers who were inextricably linked with him
in the social hierarchy.' 3 5 The customer was entitled to great deference. Religious teachings held that "[i]n ecclesiastical polity
there was no place for the notion that the seller was not responsible for the goodness of his wares" 136 because "the possessors of the
keys to heaven might force men to conform to their admission requirements." 3 7 In addition to the direct and no-nonsense lessons
on the dangers of avarice found in sermons and confessionals,
Church manuals of the Middle Ages provided strict guidelines for
conduct that included requirements for warranties of qualmarket
3
ity.'

8

On the secular front, complex regulations were initially en-

acted to control trade behavior at the traveling fairs. 3 9 More
133 Walton H. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 113536 (1931). Hamilton noted:
The refusal of public authority, through legislature and judiciary,
to accord effective protection to the purchaser, has been crystallized
into the compact expression caveat emptor. Although the words are supposed to constitute a principle of the law of sales, the rules which govern the vending of goods are far too detailed and specific to be set down
so succinctly. They change in meaning with the course of events, and
different judges may read words narrowly or broadly to secure variable
results. Moreover, caveat emptor has been a matter ofjudicial opinion, a
value if you will, a principle if you must, which directs even the rules of
laws to its own ends. Its power of compulsion resides in the individualistic common-sense to which it belongs, and the expression of this common-sense has been limited to no legal domain.
Id.
134 The term caveat emptor seems to have first appeared in print in 1534, when it
was used in the context of horse trading. Charles T. LeViness, Caveat Emptor Versus
Caveat Venditor, 7 MD. L. Rzv. 177, 182 (1943) ("Wrote Fitzherbert in his boke of
Husbandrie: 'Ifhe be tame and have ben rydden upon, then caveat emptor.'").
'35 Id. at 178. In feudal times, where society was rigidly controlled and authority
was split between church and lords, freedom of trade was practically non-existent. In
the Middle Ages, however, just as today, the phrase "the customer is always right"
described the deferential treatment given to the buyer. Id. See Donald P. Rothschild,
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Does It Balance Warrantorand Consumer Interests?, 44
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 335, 337 (1976) (noting that merchants, who had direct contact
with their neighbors in the marketplace, would generally attempt to safeguard a quality product).
136 Hamilton, supra note 133, at 1141.
137 Id. at 1139.
138 Rothschild, supra note 135, at 337.
139 The regulations on fairs included those requiring that "[gloods were to be sold
only in shops which had frontage. No merchandise could be sold which was not publicly exhibited to all." LeViness, supra note 134, at 179.
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regulations were later created when traveling fairs yielded to rapidly developing market towns and centers.14 0 All of these regulations strove to protect both parties from deceptions of any sort.
Eventually, however, the combination of increased geographic
mobility, changing economic and social demographics, the rise of
trade and the weakened grip of the Church on society contributed
with other factors to the advent of caveat emptor. The longstanding principles and practices of the Middle Ages gave way to the
"buyer beware" philosophy for several reasons. First, caveat emptor
developed
because of the failure of the administrative and court machinery
to keep the fraud and abuses of the manufacturers and sellers at
a minimum. Thus, the purchaser, of necessity had to protect
given by
himself against them and notice of that necessity was
4
the pervasiveness of the doctrine of caveat emptor.1 1
Second, the creation of established marketplaces, in turn, created a
powerful merchant class that used its growing power selfishly to discourage regulations favoring consumers.14 2 Third, the rise of the ideal
of individualism in the 18th century also facilitated the rise of caveat
emptor. During this age of laissez-faire, people adopted caveat emptor
not merely as a maxim of trade, but also as a basis for political theory
4
and personal behavior.' Caveat emptor with its appeal to self-reliance proved immensely
attractive to the rugged individualism of 19th Century Americans.
LeVinesse explains:
The growth of the railroad, the Westward Ho' movement, and
the emergence of our infant industrial system influenced the
courts to extol individualism in business, as in private life....
Caveat emptor not only was a sound legal precept, it was the patri140 With London as the chief market center by the fifteenth century, detailed regulations arose for market towns, most notably of which was the doctrine of the "market
overt." A sale in the open market, as opposed to purchases made in private homes or
back alleys, carried a warranty of title. Id.
141 ALPHONSE M. SQUILLANTE &JOHN R. FONSECA, 2 WILLISTON ON SALES § 15-12, at
364 (4th ed. 1974).
142 Rothschild, supra note 135, at 338 (footnote omitted).
143 LeViness, supra note 134, at 183. LeViness also states:
With the advent of the Eighteenth Century the spirit of individualism
was intense and there was a growing trend to laissez-faire. The great
Blackstone, whose writings so influenced the circuit riders in young
America, provided an out for the merchant "against defects that are
plainly and obviously the object of one's senses," and attributed liability
to the seller only for a "defect that cannot be discovered by sight and is
a matter of skill or collateral proof."
Id. (quoting WmiLx. BLAcKsroNE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAwS OF ENGLAND 165-66
(American ed. 1772)).
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otic thing. How could a man shift for himself on 144
the frontier
unless he could survive in the marts of commerce?
Consequently, the doctrine quickly entrenched itself in American
jurisprudence.1 45
By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, social and
legal reform movements had targeted all sorts of laissez-fairepolicies in
an effort to replace society's "law of the jungle" approach with a more
ordered and cooperative approach. Typical of these reform efforts
was the movement advocating clean advertising and honest labeling. 14 Other significant legislative actions since the turn of the century which were directed toward, or resulted in, limiting the
frequently harsh results of caveat emptor include the Uniform Sales
Act,1 47 the Uniform Commercial Code,14 the Securities Act of
1933,141 the Truth in Lending Act, 150 the Equal Credit Opportunity
Id. at 184.
Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 383, 388 (1871), is frequently cited as
indicative ofjudicial attitudes of the period. In Barnard,the United States Supreme
Court, noting the nearly universal acceptance of caveat emptor, held that given the
doctrine's widespread acceptance, "such a rule, requiring the purchaser to take care
of his own interests, has been found best adapted to the wants of trade in the business
transactions of life." See also Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817)
(finding that a purchaser of goods is not required to disclose to the seller facts about
the sale affecting the price of the goods, particularly when the information is accessible to both parties). English courts also followed the doctrine of caveat emptor.
Smith v. Hughes, L.R. 6 Q. B. 597, 607 (1871) (pointing out that "there is no legal
obligation on the vendor to inform the purchaser that he is under a mistake, not
induced by the act of the vendor").
146 This movement resulted in the passage of false advertising statutes in 42 states
and in the creation of the Federal Trade Commission at the federal level. The newlycreated Commission directed its authority toward stopping unfair advertising claims
of, inter alia, "patent medicines," alcoholic products and weight loss pills. The
Supreme Court, however, reigned in the reformist fervor of the Commission in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643 (1931), where the Court limited the
Commission to its original purpose of "enforcing the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act
and breaking up unfair trade practices which amount to a destruction of competition." LeViness, supra note 134, at 194.
147 UNIF. SALEs AcT, 3A U.L.A. 452 (1906). The Uniform Sales Act was the first
attempt at standardizing state practices regarding the sale of consumer goods.
148 The Uniform Commercial Code greatly formalized the public policy doctrines
and warranties concerning the sale of chattels.
149 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). The Securities Act of 1933 was the first important
Federal legislation to control the issuance of, and transactions in, securities. The Act
protects the investing public by requiring the issuer of securities to make certain disclosures through the filing of a registration statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The registration statement is available to the public and
contains information about the security, the issuer and the underwriter. The Act also
requires that purchasers be provided with a prospectus containing essential information from the registration statement.
150 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1067(c) (1988). The Truth in Lending Act (TILA) is Subchapter I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. It is aimed at increasing disclosure
144
145
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Act, 15 1 the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act,' 52 the Interstate
Land Sales Full Disclosures Act,' the Truth in Negotiations Act,' 54
and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (the Magnuson-Moss Act)."
Nonetheless, caveat
emptor remains viable in a number of areas. Not surprisingly, the
doctrine has fallen from favor with greater frequency in those areas in
which lay persons are involved-whether it be buying consumer goods
or buying a home. Caveat emptor's only legal stronghold remains
those areas in which professionals are involved in reaching commercial agreements.
Between the combined effects of the Uniform Commercial Code
and the Magnuson-Moss Act, the role of caveat emptor in personal
of credit costs to borrowers. The TILA, however, is not the primary source of disclosure requirements. Rather, the TILA provides for regulations to be promulgated by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve. Id. § 1604. The Board has issued
Regulation Z, Truth in Lending, which governs disclosure requirements in credit
transactions. 12 C.F.R. § 226.1 (1992). Regulation Z is aimed at providing the consumer sufficient information to enable him to make fully informed credit decisions.
151 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691(a)-(f) (1988 & Supp. III 1992). The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) is Subchapter TV of the Consumer Credit Protection Act. The ECOA
mandates that an applicant for credit is entitled to disclosures explaining the reasons
why credit has been denied or revoked.
152 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1982 & Supp. IV 1992). The Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (RESPA) mandates the use of a standard form for the statement of
settlement costs in federally related mortgage loans. Id. § 2603. RESPA also requires
the Secretary of H.U.D. to prepare and distribute booklets that explain the nature
and costs of real estate settlements. Id. § 2604. The purpose of RESPA is to ensure
that consumers "are provided with greater and more timely information on the nature and costs of the settlement process and are protected from unnecessarily high
settlement charges." Id. § 2601.
153 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1988). The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act
requires, among other things, a statement of record describing those with interests in
the land, all conditions and plans with respect to the land, and the types of sales and
transactions contemplated. Id. § 1705(1)-(12).
154 10 U.S.C. § 2306a (1988). The Truth in Negotiations Act, originally enacted in
1962, provides that prime contractors and subcontractors involved in certain government contracts must disclose to the government accurate, complete, and current, cost
and pricing data. Contractors are required to deliver the relevant information to the
government and make the significance of the information to the negotiation process
known. E.g., Singer Co. v. United States, 576 F.2d 905, 914 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
155 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1988). In 1976, Congress passed the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, which prescribed the first
comprehensive federal standards for consumer product warranties. The act attempts
to balance free market dealing with consumer protection by providing a definition of
"full" warranties, but does not require that warranties be offered. A business may
claim "full" warranties only if minimum standards are met; other types of warranties
must be termed "Limited." Importantly, this legislation was heralded as the end of
caveat emptor in consumer warranty transactions. See Christopher Smith, The
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act: Turning the Tables on Caveat Emptor, 13 CAL. W. L. REv.

391, 391-92 (1977).
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property transactions has been virtually eliminated.' 5 6 The introduction of strict liability for injuries arising from defective products has
also all but eliminated caveat emptor in this field. The doctrine is still
applied, albeit unevenly, in product liability cases involving used products. 1 57 Some states such as California 5 " and Oregon' 59 have not yet
resolved the question, while others such as New Jersey 6 ° have held
that the doctrine may apply to product liability of used products.
Real property law, on the other hand, has traditionally not extended many protections to the buyer. 16 1 Even today, the protections
are not as great as those afforded personal property. 162 Numerous
156 See BARKLEY CLARY, WARRANHEs IN THE SALE OF GOODS (1980); Smith, supra
note 155, at 391-92; Barkley Clark & Michael Davis, Beefing Up Product Warranties: A
New Dimension in Consumer Protection, 23 KAN. L. REv. 567 (1975); Andrew M. Baker et
al., Special Project, Article Two Warranties In Commercial Transactions, 64 Coi.NELu L.
REv. 30 (1978).
157 SeeJames S. Kats, Comment, Used Products and Strict Liability: Where Public Safety
and CaveatEmptor Intersec4 19 CAL. W. L. REV. 330, 330-31 (1983) (footnotes omitted).
158 See LaRosa v. Superior Ct., 176 Cal. Rptr. 224, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981); TauberArons Auctioneers Co., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 161 Cal. Rptr. 789, 798-99 (Cal. Ct. App.
1980); Green v. City of Los Angeles, 115 Cal. Rptr. 685, 697 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974).
159 See Tillman v. Vance Equip. Co., 596 P.2d 1299, 1303-04 (Or. 1979).
160 See Ortiz v. Farrell Co., 171 N.J. Super. 109, 115, 407 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Law Div.
1979); Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 285, 336 A.2d 62, 67 (Law
Div. 1975).
161 Caveat emptor was once the universal rule in the sale of real estate. A seller did
not have a duty to disclose latent defects in the property that were unknown to the
buyer. An example of the doctrine's application was shown in Swinton v. Whitinsville
Say. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942). In Swinton, a buyer unknowingly purchased a
termite infested house and sought thereafter to rescind the contract based upon the
seller's fraudulent concealment of the defect. The court, however, rejected the
buyer's claim and entered judgment for the seller. In reaching this decision, the
court stated:
The law has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon the
frailties of human nature a standard so idealistic as this [a duty by a
seller of real estate to disclose any nonapparent defect in the subject of
the sale which materially reduces its value and which the buyer fails to
discover] .... The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been
stated and followed by this court ....
Id. at 808-09 (citations omitted).
162 Caveat emptor generally does not require disclosures from sellers during negotiations for the sale of real property unless there is a special circumstance such as a
partial disclosure amounting to a misrepresentation, a volunteering of information, a
specific inquiry, a failure to correct a previously made assertion now known to be
incorrect, or a special relationship of confidence and trust between the parties. These
exceptions to the rule have themselves, by virtue of their universal appeal, served as
an artificial barrier to the recognition of obligations that precede as well as accompany contract performance. See, e.g., Wedig v. Brinster, 469 A.2d 783, 788 (Conn. App.
Ct. 1983) (volunteered information); Lock v. Schreppler, 426 A.2d 856, 862 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1981) (volunteered information); Indiana Bank & Trust Co. v. Perry, 467
N.E.2d 428, 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (volunteered information); Fageas v. Sherrill,
147 A.2d 223, 226 (Md. 1958) (special relationship); Swinton, 42 N.E.2d 808, 808
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jurisdictions have, however, retreated from strict principles of caveat
emptor in real estate transactions.' 63 Most states have recognized an
implied warranty of habitability between the buyer and the seller in
the sale of new homes.' 6 4 While these warranties do not represent
(Mass. 1942) (special relationship); Ware v. Scott, 257 S.E.2d 855, 858 (Va. 1979)
(prior representation); Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc., 288 N.W.2d 95, 107 (Wis.
1980) (buyer relied on knowledge of vendor). See generally Powell, supra note 15. As
one commentator has noted:
The law offers greater protection to the purchaser of a seventy-nine cent
dog leash than to the purchaser of a $40,000 home. If the dog leash is
defective the purchaser can easily obtain a refund or a new leash, or
even sue to recover damages if the defective leash resulted in the loss of
his pet. The purchaser of the home, on the other hand, is often without
recourse when the spring rains filter through his basement walls.
Frederick C. Wamhoff, Note, Property-CaveatEmptor-Duty to Disclose Limited to Commercial Vendors, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 547, 548 (1981).
163 Courts have developed several approaches to ameliorate caveat emptor's harshness in the real estate context. The first inroad on the rule of caveat emptor has been
to impose an implied warranty of habitability from a home builder to the purchaser of
that home. A second retreat from caveat emptor is found in the seller's tort duty to
disclose known defects to potential buyers of real property. Omar S. Parker, Jr., Caveat Emptor Is FurtherEroded By Health, Environmental Worries, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1988,
at 26. In addition, some courts have expressed a willingness to grant relief not only
where there is evidence of fraudulent misrepresentation during negotiations, but also
where the nondisclosure resulted from innocent misrepresentation. Shore Builders v.
Dogwood, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1004, 1012 (D. Del. 1985); Asleson v. West Branch Land
Co., 311 N.W.2d 533, 543-44 (N.D. 1981). See Frona M. Powell, Relieffor Innocent Misrepresentation:A Retreat From the TraditionalDoctrine of Caveat Emptor, 19 REAL EsT. L.J.
130, 130 (1990) (noting that the unwillingness of many courts to allow rescission for
an "innocent misrepresentation," even when a "relatively sophisticated purchaser"
fails to find the defects, signals a shift away from the doctrine of caveat emptor and
the recognition of a new business ethics in the sale of real property). Also, real estate
brokers are increasingly being denied the protection of caveat emptor when brokers
make misrepresentations about the property. Clarance E. Hagglund & Britton D.
Weimer, Caveat Realtor: The Broker's Liabilityfor Negligent and Innocent Misrepresentations,
20 REAL Esr. L.J. 149, 149 (1991) (observing that while the doctrine of caveat emptor
often protects a broker from liability to buyers, courts have recently imposed liability
on a broker for "negligent misrepresentations" and also have employed a strict scrutiny standard to evaluate a broker's "innocent misrepresentations" to a buyer).
164 Alaska Pacific Assurance Co. v. Collins, 794 P.2d 936, 177 (Alaska 1990); Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 430 (Ariz. 1984); Coney v. Stewart, 562
S.W.2d 619, 620 (Ark. 1978); Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Dev. Co., 525 P.2d 88, 91 (Cal.
1974) (in bank); Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399, 408 (Colo. 1964); Vernali v.
Centrella; 266 A.2d 200, 201-02 (Conn. 1970); Smith v. Berwin Builders Inc., 287 A.2d
693, 695 (Del. Super. Ct. 1972); Gable v. Silver, 264 So. 2d 418, 419 (Fla. 1972);
Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 710-11 (Idaho 1966); Petersen v. Hubschman
Constr. Co., Inc., 389 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (Ill. 1979); Theis v. Heuer, 280 N.E.2d 300,
306 (Ind. 1972); Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 496 (Iowa 1985); Crawley v. Terhune, 437 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Ky. 1969); Degeneres v. Burgess, 486 So. 2d 769, 773 (La.
Ct. App. 1986); Banville v. Huckino, 407 A.2d 294, 297 (Me. 1979); Krol v. York Terrace Bldg., Inc., 370 A.2d 589, 595-96 (Md. Ct. Spec. 1977); Weeks v. Slavick Builders,
Inc., 180 N.W.2d 503, 506-07 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970); Tereault v. Palmer, 413 N.W.2d
283, 285 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); Brown v. Elton Chalk, Inc., 358 So. 2d 721, 722 (Miss.
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complete protection of the modem home buyer, they do represent an
erosion of caveat emptor in this area. 165 Nevertheless, caveat emptor
1978); Smith v. Old Warson Dev. Co., 479 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Mo. 1972) (en banc);
Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028, 1032 (Mont. 1972); Norton v. Burleaud, 342 A.2d
629, 630 (N.H. 1975); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 NJ. 70, 93, 207 A.2d 314, 326
(1965); DeRoche v. Dame, 430 N.Y.S.2d 390, 392, appeal dismissed, 413 N.E.2d 366
(N.Y. 1980); Hartley v. Ballou, 209 S.E.2d 776, 782 (N.C. 1974); Dobler v. Malloy, 214
N.W.2d 510, 516 (N.D. 1973);Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Constr. Co., 576 P.2d 761,
764 (Okla. 1978); Yepsen v. Burgess, 525 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Or. 1974) (in bank);
Elderkin v. Gaster, 288 A.2d 771, 177 (Pa. 1972); Padula v. JJ. Deb-Cin Homes, Inc.,
298 A.2d 529, 532 (RI. 1973); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 175 S.E.2d 792, 795 (S.C.
1970); Waggoner v. Midwestern Dev., Inc., 154 N.W.2d 803, 807 (S.D. 1967); Dixon v.
Mountain City Constr. Co., 632 S.W.2d 538, 542 (Tenn. 1982); Humber v. Morton,
426 S.W.2d 554, 555 (Tex. 1968); Rothberg v. Olenik, 262 A.2d 461, 467 (Vt. 1970);
House v Thorton, 457 P.2d 199, 204 (Wash. 1969); Gamble v. Main, 300 S.E.2d 110,
115 (W. Va. 1983); Maltberg v. Nu Way Builders, Inc., No. 84-921 (Wis. CL App. Mar.
26, 1985); Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1276-77 (Wyo. 1975). See generally
Caryn M. Chittenden, Comment, From Caveat Emptor to ConsumerEquity-The Implied
Warranty of Quality Under The Uniform Common Interest OwnershipAct, 27 WAKE Foar L.
REv. 571, 579-80 (1992) (noting the rise in implied warranties of habitability in new
homes).
165 See William D. Grand, Implied and Statutoy Warrantiesin the Sale of Real Estate: The
Demise of Caveat Emptor, 15 REL Esr. L.J. 44, 55 (1986) (noting that courts have retreated from the doctrine of caveat emptor to recognize a cause of action for "breach
of an implied warranty to build and construct in a reasonably good and workmanlike
manner"). This action, according to Grand, applies to the sale of common and residential real property. Id. Some states have explicitly rejected caveat emptor as inappropriate for modem house buying practices. See Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554,
562 (Tex. 1968) ("The caveat emptor rule as applied to new houses is an anachronism
patently out of harmony with modem home buying practices."). In Johnson v. Davis,
the Florida Supreme Court rejected the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of
homes. Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985). Relying on case law from
other jurisdictions, the court found that a seller had a duty to disclose facts that materially affect property value for both new and used real property. Id. (citations omitted). According to one commentator, the Davis court had taken "a minority position,
but [it] appears to be a growing minority." Ray Reynold, Caveat EmptorDeadfor Fborida
House Saes, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1985, at 3. Many states rejecting the doctrine's application to the sale of residential property have chosen to impose a duty to disclose on
the seller of the property where the seller knows of latent material defects affecting
the value of the property of which the buyer is not aware or which could not be
discovered through reasonable diligence. Hill v.Jones, 725 P.2d 1115, 1118 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 1986); Karoutas v. Homefed Bank, 283 Cal. Rptr. 809, 811 (1991); Lingsch v.
Savage, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 210 (1963); Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366, 368 (Colo. 1960)
Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141, 143 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976), affd 235 S.E.2d 532 (Ga.
1977); Posner v. Davis, 395 N.E.2d 133, 137-38 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Loghry v. Capel,
132 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Iowa 1965);Jenkins v. McCormick, 339 P.2d 8, 11 (Kan. 1959);
Nei v. Burley, 446 N.E.2d 674, 676-77 (Mass. 1983); Williams v. Benson, 141 N.W.2d
650, 655 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966); Flakus v. Schug, 329 N.W.2d 859, 863 (Neb. 1983),
overruled on other grounds,Nielsen v. Adams, 388 N.W.2d 840, 846 (Neb. 1986); Oates v.
Jag, Inc. 333 S.E.2d 222, 226 (N.C. 1985); Brooks v. Ervin Const. Co., 116 S.E.2d 454,
457 (N.C. 1960); Holcombe v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 511-12 (N.D. 1985); Miles v.
McSwegin, 388 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Ohio 1979); von Brauchitsch v. Cravens, 604 P.2d
379, 380-81 (Okla. Ct. App. 1979); Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 124-25 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1982); Cushman v. Kirby, 536 A.2d 550, 552 (Vt. 1987); Obde v.
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is still applied in home sales in Maine,' 6 6 New York, 6 7 Ohio' 68 and
to apply the doctrine to used,
Virginia.' 6 9 Some states have continued
70
as opposed to new, home sales.'
Despite advances away from caveat emptor in the residential
property context, fewer jurisdictions have conferred the same protecSchlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 674-75 (Wash. 1960); Thacker v. Tyree, 297 S.E.2d 885, 888
(W.Va. 1982). Contra Ray v. Montgomery, 399 So. 2d 230, 232-33 (Ala. 1980); Reed v.
King, 193 Cal. Rptr. 130, 132 (1983); Cohen v. Blessing, 192 S.E.2d 204, 206 (S.C.
1972); May v. Hopkinson, 347 S.E.2d 508, 513 (S.C. CL App. 1986). Termite infestation, structural defects, roach infestation and soil defects are among the material facts
that courts have deemed to affect property values. Hill 725 P.2d at 1119; Jenkins, 339
P.2d at 10-11; Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 455-56, 317 A.2d 68, 74-75 (1974).
Other courts have gone so far as to require disclosure of all material defects that make
the land less valuable or desirable. Puget Sound Serv. v. Dalarna Management Corp.,
752 P.2d 1353, 1355-56 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988); Easton v. Strassburger, 199 Cal. Rptr.
383, 387-88 (Cal. CL App. 1984); Reed, 193 Cal. Rptr. at 132. Some courts have recognized that the duty to disclose material facts about the real estate arises because good
faith and fair dealing demand it. E.g., Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla.
1985) (stating that "It] he law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion
that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it."); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698, 706 (Idaho 1966) (quotation
omitted).
166 Stevens v. Bouchard, 532 A.2d 1028, 1030 (Me. 1987) (determining that caveat
emptor applies to home sales in the absence of a fiduciary relationship of trust between the parties).
167 Stainbovsky v. Ackley, 572 N.Y.S.2d 672, 677 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); Baker v.
Runza, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) reported in, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 15, 1990, at 17. The Bakercourt
explained:
A seller of real property is under no duty to disclose facts pertaining to
the conditions of the premises when the parties deal at arm's length
.... It is the buyer's obligation to satisfy himself as to the quality of his
bargain pursuant to the doctrine caveat emptor. This doctrine still applies in New York State to real estate transactions.
Id.
168 Layman v. Binns, 519 N.E.2d 642, 645 (Ohio 1988). Absent vendor fraud, caveat emptor precludes a buyer's recovery for structural problems in a house where
"the condition complained of is open to observation" and where this buyer "had the
full and unimpeded opportunity to examine the premises." Recently, however, the
continued application of caveat emptor to transfers of used residences has been
largely abandoned in Ohio, by statute. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 5302.30 (Anderson
1992). This law, effective July 1, 1993, requires the seller of residential real property
to fill out a disclosure form setting forth material matters related to the condition of
the residence, and to provide this form to the transferee. Id.
169 Starks v. Albemarle County, 716 F. Supp. 934, 937 (W.D. Va. 1989) (where seller
of home merely failed to disclose flood-prone nature of property and did not defraud
purchaser or divert him from investigation, the court adopted caveat emptor as the
controlling rule); Kuczmanski v. Gill, 302 S.E.2d 48, 51 (Va. 1983) (stating that in the
absence of active fraud or misrepresentation, caveat emptor will apply).
170 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Lisenby, 579 So. 2d 1291, 1294 (Ala. 1991). Williamson v. Realty Champion, 551 So. 2d 1000, 1002 (Ala. 1989); Dee v. Peters, 591
N.E.2d 115, 116 (Ill. App. CL 1992) (fiduciary requirement was required between
sellers before duty to disclose arose, so seller of used house was not obligated to disclose defects.).
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tions on buyers of commercial property. 7 1 But even in the area of
commercial property sales there has been a trend away from caveat
emptor1 72 For example, in Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, the purchaser of
duplexes sought compensation for structural defects in the property. 1 73 The court concluded that the seller, who had soil defects on
the land where the duplexes stood, had a duty to disclose that the
buildings were constructed on fill dirt. 74 Likewise, in Green Spring
Farmsv. Spring Green Farm Associates Ltd. Partnerships,the court rejected
strict application of caveat emptor and found that the seller of a dairy
farm had a duty to disclose to potential purchasers all material facts
171 A stark example of this disparate treatment is found in Florida. In Johnson v.
Davis, the Florida Supreme Court dispensed with caveat emptor in the sale of homes.
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985). In 1991, however, a Florida court of
appeals unambiguously stated that:
Nowhere does the Johnson] court conclude that the duty of disclosure is
present in the sale of commercial property ....
Nowhere does Johnson
address or change the long line of case law establishing caveat emptor as
the rule in the sale of commercial property. Johnson simply does not
impose a duty of disclosure in a commercial setting.
Futura Realty v. Lone Star Bldg. Ctrs. (Eastern), Inc., 578 So. 2d 363, 364-65 (Fla. Dist.
CL App. 1991). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Alabama, in DeAravjo v. Walker, 589
So. 2d 1292, 1293 (Ala. 1991), held that caveat emptor applied to the sale of unimproved land.
In Gill v. Marquoit, the purchaser sought to recover the purchase price of land
because the seller failed to disclose that the land was susceptible to flooding. Gill v.
Marquoit, 525 P.2d 1030, 1031 (Or. 1974). The court concluded that the sellers were
under no duty to disclose the defect because the purchasers were expected to learn of
the defect on their own. Id. at 1032. According to Gi/. the vendor has a duty to
disclose that the land for sale is not suitable for the purchaser's intended use if(i) the seller knows or has reason to know that the purchaser is buying
the land for a specific use and that such use is not feasible because of
the character of the land; (ii) the seller knows or has reason to know
that the purchaser does not know of the character of the land rendering
it unsuitable; and (iii) the purchaser does not have equal opportunities
for obtaining information which he may be expected to utilize.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
Some courts also place a greater burden on commercial purchasers in inspecting
the property, which, in effect, diminishes the duty to disclose. In Puget Sound Sero.
Coip. v. DalarnaManagement Corp., the buyer brought suit against the seller alleging
the seller's fraudulent concealment of defects in the building. Puget Sound Serv.
Corp. v. Dalarna Management Corp., 752 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Wash. Ct. App. 1988).
The court held that the vendor had no duty to affirmatively report the defects to the
purchaser because the purchaser should have made inquiries to the seller. Id. at
1356. The court further stated that the problem would have been "readily ascertained" if the purchaser had made such inquiries. Id.
172 See Powell, supranote 163, at 130, for one author's conclusion that defects ought
to be disclosed in sales of residential or commercial real estate where good faith and
fair dealing would require the disclosure.
173 740 P.2d 1022, 1025 (Idaho 1987).
174 Id. at 1028.
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that purchasers would be in poor position to discover.1 75
Perhaps the most heavily litigated area involving caveat emptor
today is the right of a purchaser of contaminated land to recover from
the previous owner responsible for the contamination under the 1980
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Generally, most jurisdictions have agreed that previous owners who pollute cannot invoke caveat emptor as a defense
against any possible financial liability. 176 In 1988, for example, the
Third Circuit held, in Smith Land & Improvement Corp. v. Celotex
Corp.,17 7 that caveat emptor was not available as a defense against lia-

bility for indemnification of cleanup costs incurred under CERCLA,
but that the doctrine could be considered in mitigation of any
amounts owed.178 Some courts have refused to hold the seller responsible for contaminated land, however, when the purchaser had an opportunity to investigate.' 79
Although caveat emptor is still followed in execution sales, tax
sales, and judicial sales,' 0 the doctrine has been rejected in security
sales, 8' and has been abandoned and limited elsewhere as noted
175 492 N.W.2d 392 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). See infra notes 552-54 and accompanying

text for additional discussion of the Green Springs Farms decision.
176 See United States v. Kramer, 757 F. Supp. 397, 428 (D.N.J. 1991); Hanlin Group,
Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chems. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 933 (D. Me. 1990); Westwood
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1277
(W.D.N.Y. 1990), affd, 964 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992); Sunnen Prods. Co. v. Chemtech
Indus., Inc., 658 F. Supp. 276, 278 (E.D. Mo. 1987); T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light
Corp., 123 N.J. 371, 387, 587 A.2d 1249, 1257-58 (1991).
177 851 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1988).
178 Id. at 89-90. See Kathleen D. Lindenberger, Note, 37J. URB. & CoNrrrEMP. L. 273
(1990).
179 Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985). See Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101, 104-05 (D.R.I. 1991).
180 Caveat emptor is still applied in execution sales: "Applying the doctrine of caveat emptor to third-party purchasers of goods and chattels at execution sales and to
purchasers at void execution sales serves no purpose other than to maintain an oppressive judicial tradition." Jeremy Gilman, Note, Rethinking The Role Of CaveatEmptor
In Execution Sales, 32 CASE W. REs. L. RExv. 735, 775 (1982). The doctrine is also still
applied to other sales. See, e.g., Gauger v. State, 815 P.2d 501, 506 (Kan. 1991) (tax
sales); Stuart v. American Sec. Bank, 494 A.2d 1333 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (foreclosure
sales); French Energy v. Alexander, 818 P.2d 1234, 1238-39 (Okla. 1991).
181 The historical acceptance of caveat emptor in the securities field was immediately and decisively abandoned following the 1929 stock market crash. In describing
the series of legislative acts that resulted from the crash and the subsequent depression, the United States Supreme Court, in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,
explained that: "The Investment Advisors Act of 1940, along with earlier efforts to
curtail securities abuses, was intended to substitute full disclosure for the doctrine of
caveat emptor in order to bring about more stringent business ethics." 375 U.S. 180,
186 (1963) (citations omitted). Occasional deregulation efforts notwithstanding, caveat emptor is still not applied in the securities arena. See also Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953); Resort Car Rental
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above. The diminishing influence of caveat emptor demonstrates that
the ethics of the marketplace are changing.
I.

Conclusion

As times and circumstances change, doubts arise as to the
soundness of old practices and opinions. Old truths become falsehoods, society prohibits bargains that were not prohibited, and refuses to enforce bargains that would formerly be enforced. The
law is becoming increasingly receptive toward using standards of
morality and ethics to judge transactions between commercial parties. There has been a slow but steady trend away from caveat
emptor towards an application of higher standards of good faith,
fair dealing, and morality to all contracts and transactions. The
doctrine of caveat emptor is being abandoned and the rule that
negotiations must be conducted with openness and in good faith is
being affirmed. This accords with the notion advanced in this Article that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a requirement of
public policy. 8

IV. THE DUTY
A.

OF DISCLOSURE DURING NEGOTIATIONS

Introduction

Generally, there is no liability for silence unless there is a duty
to disclose. A duty to disclose has been recognized in at least seven
circumstances: (1) all material facts that have been actively concealed must be disclosed; (2) prior statements that are later discovered to be or turn out to be false must be corrected; (3) all
material facts must be disclosed if anything is said; (4) all material
facts must be disclosed when there is a fiduciary or confidential
relationship between the parties; (5) superior material information
concerning a transaction must be disclosed when the other party
cannot reasonably discover the information and is under a mistaken belief with regard to it; (6) all material facts must be disclosed in the formation of insurance and suretyship contracts; and
(7) all material facts must be disclosed as required by statute.
Even if a duty to disclose exists, however, a plaintiff asserting
another's breach of the duty will not be able to recover unless the
plaintiff can demonstrate justifiable reliance. Many courts have
Sys., Inc. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1975); Spilker v.
Shayne Lab., Inc., 520 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1975); Dupuy v. Dupuy, 511 F.2d 641 (5th
Cir. 1975); Herpich v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970).
182 See supra Section III. B and F for a discussion of the historical and legal development of the good faith and fair dealing standard.
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held that justifiable reliance does not exist if the plaintiff could
have discovered the facts through a reasonable investigation.
Nonetheless, the modem trend has been to mollify or abandon
this duty of investigation. The trend away from the duty of investigation is based upon changing ethical standards, the diminishing
influence of caveat emptor and the belief that a party who has a
duty to disclose should not be able to avoid that duty as a result of
the other party's negligence or indolence.
B.

The TraditionalRule-Right to Remain Silent

Perhaps the most renowned and oft-cited case in American
common law to support the argument that silence is not a misrepresentation is Laidlaw v. Organ.' The arguments presented in
that case on the duty to disclose and the disposition of those arguments, although in dicta, are relevant for the issues dealt with in
this Article.
The War of 1812 between the United States and England formally ended on December 24, 1814, with the signing of the Treaty
of Ghent. News did not travel so quickly in 1814 and 1815 with the
unfortunate result that the bloodiest and most celebrated battle of
that war occurred on January 9, 1815, the Battle of New Orleans.
On the night of February 18, 1815, news of the Treaty of Ghent was
finally communicated by the British fleet which was blockading
New Orleans, to three individuals.1 1 4 This news was first disseminated in New Orleans in a handbill made public at 8:00 a.m. the
following day, February 19.185 Prior to public disclosure of the
treaty, the plaintiff in Laidlaw had already learned of it.' 86 Consequently, before knowledge of the treaty became widely known,
plaintiff purchased a significant quantity of tobacco from defendant, a New Orleans commission merchant." 7 Prior to the sale, defendant asked plaintiff whether there was any news "which was
calculated to enhance the price or value" of the tobacco' but
plaintiff remained silent in the face of that question.18 9 In making
the purchase, plaintiff took advantage of the depressed price of
183 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817). Laidlaw involved the silence of the buyer.
184 Id. at 182-83.
185 Id. at 183.
186 The brother of one of the three individuals who first learned of the Treaty of
Ghent told plaintiff about the Treaty. Id. at 183. The man who told plaintiff this
information was also interested in one-third of the profits from the deal plaintiff
struck with defendant. Id. See the situation described by Cicero, supra note 35.
187 Id.
188

Id.

189 Id
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tobacco caused by theBritish blockade of New Orleans." 9 As soon
as word of the Treaty of Ghent became widely known, the market
price of tobacco jumped 30 to 50%.' 9 ' Defendant then refused to
transmit the tobacco to plaintiff.
Plaintiff sued defendant for the delivery of the tobacco. The
court directed a verdict in favor of plaintiff.'9 2 Defendant then appealed to the United States Supreme Court. The arguments
presented to the Court articulated two opposing views on the
precontractual duty to disclose material information about a business transaction in good faith. Counsel for petitioner, defendant
below, stated:
Suppression of material circumstances within the knowledge of
the vendee, and not accessible to the vendor, is equivalent to
fraud, and vitiates the contract.... The parties treated on an
unequal footing, as the one party had received intelligence of
the peace of Ghent, at the time of the contract, and the other
had not ....

In answer to the question whether there was any

news calculated to enhance the price of the article, the vendee
was silent. This reserve, when such a question was asked, was
equivalent to a false answer, and as much calculated to deceive
as the communication of the most fabulous intelligence.193
190 The blockade had prevented exports of tobacco, thus causing a surplus of tobacco which decreased its market value.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 184.
193 Id. at 184-90. Counsel for petitioners cited only one authority to support his
arguments, PO-IrER, Trit Du CorRAT DE VENTE, Paris-Orleans, 1772, Nos. 233 to
241. Id. at 185 n.2 (hereinafter PoTsmR). Robert-Joseph Pothier is best known for his
work on Roman law, PANDECrAE IuSTINTANEE IN NovuM ORDiNEM DIGEsrAE, Paris,
1748-52. In Article II, No. 233 of Pothier's work, he stated:
[Njianmoins dans les contrats intgressis, du nombre desquels est le contrat de
vente, la bonne foi ne defend pas seulement tout mensonge, mais toute riticence
de tout ce que celui avec qui nous contractons a int~rit de savoir touchant la
chose qui fait l'objet du contrat. La raison est que la justice & l'quiti dans ces
contrats consistent dans lligaliti"tout ce qui tend d la blesser est donc contrairea
l'iquiti. 11 est hdident que toute reticence de la parte d'un des contractants, de
tout ce que 1'autre auroit intftit de savoir touchant la chose qui fait l'objet du
contrat, blesse cette igaliticar dis que Pun a plus de connoissance que l'autre
touchant cette chose, il a plus d'avantageque l'autre d contracter,ilfait mieux ce
qu'ilfait que L'autre, & par consequent V'galiti ne se trouve plus dans le contrat. Enfaisantl'applicationde ces principes au contrat de vente, il s'ensuit que
le vendeur est oblig de diclarer tout ce au'il sait touchant la chose vendue d
Vacheteur qui a intiritde le savoir; & quilpiche contre bonnefoi qui doit regner
dans ce contrat, lorsqu'illui en dissimule quelque chose. ([I] n interested contracts, among which is the contract of sale, good faith not only forbids
the assertion of falsehood, but also all reservation concerning that
which the person with whom we contract has an interest in knowing,
touching the thing which is the object of the contract. The reason is
that equity and justice, in these contracts, consists in equality. It is evi-
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Counsel for respondent, plaintiff below, responded that legal obligations were not coextensive with ethics, as evidenced by the existence
of the caveat emptor doctrine:
The only real question in the cause is, whether the sale was invalid because the vendee did not communicate information which
he received precisely as the vendor might have got it had he
been equally diligent or equally fortunate? And, surely, on this
question there can be no doubt. Even if the vendor had been
entitled to the disclosure, he waived it by not insisting to an answer to his question; and the silence of the vendee could easily
have been interpreted as a negative answer to the vendor's question. In principle, however, the vendee was not bound to disclose any information unknown to the vendor. Even admitting
that his conduct was unlawful, in foro conscientiae, does this admission prove that it was so in the civil forum? Human laws are
imperfect in this respect, and the sphere of morality is more extensive than the limits of civil jurisdiction. The maxim of caveat
emptor could never have crept into the law if the province of ethics had been coextensive with it. There was, in the present case,
no circumvention or manoeuvre practiced by the vendee, unless
rising early in the morning, and obtaining by superior diligence
and alertness that intelligence by which the price of commodities was regulated, be such. It is a romantic equality that is contended for on the other side. Parties never can be precisely
equal in knowledge, either of facts or the inferences from such
must concur in order to satisfy the rule confacts, and both
194
tended for.
Counsel for petitioner replied that good faith required disclosure:
The information was monopolized by the messengers from the
British fleet, and not imparted to the public at large until it was
too late for the vendor to save himself. The rule of law and of
ethics is the same. It is not a romantic, but a practical and legal
dence that any reservation, by one of the contracting parties, concerning any circumstance which the other has an interest in knowing,
touching the object of the contract, is fatal to this equality: from the
moment the one acquires a knowledge of this object superior to the
other, he has an advantage over the other in contracting; he knows better what he is doing than the other; and, consequently, equality is no
longer found in the contract. In applying these principles to the contract of sale, it follows that the vendor is obliged to disclose every circumstance in his knowledge touching the thing which the vendee has
an interest in knowing, and that he sins against that good faith which
ought to reign in this contract if he conceals any such circumstance
from him.).
Id.
194

Id. at 193-94.
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rule of equality and good faith that is proposed to be applied. 9 '
In a one paragraph opinion delivered by Chief Justice Marshall,
the Court reversed and held for petitioner ruling that the lower court
should not have directed a verdict, but should have submitted the issue to the jury to decide.' 9 6 At the same time, however, the Court in
dicta opined on the larger question expressing its concern that a duty
of disclosure could not be adequately defined:
The question in this case is, whether the intelligence of extrinsic
circumstances, which might influence the price of the commodity, and which was exclusively within the knowledge of the vendee, ought to have been communicated by him to the vendor?
The court is of the opinion that he was not bound to communicate it. It would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within proper limits, where the means of intelligence are
equally accessible to both parties. But at the same time, each
party must take care
not to say or do anything tending to impose
197
upon the other.
With this pronouncement, which addressed the failure of disclosure on the side of the buyer, application of notions of good faith to
precontractual disclosures was arrested, except in the area of insurance and suretyship law, and the doctrine of caveat emptor continued
its ascent in American jurisprudence.
Consistent with the principle enunciated by Laidlaw, courts continue to rule that silence is not considered a misrepresentation for
purposes of fraud unless there is a legally recognized duty to speak.' 98
While outright fraudulent misstatements are prohibited, 9 9 parties to
business transactions traditionally have not been required to disclose
all material information unknown to the other party before the transaction is consummated.
195 Id. at 194.
196
197

Id. at 195.
Id.

E.g., Simpson Timber Co. v. Palmberg Constr. Co., 377 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir.
1967); Bank of Red Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 284 (Ala. 1985); In re Marriage of
Travlos, 578 N.E.2d 1267, 1273 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); Greene v. Gulf Coast Bank, 593
So. 2d 630, 632 (La. 1992); Wilson v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 598 A.2d 1310, 1316 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991); Sutfin v. Southworth, 539 A.2d 986, 988 (Vt. 1987).
199 The elements of common law fraud are (1) material misrepresentation of presently existing or past fact, (2) made with knowledge of its falsity or reckless disregard
for its truth (scienter), (3) with the intention that the other party rely, and (4) resulting in justifiable reliance by the party to its detriment. 37 AM.JuR. 2d FraudandDeceit
§ 12 (1968).
198
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The Exceptions to the Rule-Duty to Speak

The seven generally accepted exceptions to the rule that a
party may remain silent have been used in an ever widening array
of circumstances, so much so, that the exceptions have almost subsumed the rule of nondisclosure. It would be incorrect to say, however, that the rule of nondisclosure no longer has any vitality. It
still does. But the exceptions are so broad that a resourceful judge
can almost always find a way to fit the facts of a case within the
confines of one of the exceptions. It is one of the points of this
Article that judges, in fact, often do precisely that.
1. Active concealment
The first exception to the general rule of nondisclosure is that
active concealment or the intentional suppression of material information is actionable.2 °° Concealment, to be actionable, requires something more than mere silence or failure to volunteer
information. 0 1 Concealment usually occurs when one party actively attempts to hide the true facts from the other party by use of
to prevent discovery of the consome trick or artifice intended
20 2
cealed fact or inquiry into it.

Duty to correct prior statement
It is well established that a party has a duty to correct a previous material representation if the party later learns that the representation is no longer true and it has not yet been acted upon. 20
2.

200 Zanbetiz v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 219 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966);
Barylski v. Andrews, 439 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Mo. Ct. App. 1969); Moser v. Spizzirro, 295
N.Y.S.2d 188, 188-89 (N.Y. App. Div. 1968), aftd, 252 N.E.2d 632 (1969); Haberman v.
Grenspan, 368 N.Y.S.2d 717, 720 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975); Klott v. Associates Real Estate,
322 N.E.2d 690, 692 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974).
201 Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888); Thorwegan v.
King, 111 U.S. 549 (1884); Connelly Bros. v. Dunlap, 39 P.2d 155, 156 (Okla. 1934);
Hutsell v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 64 S.W.2d 188, 192 (Tenn. 1933); Farmers' States Bank
of Newport v. Lamon, 231 P. 952, 953 (Wash. 1925).
202 Williams v. Woodruff, 85 P. 90, 96 (Colo. 1905); Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287,
289 (Ky. 1908); Patten v. Standard Oil Co., 55 S.W.2d 759, 761 (Tenn. 1933).
203 E.g., McGrath v. Zenith Radio Corp., 651 F.2d 458, 468 (7th Cir. 1981) (applying California law) (it is incumbent upon a party to correct material representations
when they prove to be false, even though they were believed to be true when made);
Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 683 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (citations omitted) ("It
is the prevailing law that one who learns that his statements, even if thought to be true
when made, have become false through a change in circumstances, has the duty,
before his statements are acted upon, to disclose the new conditions to the party
relying on his original representations."); St. Joseph Hosp. v. Corbetta Constr. Co.,
316 N.E.2d 51, 71 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) ("It is also well-established that where one has
made a statement which at that time is true but subsequently acquires new informa-
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It does not matter that the original representation was believed to
be or, in fact, was true at the time it was communicated .2 0 If supervening events make the original statement false, or the party
later learns that the original statement was false, there is a duty to
disclose this information to correct the prior representation. °5
3.

Partial or ambiguous statement

Even if there is no duty of disclosure, if a party volunteers to
speak or does so in response to questions, the response must be
complete and full. 20 6 This rule was set forth succinctly by the California Supreme Court almost half a century ago:
"Even though one is under no obligation to speak as to a matter,
don which makes it untrue or misleading, he must disclose such information to anyone whom he knows to be acting on the basis of the original statement-or be guilty
of fraud or deceit."); U.S. Fidelity and Guarantee Co. v. Black, 313 N.W.2d 77, 89
(Mich. 1981) (citations omitted) ("'[A] party to a business transaction is under an
obligation to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the other party, before the transaction is consummated, any subsequently acquired information which he recognizes
as rendering untrue, or misleading, previous representations which, when made, were
true or believed to be true.'") (quoting Strand v. Librascope,Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 754
(E.D. Mich. 1961)). PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 8 § 106, at 738; 37 AM. Ju.. 2d
Fraud and Deceit § 184 (1968); 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 16 (1943).
204 McGrath, 651 F.2d at 468.
205 Id. If, for example, a party learns during contract negotiations that the assets in
the opening balance sheet, which was previously submitted to the other party, are, in
fact, substantially less than shown, such party has an obligation to correct its prior
statement. See PROSSER, supra note 10, at 696-97.
206 E.g., V.S.H. Realty, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 757 F.2d 411, 414 (1st Cir. 1985) (applying Massachusetts law, the Court stated that "[t] here is much caselaw in Massachusetts
supporting the proposition that a party who discloses partial information that may be
misleading has a duty to reveal all the material facts he knows to avoid deceiving the
other party"); Southeastern Fin. Corp. v. United Merchants & Manufacturers, Inc.,
701 F.2d 565, 566-67 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law) (applying Texas law, the
Court held that a party has a duty to disclose "information necessary to prevent the
statements it did make from misleading" the other party); National Consumer Coop.
Bank v. Madden, 737 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (D. Hawaii 1990) ("when a party injects
himself into a business transaction, however, he incurs a duty to disclose all material
information necessary to prevent representations he makes, either directly or indirectly, from misleading other parties to the transaction"); Zimpl v. Trawick, 679 F.
Supp. 1502, 1510 (W.D. Ark. 1988) (once a purchaser of gas and oil interests began to
speak on the subject of the property's prospects, he had a duty to tell the whole
truth); Balch Pontiac-Buick, Inc. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 345 A.2d 520, 523
(Conn. 1973); Nicholson v. Kellin, 481 So. 2d 931, 936 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)
("even assuming that the party to a transaction owes no duty to disclose facts within
his knowledge or to answer inquiries respecting such facts, if he undertakes to do so
he must disclose the whole truth"); Nevada Nat'l Bank. v. Cold Star Meat Co., 514
P.2d 651, 654 (Nev. 1973); Wirth v. Commercial Resources, Inc., 630 P.2d 292, 297
(N.M. Ct. App. 1981) ("to reveal some information on a subject triggers the duty to
reveal all known material facts"); Meeker v. Lanham, 604 P.2d 556, 558 (Wyo. 1979)
(quotation omitted).
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if he undertakes to do so, either voluntarily or in response to
inquiries, he is bound not only to state truly what he tells but
also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge
which will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all he
must make a full and fair disclosure .... " Where there is a duty
to disclose, the disclosure must be full and complete, and any
material concealment or misrepresentation will amount to fraud
207
sufficient to entitle the party injured thereby to an action.
4.

Obligations arising out of relationship

When a confidential or fiduciary relationship exists between
the parties,2 0 8 the party who owes the confidential or fiduciary duty
has an obligation to divulge or disclose during negotiations all ma20 9
terial facts concerning the transaction within his knowledge.
Courts have recognized numerous special, confidential or fiduciary
relationships for such circumstances. These include the relation210 brothers and sisters 2 11
ship between an employer and employee,
2 12
husband and wife,
persons engaged to be married,2 1 3 children
and parents, 2 1 4 attorney and client,2 15 officers of the corporation
207 Pashley v. Pacific Elec. Co., 153 P.2d 325, 330 (Cal. 1944) (quoting 12 R.C.L.
§ 71,310). For example, a party asked by the other party about the magnitude of
agreed upon changes in accounting methods cannot limit its answer to "I don't
know," or similar evasive statements, if such party has a reasonably good appreciation
of the overall impact of the changes, and can easily perceive that the other party has
no such knowledge. The fact that the other party had ample due diligence opportunity and could possibly have found out by itself should be no excuse.
208 A fiduciary or trust relationship is one that involves special trust or confidence.
It may be formal or informal, and may even grow out of a close family relationship.
See Central States Stamping Co. v. Terminal Equip. Co., 727 F.2d 1405, 1409 (6th Cir.
1984) ("The duty to speak does not depend on the existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties. It may arise in any situation where one party imposes confidence in the other because of that person's position, and the other party knows of
this confidence."); Umbaugh Pole Bldg. Co., Inc. v. Scott, 390 N.E.2d 320, 323 (Ohio
1979) ("A fiduciary relationship may be created out of an informal relationship, but
this is done only when both parties understand that a special trust or confidence has
been reposed.").
209 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1909); Richardson v. Green, 133 U.S. 30,
47 (1890); Stewart v. Phoenix Nat'l Bank, 64 P.2d 101, 106 (Ariz. 1937).
210 United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 124 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
913 (1983); United States v. von Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1007 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 998 (1981); Arrowood v. Lyon, 279 S.W.2d 801, 803 (Ky. Ct App. 1955).
211 U.S. v. Ressler, 433 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Long v. Mulford, 17 Ohio
St. 484, 505 (Ohio 1867).
212 Vai v. Bank of America, 364 P.2d 247, 252-53 (Cal. 1961).
213 Speckman v. Speckman, 15 Ohio App. 283 (Ohio Ct. App. 1921).
214 Peterson v. Mitchener, 71 N.E.2d 510, 514 (Ohio CL App. 1947).
215 Cinema 5 Ltd. v. Cinerama, Inc., 528 F.2d 1384, 1386 (2d Cir. 1976); Gidney v.
Chappel, 110 P. 1099, 1100 (Okla. 1910).
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and stockholders,2 16 joint purchasers,2 1 7 joint owners selling jointly
owned property,2 18 partners, 21 9 joint venturers, 221 physician and patient,22 1 priest and parishioner, 222 rabbi and congregation, 2 23 principal and agent,2 2 4 and trustee and cestui que trust. 225 A few cases
have also included an accounting firm and investors, 6 a mortgage
broker and lender2 27 and a stockbroker and his client. 228 At least
two courts have even found that close friends stand in such a relationship of trust and confidence as to require full disclosure of ma229
terial facts.
This wide range of relationships indicates that courts have
used the relationship exception to the traditional right to remain
silent as a means of imposing disclosure requirements in accord
with notions of good faith and fair dealing.230 The courts, in effect,
216 Davis Bluff Land & Timber Co. v. Cooper, 134 So. 639, 641 (Ala. 1931).
217 Walker v. Pike County Land Co., 139 F. 609, 611 (8th Cir. 1905).
218 Upton v. Weisling, 71 P. 917, 920 (Ariz. 1903).
219 Palmer v. Fuqua, 641 F.2d 1146, 1155 (5th Cir. 1981); Goldsmith v. Koopman,
152 F. 173, 176 (2d Cir. 1907); Clear Creek, Inc. v. Royal American Corp. (In re Int'l
Resorts, Inc.), 46 B.R. 405, 417 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984).
220 Stevens v. Marco, 305 P.2d 669, 679 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956).
221 Nardone v. Reynolds, 538 F.2d 1131, 1135 (5th Cir. 1976); Colvin v. Warren, 163
S.E. 268, 269 (Ga. Ct. App. 1932).
222 Finegan v. Theisen, 52 N.W. 619, 622 (Mich. 1892).
223 Jewish Ctr. of Sussex County v. Whale, 165 N.J. Super. 84, 92, 397 A.2d 712, 716
(Ch. Div. 1978) (allowing Jewish Center to rescind contract with rabbi where rabbi
failed to reveal his mail fraud conviction during negotiations leading up to the execution of agreement with the Jewish Center).
224 A.B.C. Packard, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 275 F.2d 63, 69 (9th Cir. 1960);
Jack Eckerd Corp. v. Dart Group, 621 F. Supp. 725, 732 (D. Del. 1985); Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Crouch, 606 F. Supp. 464, 471 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Saporta v. Barbagelata, 33 Cal.
Rptr. 661, 667 (Cal. Dist. CL App. 1963); Stainback v. West (In re Arbuckle's Estate),
220 P.2d 950, 955 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950); Village of Burnsville v. Westwood Co.,
189 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Minn. 1971).
225 See FDIC v. Meyer, 781 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986); A.B.C. Packard, Inc., 275 F.2d
at 69 & n.6.
226 IIT, An Int'l Inv. Trust v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 927 (2d Cir. 1980); Dubowski
v. Ash, (In reAM Int'l, Inc. Sec. Litig.), 606 F. Supp. 600, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Fischer
v. Keltz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 186 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
227 Sigman v. Stevens-Norton, Inc., 425 P.2d 891, 894 (Wash. 1967).
228 LeBoce v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,-709 F.2d 605, 607 (9th Cir.
1983) (ruling that where a broker controls an account, California law imposes fiduciary obligations); Pachter v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 444 F. Supp. 417,
422 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), afftd, 594 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1978); Pace v. McEwen, 574 S.W.2d
792, 796 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); see also United States v. Dial, 757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th
Cir. 1985) (finding that a broker in silver futures is a fiduciary to his clients).
229 United States v. Ressler, 433 F. Supp. 459, 464 (S.D. Fla. 1977); Hammond v.
Marrano, 451 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982).
230 As one court stated: "The circumstances in which courts are willing to find this
relationship of trust and confidence are expanding in accordance with the notion
'that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair con-
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have been able to impose a duty of full disclosure of material facts
during negotiations on an ad hoc basis by labeling a relationship as
confidential or fiduciary in nature. 231 Because such relationships
are so broadly defined, courts are free to find such relationships in
an almost limitless set of situations. Generally, however, courts
have held that sophisticated businessmen negotiating arm's length
business transactions are not fiduciaries and thus do not have a
special relationship requiring
full disclosure of all material facts re23 2
lated to the transaction.

In determining whether a special or confidential relationship
exists, courts frequently ask whether the relationship is one in
which an individual is bound to act in "good faith" and with "due
regard to the one reposing the confidence."233 Thus, the key eleduct demands iL'" Sedco Intern'l, S.A. v. Cory, 522 F. Supp. 254, 323 n.84 (S.D. Iowa
1981) (quoting WILM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS, § 106, at 698
(4th ed. 1971)).
231 Kessler & Fine, supra note 15, at 444; Holmes, supra note 15, at 449.
232 See Brass v. American Film Tech. Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1993) (asserting that there is no relationship of trust between a prospective investor and an unknown corporate officer explaining the business plans of a company selling stock
warrants); The Original Great American Chocolate Chip Cookie v. River Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 280 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "parties to a contract are not
each other's fiduciaries"); Salinsky v. Perma Home Corp., 443 N.E.2d 1362, 1365
(Mass. App. Ct. 1985) ("The concept of fiduciary relationship thus far does not seem
to have been extended to purely commercial transactions."); Carrols Corp. v. Canton
Joint Venture, No. 88-21151, 1990 WL 99047, at *6 (Ohio Com. P1. June 27, 1990)
(pointing out that there is no confidential or fiduciary relationship between a lessor
and sub-lessee). Cf O'Neal v. Burger Chef Sys., Inc., 860 F.2d 1341, 1349 (6th Cir.
1988) (ruling that franchise agreements do not give rise to fiduciary or confidential
relationships between the parties); Banque Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement
v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 819 F. Supp. 1282, 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (finding no special
or fiduciary relationship between sophisticated financial institutions in an arm's
length real estate transaction); McDermott v. Western Union Tel. Co., 746 F. Supp.
1016, 1023 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (asserting that a customer wiring money with Western
Union is in the nature of an arm's length relationship, not a confidential or fiduciary
relationship); Rosenberg v. The Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146, 1155 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) ("The franchisor-franchisee relationship is an arms-length, commercial one,
with the parties' relations governed by the terms of the offering circular and franchise
agreement."). But see Arnott v. American Oil Co., 609 F.2d 873, 883 (8th Cir. 1979)
(applying South Dakota law, the court ruled that "the franchisor and franchisee of a
service station operation are involved in a fiduciary franchise relationship whereby the
parties should act with good faith toward each other").
233 BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 626 (6th ed. 1990). Fiduciary or confidential relation
is defined, in part, as follows:
A relation subsisting between two persons in regard to a business, contract, or piece of property, or in regard to the general business or estate
of one of them, of such a character that each must repose trust and
confidence in the other and must exercise a corresponding degree of
fairness and good faith. Out of such a relation, the law raises the rule
that neither party may exert influence or pressure upon the other, take
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ment in finding a duty to disclose all material facts is the notion
that the relationship between the parties implies a duty of good
faith and fair dealing. It is this duty of good faith that in turn raises
the expectation of, and a requirement for, full disclosures.
5.

Effect of inequality of knowledge or superior knowledge,
and the "special facts" doctrine

Courts have also recognized that there is a general duty to dis-

close information during negotiations when one of the parties is
aware that he has access to superior material information concerning the transaction and that the other party is acting under a mistaken belief with regard to such information. 3 4 Moreover, where
one party has superior knowledge and the unknowing party takes
action the party might not otherwise have taken, one's duty to disclose is particularly compelling. 23 5 Thus, courts treat the possession of superior knowledge as sufficient to trigger a duty to disclose
information. 3 6
Two examples of this heightened duty for those with superior
knowledge are situations that involve misrepresentations of law and
misrepresentations regarding future events. As a general rule, one
cannot bring an action for fraud based on a misrepresentation of
selfish advantage of his trust... [and the use of] business shrewdness,
hard bargaining, and astuteness to take advantage of the forgetfulness
or negligence of another [is] totally prohibited as between persons
standing in such a relation to each other.
Id.
234 E.g., United States ex reL- Bussen Quarries, Inc. v. Thomas, 938 F.2d 831, 834
(8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law, the court stated that "[t]he duty to disclose
may arise from.., a demonstration of superior knowledge on the part of one party
that is not within the fair and reasonable reach of the other party"); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985)
(applying Arkansas law, the court stated that "[wihen a fact is peculiarly within the
knowledge of one party and of such a nature that the other party isjustified in assuming the existence of that fact, then there is a duty to disclose the fact") (citations
omitted); U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., 757 F. Supp. 1053, 1057 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) ("Under New York law, a duty to disclose arises when one party possesses
superior knowledge not readily available to the other and that party knows the other
is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.") (citations omitted); Haberman v.
Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys., 744 P.2d 1032, 1069 (Wash. 1987) (en banc)
(asserting that "allegations of fraud may be asserted where one party possesses superior knowledge yet that party fails to state ... [a] material fact"); see also Williams v.
Benson, 141 N.W.2d 650, 656 (Mich. Ct. App. 1966);Jenkins v. McCormick, 339 P.2d
8, 11 (Kan. 1959); Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 414 (Nev. 1954); PROSSER, supra
note 10, § 106, at 697.
235 Mann v. Adams Realty Co., Inc., 556 F.2d 288, 297 (5th Cir. 1977).
236 White v. Pepin, 561 A.2d 94, 96 (Vt. 1989) (citing Cheever v. Albro, 421 A.2d
1287, 1290 (Vt. 1980)). For a more extensive discussion of the White decision, see
infra notes 534-37 and accompanying text.
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the law. 2 - 7 This rule is based on the idea that each person has a

common understanding of the law. 3 8 When one party has, or
claims to possess, a superior knowledge of the law and misleads the
other party, however, the rule does not apply. 2 9 In addition, usually one may not bring an action for misrepresentation based on
future events, as opposed to past or existing facts. 240 Yet, one may
bring such an action in circumstances where a person purporting
to have superior knowledge makes a representation pertaining to
future events.241
Another disclosure doctrine very similar to the superior knowledge doctrine is the "special facts" doctrine. As early as 1909, the
United States Supreme Court recognized that "special facts" may
242

give rise to a duty to disclose in the security transaction context.

Since that time, other courts confronting securities cases have similarly recognized this special facts doctrine, 243 and although the spe-

cial facts doctrine developed in the securities law area, there has
been some movement towards applying the doctrine in other
contexts.
In ChiareUa v. United States,2 " for example, Vincent Chiarella
was employed at a financial printing operation where he deciphered the names of several companies involved in possible takeovers and then traded in the stock market based on this
information.245 Subsequently, the United States brought an action
under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 for
237 E.g., Lucas v. Enkvetchakul, 812 S.W.2d 256, 260 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
238 Id.
259 Id.; see also Seal v. Hart, 755 P.2d 462, 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Executive
Condominiums, Inc. v. State, 764 S.W.2d 899, 902 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989).
240 Sperry Corp. v. Shaeffer, 394 N.W.2d 727, 730 (S.D. 1986).
241 Id.

Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909).
See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 1005 (1971) (stating that "anyone in possession of material inside
information must either disclose it... [or] abstain from trading"). Accord Boardman v.
Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46. The court in Jordan v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., explained the
underpinnings of the "special facts" doctrine. 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1985). The Jordan court noted that:
The "special facts" doctrine developed by several courts at the turn of
the century is based on the principle that insiders in closely held firms
may not buy stock from outsiders in person-to-person transactions without informing them of new events that substantially affect the value of
the stock.
Id. at 435.
244 445 U.S. 222 (1979).
245 Id. at 224.
242
243
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fraudulent activity relating to the purchase or sale of securities. 246
The United States Supreme Court, however, found that Chiarella
247
owed no affirmative duty to disclose this takeover information.
Importantly, the Court emphasized that, as an employee at the
printing company, Chiarella was not a corporate insider, and he
did not share a fiduciary relationship with the sellers of the target
companies' securities.24
In dissent, Justice Blackmun objected to imposing a duty to
disclose only in restricted circumstances, noting that the possession
of "special facts" has long been important in determining whether
a party has a duty to disclose. 249 Further, Justice Blackmun pointed
out that courts have applied the special facts doctrine in a number
of contexts. 25 0 Thus, the "special facts" doctrine, as enunciated by

one with specialized
Justice Blackmun, places a duty to disclose on
251
knowledge not available to the other party.

New York courts have relied on Justice Blackmun's dissent in
applying the "special facts" doctrine to business transactions. In
Congress FinancialCorp. v. John Morrell & Co., for example, the court
applied the "special facts" doctrine in finding that John Morrell &
Co. could not claim fraudulent concealment. 252 According to the
246 Id. at 225.
247 Id. at 232.
248 Id. Subsequent to Chiarella, Federal courts and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have broadened insider trading liability beyond the "fiduciary
duty" theory (to, in effect, bring insider trading law back to its original "disclose or
abstain" conceptualization as set forth in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833
(2d Cir. 1968)) through (1) adoption of the "misappropriation theory" whereby one
incurs Rule lOb-5 liability for misappropriating "nonpublic information in breach of a
fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and confidence and uses such information in a securities transaction" (here, however, the inside trader need not breach a
duty to the shareholders or issuers of the securities in question, but only a duty owed
to the source of the inside information), e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
564 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1759 (1992); SECv. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 444-48 (9th Cir. 1990), and (2) promulgation of SEC Rule 14e-3(a).
249 Id. at 247 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
250 Id. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun relied on a number of
cases involving the purchase of property. For example, in Jenkins v. McCormick, a purchaser of a home brought a fraudulent concealment action against the builder for
damages related to a latent defect in a basement floor. 339 P.2d 8, 9 (Kan. 1959). In
holding that the purchaser had stated a cause of action, the court found that when a
fact "is peculiarly within the knowledge of one party and of such a nature that the
other party isjustified in assuming its nonexistence," the party owes a duty to disclose.
Id. at 11 (quoting 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 16(b) (1955)).
251 Chiarella,445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun,J., dissenting). See alsoJones v. Arnold, 221
S.W.2d 187, 193-94 (Mo. 1949); Simmons v. Evans, 206 S.W.2d 295, 296-97 (Tenn.
1947).
252 Congress Fin. Corp. v. John Morrell & Co., 790 F. Supp. 459, 475 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
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court, the doctrine requires three elements: "(I) one party must
have superior knowledge, (2) that knowledge must not be readily
available to the other party, and (3) the party with the knowledge
must know that the other party is acting on the basis of mistaken
knowledge."253 Because Morrell had unrestricted access to all
records and documents prior to its purchase, Morrell could not
invoke the "special facts" doctrine. Few courts have applied the
"special facts" doctrine by that name outside of New York. Recently, in Minnesota Power v. Armco, Inc., the court alluded to the
doctrine in noting that when a party has access to special facts unavailable to the other party, it may have a duty to disclose. 254 While
the Second Circuit has not explicitly referred to the "special facts"
doctrine, the court has discussed the three requirements
for find2 55
ing a duty to disclose based on superior knowledge.

Recent cases demonstrate that the superior knowledge or
"special facts" doctrine is being used to chip away at caveat emptor
even in arm's length transactions. In Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., for instance, the Second Circuit applied the superior
knowledge doctrine to an arm's length transaction involving the
sale of stock warrants. 256 The Brass court reinstated plaintiffs
fraud claim by making it relatively easy to satisfy the elements of
the superior knowledge or special facts doctrine. With regard to
the requirement that the undisclosed information not be "readily
available" to plaintiff, or buyer, the court stated that the buyer had
to have "an opportunity equal to that of a seller to obtain information," and that the buyer was "not required to conduct investigations to unearth facts and defects that are present, but not
manifest."257 The court also acknowledged the trend to limit the
privilege to take advantage of ignorance. 251 With regard to the requirement that defendant know plaintiff was acting under a mistaken belief, the court indicated that it might not be necessary to
Id. at 473 (citation omitted).
937 F.2d 1363, 1368 (8th Cir. 1991).
Brass v. American Film Tech., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 151-52 (2d Cir. 1993); Grumman Allied Indus. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729, 736-39 (2d Cir. 1984); Aaron
Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 731 F.2d 112, 123 (2d Cir. 1984) (imposing the three requirements for finding a duty to disclose based on superior knowledge, but not mentioning the "special facts" doctrine).
256 987 F.2d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1993). A stock warrant is an irrevocable option to
purchase stock for a period of time. In Brass, plaintiff claimed that defendant, a film
colorizing company, was liable for fraud for failing to disclose the fact that its stock,
which was subject to the warrants, was not fully transferable for two years pursuant to
a Security and Exchange Commission rule. Id. at 145-46.
257 Id. at 151.
258 Id. at 151-52.
253
254
255
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prove that defendant subjectively knew of plaintiff's mistake. Instead, the court suggested, it may be sufficient to prove that defendant should have known of plaintiff's mistake because of the
objective facts surrounding the transaction.2 5 9
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York also denied a motion for summary judgment on behalf
of a defendant charged with fraud for failure to disclose certain
facts material to an arm's length transaction involving loans for a
real estate deal.26 ° In applying the superior knowledge doctrine
under New York law, the court stated that: "The unmistakable
trend in New York tort law is to apply the rule of superior knowledge in an increasing number of situations where the rule of caveat
emptor once applied ....
261
6.

Insurance contracts

As noted earlier, when referring to Lord Mansfield's opinion
in Carter v. Boehm, 2 62 broad disclosures are required in the formation of insurance contracts. Such disclosure requirements are said
to arise because of the nature of the contract itself, which calls for
"perfect good faith and full disclosure of all material facts between
the parties."263 The basic notions presented in Lord Mansfield's
opinion in Carterv. Boehm are apparent in American insurance law
today. 264 Insurance contracts require good faith from the participants. 2 65 The duty of disclosure extends from the time the insur26
ance application is completed to the time the policy is issued.
Appleman and Appleman noted that there is no obligation to
259 Id. at 152. The court ruled that plaintiffs complaint sufficiently alleged defendant's knowledge by claiming that defendant's agent "surely knew" that plaintiff would
not have considered the purchase of the stock warrants had he known of the restrictions on the transferability of the stock. The complaint apparently did not say how
defendant "surely knew" this. Plaintiff claimed not to have been told anything about
the restriction on the stock's transferability matter.
260 Banque Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 819
F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).

261

Id. at 9.

97 Eng. Rep. 1162 (K.B. 1766). See supranotes 38-40 and accompanying text for
a discussion on Carter v. Boehm.
.Lo,
263 Keeton, supra note 15, at 13; see alsoJoHN D. CALAMAm & JosEPH M. PE
CoN rRACrs LAw § 9-20, at 291 (2d ed. 1977).
264 See, e.g., 12AJOHN A. APPLEMAN &JEAN APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACICE
§§ 7271-7276 (1981) [hereinafter APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN].
265 See, e.g., Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1927) (applying Oregon law); Sun Mutual Ins. Co. v. Ocean Ins. Co., 107 U.S. 485, 510 (1883)
(applying marine insurance law); Indiana Ins. Co. v. Knoll, 236 N.E.2d 63, 70-71 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1968); APPLEmAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 264, at § 7271.
266 Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. at 317 & n.1 (citations omitted);
262
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disclose to the insurer things that the insurer should know or may
be presumed to know. 26 7 The concern in the formation of insur-

ance contracts is the inequality of knowledge between the parties,
which forces the underwriter to rely on the information provided
by the insured when assessing the risk. In The Columbian Insurance
Co. of Alexandria v. Lawrence, Chief Justice Marshall described the
duty of disclosure: "[Flair dealing requires that he [the insured]
should state everything which might influence, and probably would
influence the mind of the underwriter in forming or declining the
contract."

268

If a change in circumstances should occur while the insurer is
evaluating an application, the insured has a duty to inform the insurer of the change.269 Courts have also held that a change in circumstances even after the policy has been issued, requires the
insured to inform the insurer of such a change, provided that the
change was substantial and would have led the insurer to cancel
the policy or increase the premium if the insurer had known of the
risk.

27 0

Jurisdictions have been divided on the extent to which the insurer has a duty to disclose limitations on the policy. Several courts
have placed the burden of reading and understanding the provisions of the policy on the insured. 71 Other courts, however, have
held that when denying benefits to an insured who then disputes
such a denial, the insurer must inform the insured of measures
available for challenging the denial, especially arbitration. 2
APPEMAN & APPLmAN supra note 264, § 7275. Appleman and Appleman defined the

duty of disclosure required by fair dealing as follows:
Fair dealing requires the insured to state everything which might, and
probably would, influence the insurer in entering into or declining the
risk, and in disclosing all information material to the risk about which
information is sought. The insurer, by consenting to undertake a risk,
does so under an implied condition that it shall be equally informed
with the insured as to all material circumstances, so that it may judge
the nature and extent of the risk for itself.
APPLr.MAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 264, at § 7271 (citations omitted).
267 APPLEMAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 264, at § 7272.
268 27 U.S. (2 Peters) 25, 29 (1829); see also Reliance Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 671 F.
Supp. 669, 678 (N.D. Cal. 1989) (stating that "[t] he marine insurance contract is conceived in uttermost good faith... the assured must disclose every material circumstance which in the ordinary course of business ought to be known to him").
269 Stipcich, 277 U.S. 317.
270 Weems v. American Sec. Ins. Co., 450 So. 2d 431, 436 (Miss. 1984).
271 Security Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Wilson, 800 F.2d 232, 235 (10th Cir. 1986); Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. Empire Ins. Co., 469 A.2d 563, 566 (Pa. 1983).
272 Sarchett v. Blue Shield, 729 P.2d 267, 277 (Cal. 1987) (en banc); Davis v. Blue
Cross of Northern California, 600 P.2d 1060, 1067-68 (Cal. 1979) (en banc).
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Many states have laws codifying the common law and prohibiting the rescission of some kinds of insurance contracts for misrepresentations by the insured, some of which can include omissions,
27
unless the misrepresentations are material to the contract.
Though some statutes may not specifically include "omissions," answering a question incompletely by not disclosing information material to the answer of that question is often considered a
274
misrepresentation or false statement.
See, e.g., CAL INS. CODE §§ 330-339 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp. 1993); Ky. REv.
§ 304.14-110 (Michie 1988); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2218 (West
1983 & Cum. Supp. 1993); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3105 (McKinney 1993); OHIO REv. CODE
ANN. § 3923.14 (Anderson 1989). See generaUy Clayton H. Farnham, Application Misrepresentation and Concealment In PropertyInsurance-TheElusive Elements Of The Defense, 20
FORUM 299 (1985) (describing the numerous state statutory provisions regarding misrepresentation and omission in property insurance contracts).
274 See, e.g., Phoenix Ins. Co v. Raddin, 120 U.S. 183, 189 (1887); Transamerican
Ins. Co. v. Austin Farm Ctr., 354 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Randono v.
CUNA Mut. Ins. Group, 793 P.2d 1324, 1325-1326 (Nev. 1990); Merchant's Indem.
Corp. v. Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 250-51, 172 A.2d 206, 214 (App. Div. 1961);
Clingan v. Vulcan Life Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 327, 330 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). For
example, the California insurance code's rules regarding the effect of concealment in
insurance contracts are quite detailed. California's rules require both parties to communicate in good faith all facts that the party believes are material and which the
other party cannot ascertain; a party need not disclose non-material facts, facts which
the other party knows, or facts the other could know in the exercise of ordinary care.
CAL. INS. CODE §§ 332-333 (West 1972). The California Code also defines "materiality" as the "probable and reasonable" impact of facts upon the party to whom communication is due, when making an estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed
contract, or in "making his inquiries." Id. § 334. Further, a party can waive theirright
to know by the (1) terms of the insurance, or (2) neglect to make inquiries as to such
facts, where they are distinctly implied in other facts of which information is communicated. Id. § 336. In addition, Kentucky's law specifically includes omissions and
misrepresentations in stating that the contract will not be voided unless such omissions or misrepresentations are fraudulent, material, or that the contract would not
have been issued or would have been issued at a different premium. Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN § 304.14-110 (Michie 1992). Moreover, Michigan law states that a misrepresentation will not defeat a disability insurance contract unless the misrepresentation is material. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 500.2218 (West 1993). Similarly, New York law
provides that a misrepresentation will not void a contract unless the misrepresentation is material, meaning that it would have led the insurer to refuse to make such a
contract. N.Y. INS. LAw § 3105 (McKinney 1993). The Ohio Revised Code establishes
that misrepresentations do not void sickness and accident insurance policies unless
the misrepresentation is material and wilfully or fraudulently made. OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 3923.14 (Anderson 1989).
The foregoing statutes represent a sampling of the types of statutes applicable to
disclosure duties in insurance contract formation. State law determines the impact of
a party's non-disclosure or concealment of material factors, even though the statutes
themselves may define in broad terms what is considered material. See; e.g., MICH.
CoMP. LAws ANN. § 500.2218 (West 1983); N.Y. INS. LAw § 3105 (West 1985). Common law notions of materiality still control in particular circumstances. Penn Mut.
Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank and Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 419 (6th Cir. 1896)
(applying Pennsylvania law). See generaUy RobertJ. Brennan &Jane Hanson, Misrepre273

STAT. ANN.
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The court in Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., for instance, justified a Pennsylvania statute,
which provided that no misrepresentation in an insurance contract
would void the insurance contract unless it was material or not
made in good faith, by stating that the statute relieved insureds of
the hardship of the common law remedy of rescission for misrepresentations or misstatements of little importance to the forming of a
contract.2 7 5 More regulation and judicial involvement in insurance
contract law is justified by both public and third party interests in
insurance. 7 6
Lord Mansfield noted that an insured need not disclose a fact
that the underwriter knows or should know. 2 77 Because insurance
contracts often require the applicant to answer questions, many
courts have posited that these questions represent the material issues for which there must be full disclosure, and a failure to ask a
question or pursue an ambiguous answer may waive the insurer's
right to know. 278 The United States Supreme Court expressed the
rule regarding the impact of apparently complete answers to questions on an application for insurance:
Where an answer of the applicant to a direct question of the
insurers purports to be a complete answer to the question, any
substantial misstatement or omission in the answer avoids a policy issued on the faith of the application .... But where upon
the face of the application a question appears to be not answered at all, or to be imperfectly answered, and the insurers
issue a policy without further inquiry, they waive the want or
imperfection in the answer, and render the omission to answer
more fully immaterial. 7 9
In a case decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit, applying Alabama law, the court remanded the case
to determine if the underwriter could have discovered information
about the health of the applicant that the applicant failed to disclose
sentation In The Application As The Basis ForRescission Of A Property Insurance Policy, 21
& INS. L.J. 451 (1986) (discussing varying common law definitions of materiality
for determining if contract rescission is an applicable remedy for an omission or misrepresentation in an application for property insurance).
275 72 F. 413, 418 (6th Cir. 1896).
276 See, e.g., Holmes, supra note 15, at 395-400.
277 Carter v. Boehm, 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1165 (LB. 1766).
278 See, e.g., Stipcich v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 277 U.S. 311, 316 (1927); Phoenix
Ins. Co., 120 U.S. at 190; Cora Pub Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co., 619 F.2d 482, 487
(5th Cir. 1980); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Shirah, 466 So. 2d 940, 944 (Ala. 1985); see also
TORT

APPLEmAN
279

& APPLEMAN, supra note 264, § 7276.

Phoenix Ins. Co., 120 U.S. 183, 189-90 (citations omitted).
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based on the answers that the applicant had provided. 28" The court
determined that if the insurer does not ask about a particular fact,
then silence, without a fraudulent or deceitful intent, will not void the
28
contract. '
The issue of insurer knowledge is the basis for common law distinctions between marine insurance contracts, which have the
broadest disclosure requirement, and other kinds of insurance contracts. 28 2 Traditionally, because marine insurance was often
purchased while the ship was at sea, the underwriter could not make
an independent examination of the ship and had to rely on the information provided by the insured. Underwriters are more likely to have
independent access to information in other kinds of insurance situations such as property or life insurance.28 3 The non-marine insurance
rule does not generally require disclosure in the absence of a specific
inquiry. 284
The jurisdictions are split on whether the intent of the insured in
not disclosing information is material to the voidability of a nonmarine insurance contract.28 5 The language and interpretation of
some state statutes allow an insurance contract to be voided if the misrepresentations, concealment, or omission are material without requiring proof of an intent.2

86

In other states, misrepresentations,

concealment, or omission must be made wilfully or with a fraudulent
purpose as well as be material to make the contract voidable. 8 7 Some
states will allow an insurance contract to be voidable if the concealment or omission was wilful or was done with a fraudulent design,
280 Stephens v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 742 F.2d 1329, 1334-35 (11th Cir.
1984).
281 Cora Pub, Inc., 619 F.2d at 487; Stewart-Smith Haidinger, Inc. v. Avi-Truck, Inc.,
682 P.2d 1108, 1116 (Alaska 1984); A.E. Graham v. Aetna Ins. Co., 132 S.E.2d 273, 275
(S.C. 1963); U.S. Life Credit Ins. Co. v. McAfee, 630 P.2d 450, 455 (Wash. Ct. App.
1981); APPLEmAN & APPLEMAN, supra note 264, § 7274.
282 See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Say. Bank and Trust Co., 72 F.
413, 436-37 (6th Cir. 1896); Hartford Protection Ins. Co. v. Harmer, 2 Ohio St. 452,
472-73 (1853).
283 Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 72 F. at 436-37.
284 Id. at 434-41; Hartford Protection Ins. Co., 2 Ohio St. at 472-73.
285 SeeAPPLEMAN & APPI.,EmAN, supranote 264, at §§ 7273-7274; Brennan & Hanson,
supra note 274, at 456.
286 See, e.g., Stephens v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 742 F.2d 1329, 1332-33
(11th Cir. 1984); Davis v. John Hancock Mut. Life. Ins. Co., 413 S.E.2d 224, 226 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1991); Clingan v. Vulcan Life Ins. Co., 694 S.W.2d 327, 331 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-110 (Michie 1988).
287 See, e.g., Enserch Corp. v. Shand Morahan & Co., Inc., 952 F.2d 1485, 1496-97
(5th Cir. 1992) (applying Texas law); Hall v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 937 F.2d
210, 214 (5th Cir. 1991) (applying Mississippi law); OHfo REV. CODE ANN. § 3923.14
(Anderson 1989).
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even if it was not material.2"' The individual state must be analyzed in
order to determine the extent of the duty to disclose material or nonmaterial information at the time of forming the insurance contract.
The insured's duty of disclosure arises from the good faith obligations of both parties to an insurance contract.28 9 The reason for the
"rule which obliges parties to disclose, is to prevent fraud and enThough the duty has its limitations, the duty
courage good faith."'
is indicative of the importance of full disclosure in contract formation
in order for there to be a true understanding of the risk that is being
as to the actual
insured against. 291 If there is no meeting of the29 minds
2
void.
is
contract
the
then
against,
risk insured
Insurance contracts are different from many other types of contractual relationships because they are heavily state regulated.29 This
is because of the variety of interests involved in insurance contract
formation.2 9 4 Courts and legislatures seek to protect insureds from
the harsh impact of insurance contract rescission by placing some limits on the insured's duty to disclose information. 295 Even in the area
where concern for the contracting individual is high, however, the insured still has a duty to disclose information material to the risk. An
insurer may be obligated to investigate some information himself, or
"material information" may be defined by the insurer's questions, but
the insured often still has a duty not to conceal or omit information
material to the formation of the contract.
7.

Statutory disclosure requirements

Some statutes require disclosures in certain contexts.29 6 The
purposes behind these disclosure provisions vary, but they gener288 See, e.g., Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 72 F. at 419; Merchant's Indem. Corp. of N.Y. v.
Eggleston, 68 N.J. Super. 235, 172 A.2d 206 (App. Div. 1961); Lighton v. MadisonOnondaga Mut. Fire Ins., 483 N.Y.S.2d 515 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (mem.); Hartford
Protection Ins. Co., 2 Ohio St. at 472-73.
289 Carter v. Boehm, 97 Eng. Rep. 1162, 1164 (K.B. 1766).
290 Id. at 1165.
291 Id. at 1164.
292 Id.
293 Holmes, supra note 15, at 395-96.
294 Id. at 396.
295 Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Sav. Bank and Trust Co., 72 F. 413, 418
(6th Cir. 1896).
296 See supra notes 147, 149-55, for a brief description of the Uniform Sales Act, the
Securities Act of 1933, the Truth in Lending Act, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure
Act, the Truth in Negotiations Act and the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade
Commission Improvement Act. See also supranote 168, for a brief discussion of Ohio's
residential real estate disclosure law.
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ally endeavor to provide information necessary to allow fair dealing
and fully informed decision-making. While these laws do not generally address negotiations for the sale of a business, they do reflect
society's increasing interest in requiring broader disclosures. Of
additional relevance here is the duty to disclose which is inherent
in the good faith bargaining requirements of the National Labor
Relations Act.
Section 158(d) of the National Labor Relations Act states that
"to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation
of the employer and the representative of the employees to ...
confer in good faith."29 7 The United States Supreme Court in
NLRB v. Truitt Manufacturing Co. ruled that a component of this

good faith duty is the exchange of information because "if an argument is important enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof of its
accuracy." 298 This case has served as the font for a general duty to
disclose information in collective bargaining, both by the employer
and by the union.299 The employer holds a majority of the relevant
information, and therefore its duty to disclose is most important.
In order for a union to properly perform its duties as a bargaining
agent, all relevant information must be provided. 0°
The employer's duty to disclose has two important limitations:
(1) the union must demand the information in good faith; and (2)
the information must be relevant to the union's capacity as the employees' representative in bargaining with the employer. 0 1 Once
the duty arises, it "continues through the life of the agreements so
far as it is necessary to enable the parties to administer the contract
and resolve grievances or disputes." 0 2 The most important infor-

mation that must be disclosed is financial information. Other information may be obtained if the union needs it to bargain
intelligently and "to service and police the contract."3 0 3 This may
297 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
298 NLRB v. Truitt Manuf. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956). The Court ruled that
an employer has a duty to open its books and records and provide support for its
assertion that it is unable to pay higher wages.
299 Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printing and Graphic Communications Union v.
NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
300 See Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942).
301 Transport of New Jersey, 233 NLRB 694 (1977).
302 Sinclair Ref. Co. v. NLRB, 306 F.2d 569, 571 (5th Cir. 1962).
303 Viewlex, Inc., 204 NLRB 1080, 1082 (1973). A refusal to provide relevant requested information is a violation of the NLRA. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359
F.2d 983 (1st Cir. 1966); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 68 (3rd Cir.
1965). Employers may gain access to certain types of information as well, but these
cases are not nearly as plentiful. Examples of information the union must disclose
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include information pertaining to employees' hours, conditions of
employment, benefits and equal employment opportunity data.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also promulgated
rules that apply to negotiations, which are essentially disclosure
rules, requiring the franchisor to inform the franchisee about numerous aspects of the business."0 4 The rules are very similar to the
federal securities acts in requiring disclosure, but do not establish
standards for the offering. The FTC permits parties to use the Uniform Franchise Offering Circular (UFOC) in lieu of the FTC
rules.3 0 5 Most states also permit parties to comply with the UFOC,
rather than state law.3 ° 6

D. Justifiable Reliance
The preceding section sets forth the established occasions
when the courts recognize a duty to speak. Even in these cases,
however, courts place a significant barrier before a plaintiff, requiring him to show independent efforts before the judiciary will intervene. This is framed by requiring "justifiable" reliance on the
other party's omissions, and a correlated duty to investigate. 0 7 Jusare: hiring hall and manning information, information about union pension and
welfare plans, collective bargaining agreements with other employers and employees
on union out-of-work lists.
304 Id.
305 1 Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 5700 (1980). The UFOC is similar to the FTC
rules, but it is more stringent in many respects, and it requires disclosure of, among
other things, the salespersons, prior history of the franchise, pending litigation
against the franchisor, fees, obligations to make purchases from the franchisor, and
earning projections. Neither the FTC rules nor the UFOC contains an explicit duty
of good faith and fair dealing.
306 62B Am. JUR. 2d PrivateFranchiseContracts§ 307 (1990). In substance, most state
laws provide that
no person may offer or sell a franchise by means of any written or oral
communication which includes an untrue statement of a material fact
or omits to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made,
not misleading.
1 Bus. FRANCHISE GUIDE (CCH) 1 5794 (1980).
307 The elements of common law fraud for failure to disclose facts or omissions are:
(1) an omission to state or disclose; (2) material facts; (3) when there is a duty to do
so; (4) with intent to deceive or mislead; (5) causingjustifiable reliance on the part of
the plaintiff, and (6) which is the proximate cause of injury. The fifth element, justifiable reliance, also includes an unstated requirement in many jurisdictions, a duty to
investigate. See, e.g., Affiliated Capital Servs. v. W. Atlantic City Assocs., 760 F. Supp.
1067, 1073 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); Hardy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield, 585 So. 2d 29, 32
(Ala. 1991); Eckley v. Colorado Real Estate Comm'n, 752 P.2d 68, 78 (Colo. 1988)
(en banc); Stephenson v. Capano Dev., Inc., 462 A.2d 1069, 1074 (Del. 1983); Pyne v.
Jamaica Nutrition Holdings Ltd., 497 A.2d 118, 131 (D.C. App. 1985); Lidecker v.
App. Ct. 1990); Cornell v. Wunschel, 408
Kendall College, 550 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ill.
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tifiable reliance and the duty to investigate are perhaps the most
important defining aspects of the tort of non-disclosure because
the duty to disclose, in effect, is linked to a plaintiff's duty to investigate. If courts impose stringent investigatory requirements on
the plaintiff before his reliance on an omission is justifiable, this
would effectively extinguish the defendant's duty to disclose. Indeed, this is what caveat emptor did-it placed the burden of investigation to discover the facts solely on the purchaser. Although
there are still many cases that require the plaintiff to investigate
carefully, particularly in arm's length commercial transactions, and
that impute to plaintiff all knowledge he would have learned had
he performed a reasonable investigation, the modern trend has
been to lessen the plaintiff's duty of investigation and to permit a
finding ofjustifiable reliance as long as the representation or omission relied upon is not obvious and the plaintiffs reliance was in
good faith.
1. The traditional rule-there is a duty to investigate
Under the traditional rule, a party claiming fraud could not
claim that reliance upon a misrepresentation was reasonable if that
party could have, through the exercise of ordinary diligence, discovered the material facts before acting in reliance. A party who
failed to exercise ordinary diligence by making an independent inquiry into information readily available to both parties could not
claim to be a victim of fraud. 08 Furthermore, according to the
traditional view, where there had been a failure to investigate, a
N.W.2d 369, 374 (Iowa 1987); Harton v. Harton, 344 S.E.2d 117, 119-20 (N.C. CL
App. 1986); Wilson v. Donegal Mut. Ins. Co., 598 A.2d 1310, 1315-16 (Pa. Super. CL
1991); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 652 P.2d 1089, 1094 (Wash CL
App. 1982).
308 E.g., Ewers v. Ford Motor Co., 843 F.2d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that Georgia law provides no recovery where alleged fraud consisted of defendant's
silence and plaintiff could have discovered the truth by simple inspection, or when
plaintiff clearly had notice that that fact was misrepresented but nevertheless relied
upon it); Modem Enters. Inc. v. Allen, 802 F.2d 312, 314 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying
Missouri law); Kaken v. Eli Lilly and Co., 737 F. Supp. 510, 519 (S.D. Ind. 1989) (explaining that under Indiana law, one relying upon a representation is bound to exercise ordinary care and diligence to guard against fraud); Moran v. Nay Servs., 377
S.E.2d 909 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (asserting that no fraud exists where matter was
equally open to the observation of all parties and where no special relation of trust or
confidence exists); Southern Intermodal Logistics v. Smith & Kelley Co., 379 S.E.2d
612, 614 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); Robertson v. Boyd, 363 S.E.2d 672, 676 (N.C. CL App.
1988) (pointing out that even where a defendant makes an affirmative misrepresentation, failure by plaintiff to make diligent inquiries when he has notice of a problem
precludes recovery for fraud); Silva v. Stevens, 589 A.2d 852, 858 (VL 1991) (noting
that while plaintiff has a general duty of diligent attention, observation and judgment,
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party was deemed to have constructive knowledge of everything
that an inquiry might have uncovered.' Consequently, in order to
recover for fraud based upon a misrepresentation or an omission, a
party must show that it had no knowledge of the concealed facts,
and that the true facts could not have been discovered even
through diligent inquiry. 10
The traditional rule has been applied in omissions cases even
when a party typically has been found to have a duty to speak. For
example, if a party has superior information or knowledge concerning a transaction, there is generally no enforceable duty if the
information or the facts are obvious or may be discovered by exercise of reasonable diligence. In Noss v. Abrams, the court noted that
superior knowledge may give rise to a duty to speak when that
knowledge is not within the fair reach of another."' The court,
however, rejected plaintiff's claims, finding that plaintiff must first
prove "his inability to discover the undisclosed fact in the exercise
of reasonable diligence."

312

Similarly, in Grumman Allied Industries v. Rohr Industries, Inc.,
the court held that plaintiff could not maintain its action for fraud
and misrepresentation based on defendant's alleged failure to disclose when plaintiff had absolute access to all relevant information. 13 The court emphasized that New York courts are
"particularly disinclined" to entertain such claims where the transaction involved "sophisticated businessmen engaged in major
a specific duty of inquiry is triggered only when it is clear from the facts of the representation that reliance should follow only after an independent inquiry).
309 Webb v. Rushing, 391 S.E.2d 709, 711 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); Tri-State Asphalt
Prods., Inc. v. McDonough Co., 391 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1990) (ruling that parties will
be presumed to have made a suitable investigation, and their rights will be determined accordingly).
310 Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282, 287 (9th Cir. 1988)
(pointing out that reliance on a misrepresentation is not reasonable when plaintiff
could have, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, ascertained the truth of the
matter); Lesser v. Neosho County Community College, 741 F. Supp. 854 (D. Kan.
1990) (explaining that to establish fraud under Kansas law, plaintiff must show that
he did not and could not have discovered the material facts by the exercise of reasonable diligence); Hope v. Brannan, 557 So. 2d 1208 (Ala. 1989) (asserting that plaintiff's failure to inspect house negated finding of fraud where problems could have
been discovered with ordinary diligence); Brookside Village Mobile Homes v. Meyers,
782 S.W.2d 365 (Ark. 1990) (ruling that purchaser must show no knowledge of the
facts, and that ascertainment of the undisclosed fact was not within the purchaser's
diligent attention or observation).
311 Noss v. Abrams, 787 S.W.2d 834, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990).
312 Id.; see also McCollum v. P/S Invs., Ltd., 764 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. CL App.
1988).
313 748 F.2d 729, 730 (2d Cir. 1984).
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transactions [who] enjoy access to critical information but fail to
take advantage of that access."3 14 The court contrasted this situation with others in which plaintiffs could not discover material information regardless of their efforts to do so. 3 15 Thus, because

plaintiff failed to demonstrate a fiduciary relationship with defendant or the requirements for imposing a duty on one with superior
knowledge, the court rejected its claim.
2.

The modified traditional rule-sometimes there is a
duty to investigate

Some courts have recently tempered the traditional view and
as a result have lessened plaintiffs' duty of investigation, depending
upon the circumstances surrounding the transaction. Many cases
hold that a plaintiff has a duty of inquiry only if a person of the
same or similar intelligence, education, or experience would have
recognized the representation as false. 3 1 6 Similarly, other cases
have held that a plaintiff has no general duty of inquiry unless the
plaintiff knows that the defendant's representations are false or
strongly suspects that they are false. 317 While a plaintiff may not
Id. at 737.
See, e.g., Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1123 (1981); Tahini Invs., Ltd. v. Bobrowsky, 470 N.Y.S.2d 431, 433 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1987) (reversing summary judgment because plaintiffs allegation of defendant's superior knowledge presented triable issue of fact).
316 E.g., West v. Western Casualty and Sur. Co., 846 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating
that under Illinois law, plaintiff has a duty to investigate further when the circumstances reasonably require, as a matter of prudence, that an investigation be undertaken; plaintiff's duty, however, is absolved if the defendant's misrepresentations or
assurances are designed to lull the plaintiff into a false sense of security or block
further inquiry); Dime Box Petroleum Corp. v. Louisiana Land & Exploration Co.,
717 F. Supp. 717, 723 (D. Colo. 1989) (Colorado law); Elco Indus. Inc., v. Hogg, 713
F. Supp. 1215, 1218 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (explaining that under Illinois law, plaintiff has
duty to investigate statements made by the defendant if the full factual circumstances
suggest that prudence reasonably required such an investigation); Vance v. Huff, 568
So. 2d 745, 751 (Ala. 1990); Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 760 (Ala. 1986) (finding
that if the circumstances are such that a reasonably prudent person who exercised
ordinary care would have discovered the facts, plaintiff is not entitled to recover for
fraud); Lang v. Lee, 777 S.W.2d 158 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989) (pointing out that in an
arm's length transaction, plaintiff has a duty of inquiry if knowledge of the facts would
have excited inquiry in the mind of a reasonably prudent person).
317 E.g., Dexter Corp. v. Whittaker Corp., 926 F.2d 617, 620 (7th Cir. 1991) (stating
that under Illinois law, if plaintiff is not merely careless but knows or suspects that the
seller's representations are false, and declines to investigate, he cannot cry fraud);
Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1549 (7th
Cir. 1990) (ruling that Illinois law does not create a general duty of reasonable care by
buyers, but a buyer that ignores a known or obvious risk may not recover for fraud);
Tower Fin. Servs. v. Jarrett, 404 S.E.2d 622, 624-25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991) (asserting that
while the law does not protect people who have engaged in cheating or swindling, a
314
315
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close his eyes to a known or obvious misrepresentation, in the absence of a patent untruth, he is not required to make an independent inquiry. 8 A plaintiff who nevertheless relies on a
representation that he knows to be false, however, cannot claim
that his reliance was reasonable. Moreover, a party that chooses to
make an independent investigation will be chargeable with everything the party could have discovered by exercising diligence. 1 9
plaintiff claiming fraud is bound to make inquiry for himself where alleged fraud
consists of general commendations or opinions); Collins v. Bums, 741 P.2d 819, 821
(Nev. 1987) (ruling that plaintiff has no duty to investigate absent any facts that
.would serve as a danger signal and a red light to any normal person of his intelligence and experience"); Sugarline Assoc. v. Alpen Assocs., 586 A.2d 1115, 1121 (Vt.
1990) (pointing out that plaintiffs duty to investigate is "triggered when he is put on
notice by seller's declaration of ignorance as .to material facts"); Wells v. Wells, 401
S.E.2d 891, 893 (Va. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that a person has no duty to make
further inquiry, but the law will not give "indemnity against the consequences of indolence, folly or careless indifference to known information"); Atherton Condominium
Bd. v. Blume Dev. Co., 799 P.2d 250, 251 (Wash. 1990) (explaining that where purchaser discovers evidence of a defect or where defect is apparent, there is an obligation to inquire further).
318 Ampat/Midwest v. Illinois Tool Works, Inc., 896 F.2d 1035, 1042 (7th Cir. 1990)
(finding that under Illinois law, a "victim cannot be reckless in his reliance, but he is
not obliged to dig beneath apparently adequate assurances merely because the circumstances might engender suspicion in the proverbial reasonable man"); Chris
Berg, Inc. v. Acme Mining Co., Inc., 893 F.2d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying
Florida law and explaining that "most jurisdictions now permit the recipient of a
fraudulent misrepresentation to rely on it whether or not a reasonable investigation
would have uncovered the falsity of the representation, unless the recipient of the
representation knew it was false or its falsity was obvious").
319 Blitz v. 970 Realty Assocs., 233 N.J. Super. 29, 36-37, 557 A.2d 1386, 1391 (App.
Div. 1989) (citation omitted); DSK Enters., Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 189 N.J. Super.
242, 251, 557 A.2d 1201, 1206 (App. Div. 1983) (citation omitted); Trautwein v.
Bozzo, 35 N.J. Super. 270, 278, 113 A.2d 848, 852 (App. Div. 1955) (citation omitted).
This rule was explained in more detail in John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cronin,
137 N.J. Eq. 586, 589, 46 A.2d 71, 73 (Ch. 1946):
The law governing independent investigations seems clearly to have setfled the principle that when one undertakes to make an independent
investigation and relies upon it, he is presumed to have been guided by
it and be bound accordingly. One cannot secure redress for fraud
where he acted in reliance upon his own knowledge or judgment based
upon an independent investigation. ...
The respondent's brief contends that the appellant, having made
an investigation, became "chargeable with knowledge of any and all
facts, which were then in existence .... " This rule is too broad. It is
only where the independent investigation discloses the falsity of the material representations or the source of the information is revealed by the
insured where the parties are not in an equal position to know the facts,
and in either event the knowledge gained or which could have been
gained by the exercise of reasonable diligence is substituted for the insurance application, that the appellant is precluded from relying upon
the misrepresentations in the application. The mere fact that an in-
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Additionally, some courts have recognized that the existence of a
special relationship between the parties, such as a fiduciary relationship, is among the circumstances that may lessen the plaintiff's
duty to make an independent inquiry. 2 °
3.

The modem trend-there is no duty to investigate

The modem trend has been to lessen the duty to investigate
or to discard it entirely.3 2 1 This trend represents a shift in the ethisurer makes an investigation does not absolve the applicant from speaking the truth nor lessen the right of the insurer to rely upon his
statements, unless the investigation discloses facts sufficient to expose
the falsity of the representations of the applicant or which are of such a
nature as to place upon the insurer the duty of further inquiry.
Id. (citation omitted); see also McDonald v. Superior Court, 268 P.2d 1076, 1082 (Cal.
Ct. App.) ("When one undertakes an investigation and proceeds with it without hinderance, it will be assumed that he continued until he had acquired all the knowledge
he desired and was satisfied with what he learned. He will not be heard to say that he
relied on the representation of the other party."), rev'd on other grounds, 275 P.2d 464
(Cal. 1954);Jahraus v. Bergquist, 494 P.2d 110, 111 (Colo. CL App. 1971) (finding
that experienced buyer in possession of documents which were inconsistent on their
face as to financial affairs of business did not state a cause of action in fraud); Cherrington v. Woods, 290 P.2d 226, 228 (Colo. 1955) (same); Arnott v. Kruse, 730 S.W.2d
597 (Mo. CL App. 1987) (citation omitted) ("When a party makes an independent
investigation he is presumed to have relied on what he learned from that investigation
and may not claim that he relied on a contrary misrepresentation"); Puget Sound
Nat'l Bank v. McMahon, 330 P.2d 559, 561 (Wash. 1958) (ruling that plaintiff's investigation and vast business experience, precluded plaintiff from relying on representations as to net profits); Fleishman v. Hockett, 301 P.2d 166, 171-72 (Wash. 1956)
(finding no justifiable reliance in view of plaintiffs experience and investigations);
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 547 (1967).
320 Wilson v. Brown, 496 So. 2d 756, 759 (Ala. 1986) (citation omitted) ("Silence is
not actionable fraud absent a confidential relationship or some special circumstance
imposing a duty to disclose."); Hagans, Brown & Gibbs v. First Nat'l Bank of
Anchorage, 810 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Alaska 1991) (finding defendant duty bound to
disclose when facts are concealed or unlikely to be discovered because of a special
relationship between the parties or their course of dealings); Mister Donut of
America v. Harris, 723 P.2d 670, 673 (Ariz. 1986) (ruling that where special relationship of franchisor-franchisee exists between two parties, one party may rely on another's misrepresentations without investigating their truth); Powell v. James,
Hereford & McClelland, 377 S.E.2d 683, 685 (Ga. CL App. 1989) (asserting that one
alleging fraud must show that he exercised ordinary care to find out the facts and
protect himself, except where the relationship is a fiduciary one). But see Farr v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 755 F. Supp. 1219, 1227 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding that
under New York law, the existence of a fiduciary relationship does not relieve plaintiff
of an obligation to make an inquiry where there is reason to suspect the probability of
wrongdoing).
321 Although many cases state that the trend toward discarding the duty to investigate is "modem," the "trend" has been in existence for over 100 years. E.g., Chamberlin v. Fuller, 9 A. 832, 836 (Vt. 1887) ("No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder
for the simple reason that his victim is by chance a fool."); Kendall v. Wilson, 41 Vt.
567, 571 (1869) (pointing out that "the law will afford relief even to the simple and
credulous who have been duped by act and falsehood").
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cal standards of our society3 2 2 and has eliminated the duty of inquiry by permitting plaintiffs to rely on representations or
omissions as long as the plaintiffs' reliance is in good faith and the
misrepresentation or omission relied upon is not obvious. 3 According to the modern view, a plaintiff who receives a representation is still required to be alert to statements that are patently false.
In all other cases, however, a plaintiff is entitled to rely upon a
representation and to take the defendant at his word, without having a duty to investigate the truth of the statement. 324 Thus, the
burden of discerning the truthfulness of a statement is no longer
on the party to whom the representation was made. Rather, the
party making the statement bears the burden of making certain
that the representation is true.325
The same rule has been applied in omissions cases. One court
has stated that "it is no excuse for the defendant, nor does it lie in
his mouth to say, that the plaintiff might, but for his own neglect,
3 26
have discovered the wrong and prevented its accomplishment."
322 Fleming James Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation- Part II, 37 MD. L. REv. 488,
511-22 (1978). James and Gray added that "The shift in ethical standards by the
community and the reflection of the shift in the law of fraud are nowhere better
illustrated than by the change in the law's requirement of diligence on plaintiffs
part" Id. at 511.
]
323 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, section 540, states that "[t he recipient of
a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in relying upon its truth, although
he might have ascertained the falsity of the representation had he made an investigation." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976). Section 541, however, states
that "[t] he recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justified in relying upon
its truth if he knows that it is false or its falsity is obvious to him." Id. § 541. See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 172 (1979) ("A recipient's fault in not knowing or discovering the facts before making the contract does not make his reliance
unjustified unless it amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
reasonable standards of fair dealing.").
324 Chris Berg, Inc. v. Acme Mining Co., 893 F.2d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that under Florida law, whether plaintiff could have discovered the falsity of a
representation is irrelevant to recovery for fraud); Formento v. Encanto Business
Park, 744 P.2d 22, 27 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987) (pointing out that in cases of incomplete
disclosure and misrepresentation, the buyer is entitled to rely on a representation,
and has no duty to make an independent inquiry); Estate of Jones v. Kvamme, 430
N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (explaining that plaintiff isjustified in relying
upon a false representation, although he could have ascertained the truth; plaintiff
was not negligent in taking the defendant at his word); West v. Carter, 712 S.W.2d
569, 575 (Tex. CL App. 1986) (same); Husman, Inc. v. Triton Coal Co., 809 P.2d 796,
800 (Wyo. 1991) (asserting that it was not unreasonable for a contractor to rely upon
the owner's representations and to limit its investigation).
325 Harris v. M & S Toyota, Inc., 575 So. 2d 74, 78 (Ala. 1991) (stating that "this
approach continues the move away from the doctrine of caveat emptor, to the modem perspective that parties to transactions should be able to rely on representations
that are not obviously false").
326 Sutfin v. Southworth, 539 A.2d 986, 988 (Vt. 1987) (quotation omitted). See also
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If a person has been led into a trap, "he owes no duty to the one
who did the trapping."12 7 Therefore, at least some courts recognize
that nondisclosure is sufficiently offensive in some contexts that
concepts of investigation, similar to the due diligence obligations
in negotiations for purchase of a business, may not be relevant.
Consequently, according to the modem trend, a defendant in
a fraud action can no longer defeat a claim for damages by claiming that the plaintiff might have discovered the truth had he exercised reasonable diligence in making an independent inquiry. -2
While the traditional view enforced the concept of caveat emptor,
or let the buyer beware, cases following the modem trend impose a
3 29
new standard: caveat mendax, or let the liar beware.
4.

The issue of "negation of reliance" through disclaimers
or integration clauses

Some courts have held that parties to a contract may exculpate
themselves of a fraudulent inducement claim by negating the element of reliance with the insertion, at the time when the contract
is reduced to writing, of an unambiguously worded merger and integration clause. 33 ' These courts have dismissed fraud claims on
the basis that such contract language negates the reliance element
necessary for a fraud claim.3 3 ' To negate the reliance element,
Brass v. American Film Technologies, Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 151 (2d Cir. 1993) ("[I]n an
increasing number of situations, a buyer is not required to conduct investigations to
unearth facts and defects that are present, but not manifest."); Teamsters Local 282
Pension Trust Fund, 762 F.2d 522, 528 (7th Cir. 1985) ("Once a duty to disclose
exists, and lying or nondisclosure is condemned as an intentional tort, it no longer
matters whether the buyer conducts an investigation well or at all."); Banque Arabe Et
Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat'l Bank, 819 F. Supp. 1282, 1290
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (quoting Brass, 987 F.2d at 151).
327 Parker v. Title and Trust Co., 233 F.2d 505, 510 (9th Cir.), reh'g denied, 237 F.2d
423 (1956).
328 West v. Carter, 712 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. Ct. App. 1986).
329 Harris,575 So. 2d at 78.
330 The typical merger and integration clause provides that, (1) the contract constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes all prior and contemporaneous agreements, discussions, or negotiations, and (2) there are no other
warranties, representations, or agreements, express or implied, except as set forth in
the contract.
331 A number of cases have found that such clauses negate the reliance element of
a fraudulent inducement claim. E.g., Jockvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411, 41617 (1st Cir. 1989); One-O-One Enters., Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283, 1286-87 (D.C.
Cir. 1988); Amplicon, Inc. v. Marshfield Clinic, 786 F. Supp. 1469, 1475-76 (W.D. Wis.
1992); Acrotube, Inc. v. J.K. Fin. Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 470, 475-76 (N.D. Ga.
1987); Gibson v. Home Folks Mobile Home Plaza, 533 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (S.D. Ga.
1982). Sometimes essentially the same result is achieved by inserting a disclaimer in
the contract whereby the purchaser agrees that he has performed his own examina-
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however, most courts state that the integration3 32or merger clause, or
the disclaimer, must be specific, not general.
Other authority, however, provides that a contract may not negate a fraud claim: "Fraud vitiates and avoids all human transactions ....[W] hen once shown to exist, it poisons alike the contract
of the citizen, the treaty of the diplomat, and the solemn judgment
of the court."13 Accordingly, it has been stated generally that,
"[e]ven specific provisions or stipulations in a contract providing in
effect for immunity from or nullification or waiver of preliminary
or extraneous misrepresentations in connection with the contract
are generally ineffective, and do not prevent a subsequent assertion of the misrepresentation as a basis for fraud.""3 4 It has been
held that a party to a contract can exclude liability for innocent
misrepresentations, even if made negligently, 3s5 but that no exemption or integration clause can protect the party from liability
for his own fraud or require the other party to assume what he
knows to be false. 3 6
Recently, the Colorado Supreme Court has gone further by
holding that integration and disclaimer clauses in a contract for
don and relies solely on his own judgment in addition to noting that there are no
other agreements, understandings or representations made by the seller. Pommer v.
Medtest Corp., 961 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that "an express disclaimer
of reliance on oral representations . . . protects a seller [from a fraud claim]");
Landale Enters., Inc. v. Berry, 676 F.2d 506, 508 (11th Cir. 1982); Agristor Leasing-Il
v. Pangburn, 557 N.Y.S.2d 183, 184-85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). The reasoning is that
the effect of integration or disclaimer clauses is not to exculpate one of fraud, but
rather to negate the reliance element of a fraud claim (and the result is said to be
that, obviously, without reliance, there is no fraud).
332 E.g., Rosenberg v. Pillsbury Co., 718 F. Supp. 1146, 1153 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Carlock v. Pillsbury Co., 719 F. Supp. 791, 829 (D. Minn. 1989) (asserting that a party
cannot reasonably rely on allegedly fraudulent promises that are directly contradicted
by a disclaimer clause); Agristor Leasing-I, 557 N.Y.S.2d at 184-85. Some courts have
also stated that "as is" clauses will not insulate one from fraud. Lee v. Goldstrom, 522
N.Y.S.2d 917, 918 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987); Chopp v. Welbourne & Purdy Agency, Inc.,
522 N.Y.S.2d 367, 368 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
333 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 292 S.W.2d 749, 754 (Tenn. 1956)
(quotation omitted). See also 12 SAMUEL WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACrS § 1486
(3d ed. 1970).
334 37 AM. JuR. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 387 (1968) (footnote omitted). See also 17A
AM. JuR. 2d Contracts § 299 (1991).
335 E.g., United States Welding, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 640 F. Supp. 350, 352-53
(D. Colo. 1985); Rio Grande Jewelers Supply, Inc. v. Data General Corp., 689 P.2d
1269, 1270-71 (N.M. 1982).
336 E.g., Banque Arabe Et Internationale D'Investissement v. Maryland Nat'l Bank,
819 F. Supp. 1282, 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); United States Welding Inc., 640 F. Supp. at
354; Sires v. Luke, 544 F. Supp. 1155, 1165 (S.D. Ga. 1982); L. Luria & Son, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 460 So. 2d 521, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Bryant v. Troutman,
287 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956); 6A CoRBIN, supra note 34, at § 1516.
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the sale of silos, which clauses provided that there were no agreements or oral statements other than those set forth in the parties'
contract and that any advertisements, brochures, or other statements not in the agreement were not guarantees and had not been
relied upon, do not waive a claim for negligent misrepresentation. 7 The court explained that there was a "policy of encouraging honesty and candor in contract negotiations" and that this
policy was "reflected in the recognition of an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.""s Indeed, the court concluded that
"[t] he implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing would be
virtually eliminated if a contracting party could escape liability for
negligent conduct simply by inserting a general integration clause
into the agreement.""3 9 Obviously, if the court's reasoning applied
to negligent misrepresentations, it is at least as applicable to fraudulent misrepresentations. The case may be limited in its applica40
tion, however, because the case involved an adhesion contract
and/or because the court stated that its rule applied only to general integration clauses.3 4 ' In any event, the case is significant insofar as the court indicated that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing applied to contract negotiations and because the
court additionally encouraged honesty and candor in such
negotiations.
Although the cases appear to be split on the issue of negating
reliance, they may be reconciled, at least to some extent. On the
one hand, the courts do not permit fraud or allow a dissembler to
exculpate fraudulent conduct by a general or craftily worded integration or disclaimer clause. On the other hand, courts allow sophisticated parties to agree that as to specific matters they may rely
on their own investigation of facts and not upon any representaKeller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 819 P.2d 69, 72-73 (Colo. 1991).
Id. at 73 (emphasis added).
339 Id.
340 The result in Keller has been supported based on the argument that the case
involved an adhesion contract. CORBIN, supra note 34, § 580(a) (19). The disclaimers
in the agreement for the silos were not negotiated. The contract was pre-printed and
presented on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. Thus, Keller may stand only for the proposition that boilerplate disclaimers will not be upheld.
341 The Keller court stated that a "general integration clause" does not waive a negligent misrepresentation claim and that a contract purporting to prohibit a party from
asserting such a claim must be "couched in clear and specific language." Kelle, 819
P.2d at 73, 74. A dissenting opinion argued that the majority decision was "antithetical to the principles of freedom of contract." Id. at 75 (Rovira, CJ., dissenting). In
addition, the dissent believed that the contract was not ambiguous and that the contract did not have to disclaim negligent misrepresentation claims specifically. Id. at 76
(Rovira, C.J., dissenting).
337
338
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tion or information from any other party. These two positions are
not necessarily contradictory. If the disclaimers are set forth with
particularity, and the information that is not divulged is reasonably
accessible to the other party, then the disclaimer probably should
be upheld. In such a case, the duty of good faith would not be
breached. But an omission that cannot be discovered by a reasonable investigation should not be rendered inactionable by a disclaimer or integration clause. The insertion of a disclaimer or
integration clause under such circumstances is meant to prevent,
and does prevent, the discovery of the facts rather than shifting the
burden to discover such information. When a disclaimer clause
shifts the burden to discover information to a particular party or
stipulates that the party is relying only upon his own investigation
of the facts, it is implied that the facts are discoverable. If the facts
are not available, however, then the party who knows of the facts,
and who knows that the facts in all probability will not be discovered, should not be permitted, as a matter of contract interpretation as well as of public policy, to hide behind disclaimer and
integration clauses.
E.

The Duty of Good Faith Requires Disclosures

A duty to disclose arises only if contemporary notions of good
faith and fair dealing require disclosures. While most of the cases
applying the good faith duty to disclose do so in the context of the
generally recognized exceptions to the right to remain silent, the
rationale is in place for courts to expand upon disclosure requirements. The Restatements of Contracts and Torts have also recognized the applicability of notions of good faith to determine when
disclosure should be made, and they have also recognized that the
right to remain silent will change as business ethics change.
There is substantial authority stating that the reason why disclosures are mandated in the negotiation of a contract is that notions of good faith and fair dealing require such disclosures. Just
what our understanding of good faith and fair dealing will require
to be disclosed is in flux, but there is now considerable authority
that the yardstick by which omissions are deemed to be actionable
is "good faith."
1. The Common Law
Seventy-one years after the United States Supreme Court's decision in Laidlaw v. Organ, the Supreme Court took the first step
towards recognizing that notions of good faith should be used to

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

152

[Vol. 24:70

measure what must be disclosed during contract negotiations. In
Stewart v. The Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., a British corporation
purchased a cattle ranch in the Wyoming territory after its agent
had visited the ranch and received false information from the
owner about the size of the cattle herd on the ranch. 4 2 The owner
of the ranch also prevented plaintiff's agent from discovering the
truth about the cattle herd by discouraging the agent from making
inquiries to the foreman and other persons on the ranch. 43 In
upholding a jury verdict for plaintiff and the trial court's jury instructions, the Supreme Court acknowledged the rule in Laidlaw
and noted that silence as to a material fact was not necessarily
"equivalent to a false representation."" 4 On the other hand, the
Court distinguished silence from concealment, and asserted that
a suppression of the truth may amount to a suggestion of falsehood; and if, with intent to deceive, either party to a contract or
sale conceals or suppresses a material fact, which he is in goodfaith
bound to disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to a false representation ....

345

Two years after Stewart, in Farrarv. Churchil1l the Supreme Court
repeated the rule that one was guilty of fraud if he suppressed or concealed information he was "'in good faith bound to disclose.'" 3 4 6 Farrar involved the sale of a plantation. Complainant claimed that the
seller's agents misrepresented the acreage that could be cultivated
and certain other aspects of the plantation, which the complainant
relied on to his detriment in purchasing the property. The Court rejected complainant's claims because the evidence was not sufficient to
prove fraud and because complainant had the opportunity to, and did
independently, investigate the facts. The Court stated that "[i]f the
purchaser investigates for himself and nothing is done to prevent his
investigation from being as full as he chooses, he cannot say that he
relied on the vendor's representations."3 4
Shortly after the Farrardecision, the Supreme Court again sug342

128 U.S. 383, 383-84 (1888).

343
344
345
346

Id. at 384.
Id. at 388.
Id. (emphasis added).
135 U.S. 609, 616-17 (1890) (quoting Stewar4 128 U.S. at 388).

347

Id. In addition, the Court noted that
where the facts lie equally open to both vendor and vendee, with equal
opportunities of examination, and the vendee undertakes to examine
for himself, without relying on the statements of the vendor, it is no
evidence of fraud in such case that the vendor knows facts not known to
the vendee and conceals them from him.
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gested that notions of good faith were relevant in determining when
an omission would be actionable. In Tyler v. Savage, plaintiff
purchased stock in a company to secure employment for her son at
the firm based, in part, upon the company president's false and misleading representations about the company's prospects, profitability
and payment of dividends.' In affirming a decree for plaintiff, the
Supreme Court noted that plaintiff had been informed in April 1884,
before her stock purchase, that the last dividend of the company had
been "'a 7 percent semi-annual,'" and that the fiscal year ended on
June 13 4 ' The Court believed that this representation was meant to
make plaintiff think the last dividend was declared one year earlier, in
June 1883, but in fact the last dividend was actually declared in June
1882.50 The Supreme Court stated that "[t] his suppression of a material fact, which Tyler [the defendant] was bound in good faith to disclose,
was equivalent to a false representation. "351
In 1889, the Supreme Court of Alabama also referred to "good
faith" to measure whether omissions to state material facts were actionable. 52 In C/rie plaintiff, the assignee of an interest to purchase
land, sued the assignors for fraud, in part, because plaintiff claimed
that the assignors had failed to inform plaintiff that the assignors' contract to purchase the land with the owner was verbal. The court set
forth the applicable rule of law: "[t]he principle may be generalized,
in other words, by saying that to constitute fraud, in cases of mere
silence, there must be the suppression of some material fact which
honesty and goodfaith require to be disclosed, under the facts of a particular case."" 3 The court stated that in determining whether there
was a disclosure duty a number of factors should be considered including, "the fiduciary or other relation of the parties; the nature of
the contract; the degree of trust reposed, whether expressly or impliedly; the value or nature of the particular fact; the relative knowledge of the contracting parties; and other circumstances of the
3 54
case."
In 1893, in Loewer v. Harris, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit also referred to "good faith" as the standard by
143 U.S. 82, 83-85 (1892).
Id. at 90.
350 Id.
351 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Stewart v. The Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128
U.S. 383, 388 (1888)).
352 Griel v. Lomay, 6 So. 741, 744 (Ala. 1889).
353 Id. (emphasis added).
354 Id.
348
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which to measure disclosure requirements. 5 5 In Loewer, plaintiff, on
behalf of a London syndicate, entered into negotiations with defendant to purchase defendant's brewery. 5 6 In January 1891, defendant
gave plaintiff a six-month old prospectus setting forth the brewery's
profitability and growth. 5 7 When plaintiff asked defendant if the
brewery was still doing well, plaintiff said the prospectus was accurate
and that the company's business was increasing."5 8 In April 1891, a
purchase and sale contract was signed by the parties."5 9 Shortly thereafter, plaintiff learned that the output and profits of the brewery had
declined sharply after January 1891 and before the contract was
signed. 6 Defendant failed to inform plaintiffs about the downturn
in business and argued that there was no duty to inform plaintiff of
subsequent facts correcting defendant's initial representations.3 6 ' In
affirming a decision for plaintiff, the court acknowledged that there
was no duty of disclosure simply because the undisclosed fact was material, or because the party to whom the fact is known knows the other
party is ignorant of it.3 62 But, the court went on to conclude that:
[W] hen one of the parties, pending negotiations for a contract, has held out to the other the existence of a certain state of
facts, material to the subject of the contract, and knows that the
other is acting upon the inducement of their existence, and,
while they are pending, knows that a change has occurred, of
which the other party is ignorant, good faith and common honesty
require him to correct the misapprehension which he has created. It becomes his duty to make disclosure of the changed
state of facts, because he has put the other party off his guard. 6 3
The foregoing cases demonstrate that the general guiding principle for determining when disclosures should be made was first articulated within the short span of five years from 1888 to 1893.36 4 A duty
to speak arises whenever notions of good faith dictate a disclosure. Of
355 57 F. 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1893).
356

Id. at 370.

357

Id.

358 Id.
359
360
361
362
363

Id.
Id.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 373.
Id. (citing Sm

FREDERICK POLLOCK, PRINCIPLES OF CoNTAcrs: A TREATISE ON

THE GENERAL PRINCIPLES CONCERNING THE VALIDIY OF AGREEMENTS IN THE LAW OF
ENGLAND 491). See also Beers v. Hamburg - American Packet Co., 62 F. 469, 472

(S.D.N.Y. 1894) (asserting that if one chooses to answer inquiries, he "is bound to
answer in good faith, and without deceit, if he answers at all").
364 Other cases have also applied this same law. E.g., Gottschalk v. Kircher, 17 S.W.
905, 909 (Mo. 1891); Parry v. Parry, 48 N.W. 654, 657 (Wis. 1891).
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course, the early cases reflect the ethics of their day and the strong
influence of caveat emptor that was then prevalent. Thus, it is not
surprising that the initial cases found that good faith required disclosures only when there was an affirmative misrepresentation and active
concealment (Stewart), an affirmative misrepresentation and a halftruth or partial disclosure (Tyler), and a representation that later
turned out to be false (Loewer), while at the same time denying relief
where the facts were open and susceptible to discovery by the complainant in an investigation he undertook (Farrar). Nevertheless, the
stage was set so that increased disclosures would be required as our
business ethics changed and the mandates of good faith evolved.
For almost twenty years after Loewer, little development of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing as applied to disclosures in contract negotiations occurred, although another Supreme Court decision, as well as cases in Georgia, Kentucky, Maine and Texas,
recognized that "good faith" determined whether there was a duty to
speak.3 65 In 1913, the Supreme Courts of Iowa and Oklahoma had
occasion to address the issue. Although those courts did not expand
upon the disclosures required by good faith, it is significant that both
courts recognized that the dictates of good faith determined the duty
to speak.
In Boileau v. Records & Breen, the Supreme Court of Iowa explained that: "Under certain circumstances concealment of a material
fact which the party is bound in good faith to disclose will amount to a
misrepresentation, if it was an inducing cause in the transaction."3 6 6
The court also noted, however, that mere silence as to a material fact
was not as a matter of law "equivalent to a false representation," and
the court asserted that if a "purchaser has equal and available means
of information, he must make use of them, and in failing to do so he
cannot recover on the grounds that he was mislead."36 7 In accord
with this reasoning, the court held that defendant was not liable for
failing to inform plaintiff that a tax deed defendant had sold to plaintiff was subject to attack. The court added that the original owner of
365 Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 430-31 (1909) (in a case originating in the Philippines, the Court indicated that a duty to disclose arose when required by "good
faith"); In re. S. Patterson & Co., 125 F. 562, 566 (N.D. Tex. 1903) (quoting Stewart v.
The Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888)); Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E.
232, 235 (Ga. 1903) (quoting Stewar4 128 U.S. at 388); Hays v. Meyers, 107 S.W. 287,
289 (Ky. 1908) (quoting Stewart, 128 U.S. at 388); Barrett v. Lewiston, B. & B. St. Ry.,
85 A. 306, 308 (Me. 1912) ("If, with intent to deceive, one party to a contract conceals
or suppresses from the other a material fact, which he is in good faith bound to disclose, it is tantamount to a false representation.").
366 Boileau v. Records & Breen, 144 N.W. 336, 338 (Iowa 1913) (emphasis added).
367 Id. (citation omitted).
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the property had a possible defense, based on his mental incompetence, to the forced sale of his property to pay taxes. The court did
not believe that defendant, in good faith, had to reveal information
about possible defenses because plaintiff had already been put on notice of possible defenses or could on his own have ascertained the true
facts by reviewing court records.
The same law was applied by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Miller v. Wissert, but a different result was reached." 8 In Miller, defendant sold real estate to plaintiff after representing that it was a 160
acre parcel when, in fact, it was only 148.94 acres. After plaintiff
purchased the property, defendant gave plaintiff a patent showing
that the property consisted of only 148.94 acres. Defendant had withheld the patent from both plaintiff and plaintiff's real estate agent
prior to consummation of the sale, even though plaintiff had asked
for it. Based on those facts, the court asserted that defendant had
intentionally fostered the impression that he was selling 160 acres and
held:
The rule is that if, with intent to deceive, either party to a
contract of sale conceals or suppresses a material fact which he is
in good faith bound to disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to
a false representation, because the concealment or suppression
is in effect
a representation that what is disclosed is the whole
9
truth

36

As in Boileau, the court also stated that to be actionable, the facts concealed must not be "equally within the knowledge or reach of the
plaintiff." 7 ° That a survey of the property or a review of the plats in
the public record would have revealed the true facts to plaintiff did
not prevent plaintiffs recovery in the case.
Stewart, Farrar, Tyler, Griel and/or Loewer were followed by a
number of cases in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s in federal court 7" and
in Alabama,3 7 2 California, 73 Connecticut,3 74 the District of Colum368

134 P. 62 (Okla. 1913).

369 Id. at 63-64 (emphasis added).
370
371

Id. at 64.

General Reinsurance Corp. v. Southern Sur. Co., 27 F.2d 265, 272 (8th Cir.
1928) (finding that in a reinsurance contract the insured must disclose all facts relating to the risk; "the pivotal test is good faith").
372 Lovell v. Smith, 169 So. 280, 284-85 (Ala. 1936); Southern Land Dev. Co. v.
Meyer, 159 So. 245, 246 (Ala. 1935); American-Traders' Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 133
So. 36, 38 (Ala. 1931). In Love// the court stated that "in cases of mere silence, there
must be the suppression of some material fact which honesty and good faith require
to be disclosed, under the facts of the particular case." Love. 169 So. at 285. In
Meyer, plaintiff sued defendant for rescission of a contract to purchase real estate alleging that the defendant had misrepresented the location of the property. The court
stated that the suppression of a material fact may be actionable if, with intent to
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bia,3 7 1 Illinois,3 76 Kentucky,- 77 Michigan, 3 78 Minnesota,3 79 Nebraska3 8 0
and New York. 8 ' Thereafter, the general recognition that standards
deceive, the "party to the contract conceals or suppresses a material fact which good
faith requires to be declared or disclosed." 159 So. at 246 (citations omitted). Henderson set forth essentially the same law citing, among other authority, Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U.S. 609 (1890). Henderson, 133 So. at 38.
373 Kershaw v. Julien, 72 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1934) (applying California law). In
this case, which involved plaintiff's purchase of a mortgage from a bank, the court
quoted the disclosure requirements set forth in Tyler v. Savage, 143 U.S. 79 (1892).
Kershaw, 72 F.2d at 530-31. The court found that there was a confidential relationship
between the parties because plaintiff had been a long time customer of defendant
bank, had purchased numerous mortgages from defendant bank over many years,
and as a longtime customer of the bank had relied upon the bank's representations to
her. Id. at 530.
374 Siro v. American Express Co., 121 A. 280, 282 (Conn. 1923) (citation omitted)
("The suppression of a fact is not a false representation in all circumstances.... The
fact suppressed must be one which is material to the contract of sale and which the
person suppressing was bound in good faith to disclose.").
375 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 37 A.2d 345, 350 (D.C. 1944) ("A suppression of the truth may amount to a suggestion of falsehood, and if, with intent to
deceive, either party to a contract conceals or suppresses a material fact, which he is
in good faith bound to disclose, this is evidence of and equivalent to a false
representation.").
376 Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County v. Christopher, 52 N.E.2d 313, 319 (Il.
App. Ct. 1943) (quoting Stewart v. Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388
(1890)).
377 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1929) (applying Kentucky
law). In Gay the court found that an insured had a duty to disclose material facts
discovered after he filed his application of insurance, but before the policy was issued,
which materially increased the risk of the insurance company. Id. at 638. The court
stated that: "It is well-settled that suppression of a material fact which a party is bound
in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation." Id. (citing Tyler v.
Savage, 143 U.S. 79 (1892)).
378 Wolfe v. A.E. Kusterer & Co., 257 N.W. 729, 730 (Mich. 1934) (quoting Stewart
v. The Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S. 383, 388 (1888)).
379 Shepard v. City Co. of New York, 24 F. Supp. 682, 686 (D. Minn. 1938) (applying
Minnesota law). In Shepard, defendant sold shares of stock in a Minnesota corporation to plaintiff without divulging to plaintiff that the stock was not registered as required by Minnesota law. The court found that this was fraudulent. Id. The court
stated that: "The suppression of a material fact which one is bound in good faith to
disclose may be equivalent to a false representation." Id. (citing Tyler v. Savage, 143
U.S. 79 (1892)).
380 Pearlman v. Snitzer, 198 N.W. 879, 880 (Neb. 1924) (quoting Stewart, 128 U.S. at
388); Linton v. Sheldon, 154 N.W. 724, 725-26 (Neb. 1915) (quoting Stewart, 128 U.S.
at 388).
381 Schroeder v. Schroeder, 56 N.Y.S.2d 36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945) (citing Loewer v.
Harris, 57 F. 368, 373 (2d Cir. 1893)); Noved Realty Corp. v. A. A. P. Corp., 293 N.Y.S.
336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937) (quoting Stewart 128 U.S. at 388); Boston & M. R. R. v.
Delaware & Hudson Co., 264 N.Y.S. 470, 476 (N.Y. App. Div. 1933) (noting that "[i]t is
often difficult to distinguish between facts which a party is bound in good faith to
disclose and facts which he is under no obligation to present"). In Schroeder, the court
ruled that
when one of the parties, pending negotiations for contract, has held out
to the other the existence of a certain set of facts material to the subject
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of good faith, fair dealing, common decency, equity, or good conscience should determine the propriety of precontractual disclosures
gained increased acceptance. Interestingly, this trend followed the
general development of the implied duty of good faith in contract
performance, which began to blossom in the 1950s and gained widespread acceptance in the late 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. The duty of
good faith disclosures, or its essential equivalent,3 8 2 was recognized by
at least five cases in the 1950s in five jurisdictions (California, Nebraska, Nevada, New York and Wyoming) ;"s' by at least six cases in the
1960s in five jurisdictions (Colorado, Idaho, Michigan, New York and
Washington) ;84 by at least fifteen cases in the 1970s and 1980s in thirmatter of the contract, and knows that the other party is acting upon
the inducement of their existence, and while they are pending knows
that a change has occurred of which the other party is ignorant, good
faith and common honesty require him to correct the misapprehension
which he has created.
56 N.Y.S. 2d at 38 (citing Loewer, 57 F. at 373). In Noved Really Corp., the court ruled
that
if, with intent to deceive either party to a contract of sale conceals or
suppresses a material fact, which he is in good faith bound to disclose,
this is evidence of and equivalent to a false representation, because the
concealment or suppression is in effect a representation that what is
disclosed is the whole truth.
293 N.Y.S. at 341 (quoting Stewart, 128 U.S. at 388).
382 Some courts have used such language as "good conscience," "equity," or "common decency."
383 Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 P.2d 14, 16 (Cal. App. 1956)
(citation omitted) ("Full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever fair
conduct demands it"); Darque v. Chaput, 88 N.W.2d 148, 155 (Neb. 1958) (quoting
Stewart, 128 U.S. at 388); Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 414 (Nev. 1954) (citing 37
C.J.S. Fraud§ 16a (1943)) ("The suppression of a material fact which a party is bound
in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation, since it constitutes an
indirect representation that such fact does not exist."); Schlenoff v. Kroll, 141
N.Y.S.2d 370, 373-74 (Mun. Ct. N.Y. 1955) (quotations omitted) (suggesting that a
defendant would be guilty of fraud if he concealed or suppressed material facts that
had to be disclosed in good faith); Steadman v. Topham, 338 P.2d 820, 826-27 (Wyo.
1959) (the court suggested that there is a disclosure requirement when "common
decency and ordinary honesty" require it).
384 Nicholas v. McGlothlin, 330 F.2d 455, 457 (10th Cir. 1964) (applying Colorado
law, the court ruled that in business transactions involving the purchase and sale of
stock the seller of the stock must not conceal "material facts which equity and good
conscience required him to disclose fully and honesdy"); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 184-86 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (recognizing that the law of deceit for a non-disclosure
was in a state of flux because of inroads being made into the doctrine of caveat
emptor, the court also acknowledged that a duty to correct prior statements was required in "good faith and common honesty" and that "the elements of 'good faith
and common honesty' which governs the businessman presumably should apply" to
independent accountants with regard to their disclosure duties);Janinda v. Lamming,
390 P.2d 826, 830 (Idaho 1964) (citing and quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 31 (1937)) (stating that there is a duty to
speak whenever justice, equity and fair dealing demand it); Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 415
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teen jurisdictions (Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Kansas, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Washington and Wisconsin);s85 and by at least five cases so far in the
P.2d 698, 706 (Idaho 1966) (same); Nowicki v. Podgorski, 101 N.W.2d 371, 378
(Mich. 1960) (citation omitted) ("It is also true that one who remains silent when fair
dealing requires him to speak may be guilty of fraudulent concealment."); Obde v.
Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 675 (Wash. 1960) (citing and quoting W. Page Keeton,
Fraud-Concealmentand Non-Disclosure, 15 Tr.x. L. REv. 1, 31 (1937)) (ruling that there
was a duty of disclosure whenever justice, equity, and fair dealing demanded it).
385 Huntsville Dodge, Inc. v. Furas, 361 So. 2d 585, 588 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978)
("Where, with intent to deceive, a party to a contract conceals material facts which
good faith requires him to declare or disclose, it is the equivalent of a false misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment."); Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850, 852
(Colo. CL App. 1981) (citation omitted) ("A false representation may be the'failure to
disclose a material fact which in good conscience should have been disclosed.");Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 628 (Fla. 1985) ("The law appears to be working toward
the ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it."); Gatto v. Walgreen Drug Co., 337 N.E.2d
23, 28-29 (Ill. 1975) (quoting Stewart v. The Wyoming Cattle Ranche Co., 128 U.S.
383, 388 (1888)); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210, 1229 (Kan. 1987) (citation omitted) ("Fraud may arise by the concealment of facts which legally or equitably
should be revealed .... ."); Moore v. State Bank of Burden, 729 P.2d 1205, 1212 (Kan.
1986) (citations omitted) ("A suppression or concealment of the truth is not at all
There must be a concealtimes such fraud or deceit as will be relieved against ....
ment of facts which a party is under a legal or equitable duty to communicate and in
respect of which he could not be innocently silent."); Bursey v. Clement, 387 A.2d
346, 348 (N.H. 1978) (citations omitted) (ruling that every agreement contains an
implied covenant that each of the parties will act in good faith and fair dealing with
the other and that this covenant required that a party engaged in negotiations of a
contract correct any prior statement he has made when it appears later to be erroneous or false); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 N.J. 445, 449, 455-56, 317 A.2d 68, 71, 74-75
(1974) (quotation omitted) (finding that silence is fraudulent where a contracting
party suppresses facts that he "under the circumstances, is found in conscience and
duty to disclose to the other party" and the court indicated that "modem concepts of
justice and fair dealing" are the applicable judicial standards); Grossman Furniture
Co. v. Pierre, 119 N.J. Super. 411, 420, 291 A.2d 858, 863 (Essex County Ct. 1972)
(asserting that a party to a contract must disclose facts that "fair dealing would dictate" be disclosed); Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332,
L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTs
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (quoting WniumL
§ 106, at 698 (4th ed. 1971)) (stating that the "'law appears to be working toward the
ultimate conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever
elementary fair conduct demands it'"); Diemert v. Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 546, 549
(N.D. 1980) ("The suppression of a material fact, which a party is bound in good faith
to disclose, is equivalent to a false representation."); Mitchell v. Slocum, 455 N.E.2d
20, 22 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1981) (citation omitted) ("The suppression of a material fact
which a party is bound in good faith to disclose is equivalent to a false representation."); Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 125 & n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (quoting
WiLLAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF ToRs, § 106, at 697-98 (4th ed.
1971)) (recognizing that disclosures had to be made "when elementary fair conduct
demands it" and indicated that this required that the seller of a home disclose serious
dangerous and latent defects known to exist by the seller). Judge Spaeth, writing a
concurrence in Quashnock, stated that even if a party was not guilty of fraudulent
concealment they may have engaged in bad faith. Quashnock, 445 A.2d at 131
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1990s in four jurisdictions (Colorado, Louisiana, New York and Wisconsin)."36 Thus, the duty of good faith disclosure in contract formation has been recognized in federal courts, the District of Columbia
3 87
and in at least twenty-eight states.
The preceding cases have involved a wide range of transactions,
including transactions pertaining to the sale of commercial real es39 2
39 0
stock or bonds,3 91 mortgages,
tate,38 8 residences,3 8 9 businesses,
(Spaeth, J., concurring). The judge also indicated that disclosures should be made
when good faith and fair dealing required such disclosures and that disclosure of
known termite infestation was not too much to demand of a seller. Id. Bazan v. Dept.
of Social and Health Servs., 616 P.2d 413, 416 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980) (citation omitted) ("Fraud may also be the willful concealment of a material fact that one is bound
to disclose in good faith."); Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 102-03 (Wis.
1980) (quoting W. Page Keeton, Fraud-Concealmentand Nondisclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv.
1, 31 (1936)) (recognizing that attitudes towards good faith and fair dealing in business transactions have changed).
386 Heineman v. S&S Mach. Corp., 750 F. Supp. 1179, 1186 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (asserting that "'[t]he law appears to be working toward the ultimate conclusion that full
disclosure of all material facts must be made whenever elementary fair conduct demands it.'") (quoting WILiAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 106,
at 698 (4th ed. 1971)). See Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992).
In Feit, the court declared:
To establish a primafacie case of fraudulent concealment, plaintiff must
prove that the defendant knowingly concealed a material fact that in
equity or good conscience should have been disclosed with the intent
the Plaintiff act on that concealed fact and that the Plaintiff did act on
the concealment resulting in damage.
Id.; see also Berger v. Sec. Pac. Info. Sys. Inc., 795 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Colo. Ct. App.
1990) ("Stated generally, a person has a duty to disclose to another with whom he
deals facts that 'in equity and good conscience' should be disclosed.") (quotation
omitted); Bunge Corp. v. GATX Corp., 557 So. 2d 1376, 1383 (La. 1990) ("Modern
law... imposes on parties to a transaction a duty to speak whenever justice, equity,
and fair dealing demand it."); Green Spring Farms v. Spring Green Farm Ass'n Ltd
Partnership, 492 N.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (applying a more enlightened rule that rejects strict application of the doctrine of caveat emptor because
"business ethics have changed and moved toward more stringent requirements of fair
dealing").
387 These states are: Alabama, California, Connecticut, Colorado, Florida, Georgia,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming.
388 Farrar v. Churchill, 135 U.S. 609 (1890); Stewart v. The Wyoming Cattle Ranche
Co., 128 U.S. 383 (1888); Southern Land Dev. Co. v. Meyer, 159 So. 245 (Ala. 1935);
Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l. Trust & Say. Bank, 300 P.2d 14 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956);
Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d 826 (Idaho 1964); Bursey v. Clement, 387 A.2d 346
(N.H. 1978); Diemert v. Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 546 (N.D. 1980); Mitchell v. Slocum,
455 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1981); Miller v. Wissert, 134 P. 62 (Okla. 1913); Obde
v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960).
389 Feit, 826 P.2d 407; Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981);
Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1985); Bethlahmy v. Bechtel, 415 P.2d 698
(Idaho 1966); Boileau v. Records & Breen, 144 N.W. 336 (Iowa 1913); Darque v.

1993]

GOOD FAITH DISCLOSURES

161

personal property3 9 3 and insurance.3 9 4 In addition, the cases have applied the good faith duty of disclosure to set aside the distribution of
an estate,3 9 5 to rescind a contract sending children to a summer
camp,3 96 to loan transactions, 3 97 to accountants with regard to their
audits and studies performed for a publicly traded company,3 98 to the
interpretation of the Aid to Families With Dependent Children proto the sale of a dairy
gram, 399 to an employment-at-will contract,'
4
1
farm and to a wholesale distribution contract. 40 2 Thus, it is clear
that the standard of good faith and fair dealing to measure the duty to
speak is a general duty applicable to all forms of transactions.
There are also a number of cases that have held that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing required disclosures after a contract had
been entered into.4 °3 Although one of those cases declared, in dicta,
Chaput, 88 N.W.2d 148 (Neb. 1958); Weintraub v. Krobatsch, 64 NJ. 445, 317 A.2d 68
(1974); Quashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1982).
390 Loewer v. Harris, 57 F. 368 (2d Cir. 1893); Heineman v. S&S Mach. Corp., 750
F. Supp. 1179 (S.D.N.Y. 1990); Nowicki v. Podgorski, 101 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1960).
391 Nichoalds v. McGlothlin, 330 F.2d 454 (10th Cir. 1964); Shepard v. City Co. of
New York, 24 F. Supp. 682 (D. Minn. 1938); Lovell v. Smith, 169 So. 280 (Ala. 1936);
Wolfe v. A.E. Kusterer & Co., 257 N.W. 729 (Mich. 1934).
392 Kershaw v.Julien, 72 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1934); Noved Realty Corp. v. A. A. P.
Co., 293 N.Y.S. 336 (N.Y. App. Div. 1937).
393 Huntsville Dodge, Inc. v. Furnas, 361 So. 2d 585 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978) (sale of a
car); Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210 (Kan. 1987) (sale of an intrauterine
device known as the "Dalkon Shield"); Grossman Furniture Co. v. Pierre, 119 NJ.
Super. 411, 291 A.2d 858 (Essex County Dist. Ct. 1972) (sale of furniture).
394 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1929) (suit for proceeds of
life insurance policy); General Reinsurance Corp. v. Southern Sur. Co., 27 F.2d 265
(8th Cir. 1928) (reinsurance); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Adams, 37 A.2d 345 (D.C.
1944) (suit for proceeds of life insurance policy); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 56 N.Y.S.2d
36 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945) (suit involved assignment of certain insurance policies apparently as part of a divorce settlement).
395 Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409 (Nev. 1954).
396 Schlenoff v. Kroll, 141 N.Y.S.2d 370 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1955).
397 Moore v. State Bank of Burden, 729 P.2d 1205 (Kan. 1986); Steadman v.
Topham, 338 P.2d 820 (Wyo. 1959).
398 Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
399 Bazon v. Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 612 P.2d 413 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
400 Berger v. Sec. Pac. Info. Sys., Inc., 795 P.2d 1380 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
401 Green Spring Farns v. Spring Green Farm Ass'n Ltd. Partnership, 492 N.W.2d
392 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
402 H&H Distribs., Inc. v. BBC Int'l, Inc., 812 P.2d 659 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990).
403 Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Frey, 941 F.2d 588, 593-98 (7th Cir. 1991)
(asserting that the duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every contract, under
certain circumstances, may require disclosure of information during performance of
the contract, particularly when the party with superior knowledge can correct at no
cost the mistake of the other party); AMPAT/Midwest, Inc. v. Illinois Toolworks, Inc.,
896 F.2d 1035, 1040-41 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing read into every contract requires the seller of a defective product to reveal the
defect and help the buyer avoid the adverse consequences of the defective condition);
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that the duty of good faith was not a duty of candor and was minimized in contract negotiations, that case did not address the considerable authority set forth above.'
Most cases that utilize the duty of good faith and fair dealing to
measure required disclosures have done so in the context of one or
more of the generally recognized exceptions to the rule that one may
remain silent without incurring liability. Thus, many of the cases involved affirmative misrepresentations or active concealment,40 5 a duty
40 7
to correct prior statements," 6 partial or ambiguous statements,
confidential relationships,40 superior knowledge or the "special facts"
doctrine,40 9 or insurance.410 In addition, at least two of the cases concerned real estate transactions involving a latent dangerous defect
(termite infestation), which some jurisdictions have long held to be
another exception to the general rule of non-disclosure. 41 ' Some of
the cases that have applied good faith as the standard to measure disWalker v. KFC Corp., 515 F. Supp. 612, 621-22 (S.D. Cal. 1981) (ruling, in a franchise
contract case involving a fast food restaurant, that the duty of good faith and fair
dealing implied in all contracts required the franchisor to disclose certain material
facts during the performance of the contract), rev'd, 728 F.2d 1215, 1222 (9th Cir.
1984) (the appellate court reversed the concealment instructions of the district court
because they imposed on every party to a contract a duty to disclose all material facts
even if known or reasonably accessible to the other party, which the court explained
was not consistent with the California law applicable to the case).
404 Market St. Assoc. Ltd. Partnership,941 F.2d at 594-95.
405 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F.2d 634, 634-35 (6th Cir. 1929); Diemert v.
Johnson, 299 N.W.2d 546, 547 (N.D. 1980); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 675
(Wash. 1960).
406 Bursey v. Clement, 387 A.2d 346, 348 (N.H. 1978); Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Schroeder v. Schroeder, 56 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38 (N.Y. App. Div.
1945); Bazan v. Dept. of Social and Health Servs., 612 P.2d 413, 419 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980).
407 Feit v. Donahue, 826 P.2d 407, 412 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992); Berger v. Sec. Pac.
Info. Sys., Inc., 795 P.2d 1380 (Colo. App. Ct. 1990); Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d
826, 830 (Idaho 1964); Noved Realty Corp. v. A. A. P. Co., 293 N.Y.S. 336, 341 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1937).
408 Kershaw v. Julien, 72 F.2d 528, 530 (10th Cir. 1934); Schlenoff v. Kroll, 141
N.Y.S.2d 370, 374 (N.Y. Mun. Ct. 1955).
409 Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Cohen v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 P.2d 14, 16 (Cal. App. 1956);
Villalon v. Bowen, 273 P.2d 409, 414-15 (Nev. 1954); Green Springs Farm v. Spring
Green Farm Ass'n Ltd. Partnership, 492 N.W.2d 392 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992).
410 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gay, 36 F.2d 634, 638 (6th Cir. 1929).
411 Quaashnock v. Frost, 445 A.2d 121, 125 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1982) (ruling that seller of
real estate must disclose to purchaser serious and dangerous context defects such as
termite infestation); Obde v. Schlemeyer, 353 P.2d 672, 675 (Wash. 1960). Another
case that may fall within this category is Tetuan v. A.H. Robins Co., 738 P.2d 1210,
1228-29 (Kan. 1987). Although Tetuan does not involve a real estate transaction, the
case involved an intrauterine device, the "Dalkon Shield," which was found to be a
dangerous device. See genera//y Keeton, supra note 14, at 14-17; see also Cutter v.
Hamlen, 18 N.E. 397 (Mass. 1888).
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closure requirements, however, do not fall neatly within the exceptions to the traditional rule permitting silence, which demonstrates
that the disclosures required by good faith are in flux and
expanding.4 1 2
It might be argued that, even though the courts have used the
language of good faith and fair conduct to determine when a duty to
speak should be imposed, the cases do not warrant any extension of
disclosure requirements because almost all of the cases fall within recognized exceptions to the general rule of non-disclosure. 4 13 This argument, however, misses the point. The cases recognize that
contemporary notions of good faith, fair dealing, and common de412 In Nowicki v. Podgorski, 101 N.W.2d 371 (Mich. 1960), the court found defendants, husband and wife, to be guilty of fraud in the sale of defendants' grocery store to
plaintiff, even though the wife made no affirmative misrepresentations and none of
the exceptions to the general rule permitting silence applied to her conduct, because
the wife sat by silently as her husband misrepresented certain facts about the grocery
store to plaintiff. Id. at 373, 378. In Schnell v. Gustafson, 638 P.2d 850 (Colo. App.
Ct. 1981), the court held that previous owners of a home could be found guilty of
fraud in the sale of the residence to plaintiff for failing to inform plaintiff that the
home was built on radioactive uranium mine tailings, even though defendants were
not the sellers of the residence (plaintiff bought the home from a company that had
purchased the home from defendants). Id. at 851-52. The court reasoned that even if
defendants were not the sellers of the property, they had a duty to disclose the defect
to the buyer because "equity and good conscience" demanded disclosure, Id. at 852.
Additionally, in Mitchell v. Slocum, 455 N.E.2d 20, 23-24 (Ohio Mun. CL 1981), defendant was found guilty of fraud in the sale of commercial real estate because he
failed to inform plaintiff that the City of Akron, Ohio was going to charge the property in question with the cost of closing a vault under the sidewalk in front of the
property. Defendant was found guilty of fraud even though there were no inquiries
from plaintiff with regard to this matter, and even though defendant made no disclosures, partial or otherwise, on the topic. Id. at 24. Moreover, in Shepard v. City Co. of
New York, 24 F. Supp. 682 (D. Minn. 1938), the mere sale of unregistered stock alone
was found to be fraudulent. Id. at 684. Finally, in Ollerman v. O'Rourke, 288 N.W.2d
95, 107 (Wis. 1980), the court declared that the seller of a residential lot had the duty
to disclose material facts to a non-commercial purchaser when the facts were not readily discernable to the purchaser.
413 One commentator has asserted this type of argument. Jon Warren, Is The Duty
to Disclose a Question of FairConduct?,2 IDAHo L. REv. 112 (1965). Warren reviewed the
following cases: Janinda v. Lanning, 390 P.2d 826 (Idaho 1964); Obde v. Schlemeyer,
353 P.2d 672 (Wash. 1960); Steadman v. Topham, 338 P.2d 820 (Wyo. 1959); Cohen
v. Citizens Nat'l Trust & Sav. Bank, 300 P.2d 14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956); Villalon v.
Bowen, 273 P.2d 409 (Nev. 1954). Another commentator reviewing the Obde decision
suggested that the "case might be viewed... as a concrete manifestation of the court's
ability to place liability where considerations of fair dealing indicate it should lie by
mechanism of labeling specific factual patterns arising in the vendor-purchaser interchange as constituting conditions dangerous to life, health or property." Virginia
Lyness, Note, Silence as FraudulentConcealment -Vendor and Purchaser- Duty to Disclose, 36
WASH. L. REV. 202, 204 (1961). These commentators appear to have been unaware of
the other considerable authority applying notions of good faith and fair dealing to
measure disclosure requirements.
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cency are ultimately the concepts by which disclosure requirements
are to be measured. That most of the cases fall within traditional exceptions to the rule of non-disclosure does not mean that good faith
requires disclosures only in those cases. The exceptions were created
over time as our society changed and decided that good faith and fair
dealing demanded them. 4 14 This demonstrates that good faith is the
proper standard and that, when society's notions of what is required
by good faith and business ethics change, disclosure requirements
also change.
2.

Restatement (Second) of Contracts and Torts

Both the Restatements (Second) of Contracts and Torts recognize that notions of good faith and fair dealing, at least under certain circumstances, are relevant for determining when one has a
duty to speak. Although the Restatements' rules still give weight to
caveat emptor, both acknowledge that changing societal ethics and
norms affect disclosure requirements and that those requirements
may expand as ethics and norms change.
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 161, which
deals with the effect of silence during precontractual negotiations,
was submitted to the members of the American Law Institute (ALI)
on April 15, 1976 and was substantially incorporated into the Restatement (Second) on May 17, 1979.415 Section 161 is based on
the Restatement of Contracts sections 471 (c) and 472, adopted in
414 Numerous commentators have recognized, after reviewing the cases, that the
courts, whether they say so or not, have been applying contemporary standards of
good faith and fair dealing to determine whether disclosures should be made. See also
note 15 for a discussion of some other commentators' views. In Olerman v. O'Rourke
Co., the court observed:
Over the years society's attitudes toward good faith and fair dealing in
business transactions have undergone significant change, and this
change has been reflected in the law. Courts have departed from or
relaxed the "no duty to disclose" rule by carving out exceptions to the
rule and by refusing to adhere to the rule when it works an injustice.
Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., 288 N.W.2d 95, 102 (Wis. 1980). See also Goldfarb, supra
note 8, at 43 ("[I]n the typical transaction, nondisclosure of material facts on the part
of a vendor or purchaser is not fraudulent. This is the older law, and, notwithstanding a movement in the other direction, manifested by the gradual multiplication of
qualifying exceptions, it is the modem law as well."). Another commentator has
noted:
[A] ccount should be taken of the ethical quality of the defendant's conduct; and there are clear indications that our courts are moving in this
direction. This is one aspect of a general movement toward holding
parties to business transactions to standards of fair dealing, a tendency
illustrated by the gradual whittling away of the maxim caveat emptor.
GEORGE E. PALMIn, MIsTAEz AND UNJuSr ENUcHMzNT 83 (1962).
415 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 161 states:
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1932, and the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 551.416 As
finally adopted, section 161 is, perhaps, an awkward formulation of
rules normally asserted to lie in the tort arena. Most of the disclosure requirements set forth in section 161 are based on well established fraud and misrepresentation law.41 7
Section 161 (b) provides that disclosure is required to correct a
mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that
party is making a contract, if non-disclosure of the fact would
amount to "a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with
A person's non-disclosure of a fact known to him is equivalent to an
assertion that the fact does not exist in the following cases only:
(a) where he knows that disclosure of the fact is necessary to prevent some previous assertion from being a misrepresentation or from
being fraudulent or material.
(b) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party as to a basic assumption on which that party is
making the contract and if non-disclosure of the fact amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable standards of
fair dealing.
(c) where he knows that disclosure of the fact would correct a mistake of the other party to the contents or effect of a writing, evidencing
or embodying an agreement in whole or in part.
(d) where the other person is entitled to know the fact because of a
relation of trust and confidence between them.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTS § 161 (1979).
416 See id. at Reporter's Note. The Restatement of Contracts § 471(c) defined
fraud, in pertinent part, as "non-disclosure where it is not privileged, by any person
intending or expecting thereby to cause a mistake by another to exist or continue, in
order to induce the latter to enter into or refrain from entering into a transaction."
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 471(c) (1932). Comment g to § 471 provided that it is not always fraudulent "for a person to fail to inform the other party to a
bargain that he is acting under a mistake." Id. § 471 cmt. g. Section 472 set forth the
circumstances when non-disclosure is not privileged:
(1) There is no privilege of non-disclosure, by a party who
(a) has previously made the misrepresentation, either innocently
or without any intention or expectation that it would induce conduct
and subsequently before a transaction has been induced thereby is
aware of the facts and intends or expects that conduct will be induced
by the mistake, or
(b) knows that the other party is acting under a mistake as to undisclosed material facts, and the mistake if mutual would render voidable a
transaction caused by relying thereon, or
(c) occupies such a relation to the other party as to justify the latter
in expecting that his interests will be cared for, or
(d) is denied immunity from non-disclosure by any special rules of
law.
(2) Where non-disclosure is not privileged it has the effect of a material
misrepresentation.
Id. § 472.
417 See supra note 415 (pointing out the disclosure requirements of § 161).
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reasonable standards of fair dealing."4 1 8 This is a modification of
the older Restatement non-disclosure rule pertaining to contract
negotiations. The first Restatement of Contracts did not measure
disclosure requirements by standards of good faith and fair dealing.4 19 Comment d to section 161 explains that a party is "ex-

pected only to act in good faith and in accordance with reasonable
standards of fair dealing, as reflected in prevailing business ethics."420 Consistent with traditional notions of caveat emptor, however, the comments also note that a party may "expect the other to
take normal steps to inform himself and to draw his own
conclusions."42 1
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 551, upon which
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, is partially based, addresses
the topic of "Liability for Nondisclosure" in business transactions.422 The rule is expressly worded in terms of the duty owed
418

See supra note 415 (setting forth the text of

TRAS section 161(b)).
419 See supra Section

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

III. D. 2 for a discussion of the first

CONTRACTS.
420 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 161 cmt. d (1979).
421 Id. Moreover, "[i]f the other is indolent, inexperienced or

OF CON-

RESTATEMENT OF

ignorant, or if his
judgment is bad or he lacks access to adequate information, his adversary is not generally expected to compensate for these deficiencies." Id.
422 Section 551 provides:
(1) One who fails to disclose to another a fact that he knows may justifiably induce the other to act or refrain from acting in a business transaction is subject to the same liability to the other as though he had
represented the nonexistence of the matter that he has failed to disclose, if, but only if,
he is under a duty to the other to exercise reasonable care to disclose the matter in question. (2) One party to a business
transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose to the
other before the transaction is consummated,
(a) matters known to him that the other is entitled to know because
of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between
them; and
(b) matters known to him that he knows to be necessary to prevent
his partial or ambiguous statement of the facts from being misleading;
and
(c) subsequently acquired information that he knows will make untrue or misleading a previous representation that when made was true
or believed to be so; and
(d) the falsity of a representation not made with the expectation
that it would be acted upon, if he subsequently learns that the other is
about to act in reliance upon it in a transaction with him; and
(e) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that the other is about
to enter into it under a mistake as to them, and that the other, because
of the relationship between them, the customs of the trade or other
objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of those
facts.
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during negotiations "before the transaction is consummated." Despite the confusion that revised section 551 would later engender,
the original provision had a rather inauspicious origin. The original section 551 appears to have been adopted almost verbatim
from Tentative Draft No. 13 at the May, 1936 ALI meeting.423 The
Reporter's explanatory notes to section 551 cited only three cases,
was "a slender
which caused at least one court to comment that this424
reed indeed upon which to predicate that section."

The revision of section 551 was first discussed at the 1965 ALI
meeting, when suggested improvements were circulated as part of
Tentative Draft No. 11. The proposed revision was essentially a reorganization of the original section 551 with one major addition
dealing with precontractual negotiations. 425 That new addition,

section 551 (2) (e), provided that (i) one party to a business transaction is under a duty to disclose to the other before the transaction
is consummated, (ii) facts basic to the transaction, if he knows that
the other is about to enter into the transaction under a mistake as
to such facts, and that the other, because of the relationship between them, the customs in the trade, or other objective circumstances, would reasonably expect a disclosure of such facts.42 6
The Reporter, in his explanatory notes, discussed the legal
trends preceding the creation of section 551(2)(e) 427 and cited
over twenty-five cases in support of the proposed clause, most of
which refer to real estate or animal sales. 2 ' The discussion of proposed section 551 at the 1965 ALI meeting was wide ranging and
inconclusive.42 9 At least one judge, however, was later able to re-

view the record of the proceedings and conclude that the section's
"history indicates that its purpose was to liberalize the traditional
doctrine of caveat emptor, not to create a general tort of commercial
RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS

§ 551 (1976).

423 United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Fought, 630
424 Id. at 347.
425 Proceedings 1965, 42 A.L.I. PROC. 371 (1965).
426 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (Tentative
427 Id. The Reporter noted:

P.2d 337, 346 (Or. 1981).

Draft No. 11, 1965).

Clause (e) is new. There were cases to support it when the old Section
was drawn in 1936. Since then they have been piling up rapidly, and
there are now so many of them that they cannot be ignored .... Even if
they were not, the Subsection appears quite obviously right, if we consider such results as that in Swinton v. Whitinsville Savings Bank, (1942)
311 Mass. 677, 42 N.E.2d 808, where the defendant unloaded a termiteriddled house upon the plaintiff, and escaped all tort liability.
Id.
428

Id.

42

Proceedings 1965, 42 A.L.I. PRoc. 370-83 (1965).
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nondisclosure."43 ° Confused over the meaning of section
551(2) (e), the drafters agreed to hold over section for further
consideration. a1
Section 551 returned virtually unchanged to the 1966 ALI
meeting. Again, virtually all of the cases designated by the Reporter as support for clause (e) related to undisclosed defects in
the tide of land or basic chattel such as houses or animals.43 2 With
little additional fanfare or discussion, the ALI adopted section
551.4

The section 551(2) (e) duty to disclose facts basic 4 3 4 to the
transaction during negotiations is triggered only when "the relationship between [the bargaining adversaries], the customs of the
trade or other objective circumstances" require as much. 43 5 Com-

ment k, 4 6 and its deference to the "legitimate advantages" of supe430 United States Nat'l Bank of Oregon v. Fought, 630 P.2d 337, 353 (Or. 1981)
(Tanzer, J., dissenting). Judge Tanzer also stated that section 551's "words are consistent with its underlying intent to regulate sales and, to some degree, the broader class
of 'business transactions' (e.g., loans, leases) as opposed to on-going business arrangements and relationships such as that in this case." Id.
431 Proceedings 1965, 42 A.L.I. PROC. 370-83 (1965).
432 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 (Tentative Draft No. 12, 1966).
433 1966 Proceedings, 43 A.L.I. PRoc. 411-13 (1966). Unlike the first Restatement,
the official comments accompanying the second Restatement were designed to play
an important role in the section's interpretation:
The basic system of Blackletter, Comments, and Illustrations has been
retained in the second Restatement. The Comments are much more discursive, treating the rationale and application of the rule in considerable detail. Often the Blackletter is written in more genera, more flexible
language, and it now serves primarily as an introduction to the Comments,
which provide the essence of the treatment.
John W. Wade, The Restatement (Second): A Tribute to its Increasingly Advantageous Quality,
and an Encouragement to Continue the Trend, 13 PEPP. L. REv. 59, 61 (1985) (emphasis
added). Given the breadth of language used in section 551(2) (e), the comments
attached to that clause were created to flexibly trace the boundaries for its
application.
434 A basic fact is one
that is assumed by the parties as a basis for the transaction itself. It is a
fact that goes to the basis, or essence, of the transaction, and is an important part of the substance of what is bargained for or dealt with.
Other facts may serve as important and persuasive inducements to enter
into the transaction, but not go to its essence. These facts may be material, but they are not basic.
RESTAT-EmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. j (1976).
435 Id. § 551(2) (e).
436 Id. cmt. k. Comment k provides:
The rule stated in Subsection (1) reflects the traditional ethics of bargaining between adversaries, in the absence of any special reason for
the application of a different rule. When the facts are patent, or when
the plaintiff has equal opportunity for obtaining information that he
may be expected to utilize if he cares to do so, or when the defendant
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rior information and "better business acumen," explains why
Section 551 (2) (e) has not been actively applied in the area of major commercial negotiations. In essence, the customs of these business communities differentiate between facts that are "basic" and
those that are merely "material."4 7 Even the drafters of Section
551(2) (e) found it difficult to articulate the circumstances under
which the duty to disclose facts basic to the transaction would
arise.43 8
Despite a deference to the then current customs and ethics of
the business community, the comments also indicate that the drafters allowed for, and anticipated, a more expansive use of section
551 (2) (e) in the future. 43 9 Rather than create a static tort rule that
has no reason to think that the plaintiff is acting under a misapprehension, there is no obligation to give aid to a bargaining antagonist by
disclosing what the defendant has himself discovered. To a considerable
extent, sanctioned by the customs and mores of the community, superiorinformation and better business acumen are legitimate advantages, which lead to no
liability. The defendant may reasonably expect the plaintiff to make his own
investigation, draw his own conclusions and protect himself; and ifthe plaintiff
isindolent, inexperienced or ignorant, or his judgment is bad, or he does not
have access to adequate information, the defendant is under no obligation to
make good his deficiencies. This is true, in general, when it is the buyer of
land or chattels who has the better information and fails to disclose it.
Somewhat less frequently, it may be true of the seller.
Id.
437 The Reporter emphasized that the "[a]dvisers [were] unanimous in wishing to
limit Clause (e) to facts 'basic to the transaction.'" Id. The Reporter opined that the
"law may be moving in the direction of requiring disclosure of 'material' facts, but it is
not yet sufficiently clear to justify more than 'basic.'" RSrTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 551 (Tentative Draft No. 11, 1965).
438 Comment I to § 551 provides, in part:
It is extremely difficult to be specific as to the factors that give rise to
this known, and reasonable, expectation of disclosure. In general, the
cases in which the rule stated in Clause (e) has been applied have been
those in which the advantage taken of the plaintiffs ignorance is so
shocking to the ethical sense of the community, and is so extreme and
unfair, as to amount to a form of swindling, in which the plaintiff is led
by appearances into a bargain that is a trap, of whose essence and substance he is unaware.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 551 cmt. 1 (1976).
439 Comment Ito § 551 provides, in part:
The continuing development of modem business ethics has, however,
limited to some extent this privilege to take advantage of ignorance.
There are situations in which the defendant not only knows that his
bargaining adversary is acting under a mistake basic to the transaction,
but also knows that the adversary, by reason of the relation between
them, the customs of the trade or other objective circumstances, is reasonably relying upon a disclosure of the unrevealed fact if it exists. In
this type of case good faith and fair dealing may require a disclosure.
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would freeze the rule based on the customs and mores of the day,
the ALI noted that section 551 could grow in tandem with the progression, if any, of business ethics. Indeed, sometime after the
1966 annual ALI meeting, a paragraph was deliberately attached to
comment 1, which provides that:
There are indications, also, that with changing ethical attitudes in many fields of modem business, the concept of facts
basic to the transaction may be expanding and the duty to use
reasonable care to disclose the facts may be increasing somewhat. This subsection is not intended to impede that
development. 440
The most frequent application of section 551(2) (e) to date has
been in the area of negotiations for residential real estate. 441 The secdon has also been applied to a lesser degree in other consumer negotiations such as securities purchases, 442 lending, 44 ' car sales 444 and
insurance." 5 Some courts have also found an application for section
551(2) (e) in family law. 4 46
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin reviewed the developing duty
to disclose in Ollerman v. O'Rourke Co., Inc." 7 None of the cases analyzed or listed in the review involved major commercial transactions.4 48 In fact, the only unifying characteristic to all of the cases that
cite section 551(2) (e) is a defendant who takes advantage of an unsophisticated or incompetent plaintiff. Jersild v. Akeyi 49 is a textbook ex440
441

Id.

447

288 N.W.2d 95 (Wis. 1980).
Id. at 103 n.15.

See, e.g., Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 740 P.2d 1022, 1028 (Idaho 1987) (reversing
summary judgment to determine if fact that real estate was built on fill must be disclosed); Griffith v. Byers Constr. Co. of Kansas, Inc., 510 P.2d 198, 203 (Kan. 1973)
(ruling that purchaser may recover from residential real estate developer).
442 Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 552 F. Supp. 332, 337 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) (pertaining to silver monopoly created artificial prices that lured traders into
the futures market).
443 Bair v. Public Serv. Employment Credit Union, 709 P.2d 961, 962 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985) (ruling that lender must disclose terms of credit disability insurance policy
to borrower when insurance included as part of loan agreement).
444 Gaines Servs. Leasing Corp. v. Carmel Plastic Corp., 432 N.Y.S.2d 760, 761-62
(N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980) (asserting that failure to pay for car is a basic fact requiring disclosure to seller).
445 Eddy v. Sharp, 245 Cal. Rptr. 211, 213-14 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (pertaining to
insurer's duty to reasonably inform the insured of the insured's rights and obligations
under the policy).
446 Bryant v. Bryant, 495 N.Y.S.2d 121, 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (finding that section 551 (2) (e) applied to child support agreement); Abbate v. Abbate, 441 N.Y.S.2d
506, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (ruling that section 551(2)(e) applied to alimony
negotiations).
448

449 766 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Wis. 1991).
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ample of a factual setting that closely approximates that of a major
commercial transaction. Plaintiff Jersild was a vice-president of a
closely-held corporation. Despite his position, he was neither a stockholder nor privy to information about the finances of the company.
Defendant Aker, married to Jersild's cousin, was a shareholder in the
company and was fully aware that the company was in dire financial
straits.
Rather than answer a cash call for a personal investment in the
failing company, defendant Aker donated 150 of his personal shares
to the corporate treasury and then invited Jersild to become a shareholder. Jersild, flattered by the invitation, purchased the shares from
the corporate treasury. The court, in denying defendant's motion for
summary judgment against a subsequent tort claim based on nondisclosure, found sufficient evidence to go forward under section
551 (2) (e).45° While the family aspects of this case make it inapplicable to most major commercial transactions, it is evidence that the
courts may be willing to apply section 551(2) (e) in commercial negotiations if the circumstances call for it.
Section 551(2) (e) of the Restatement (Second) of Torts was
drafted and passed amid great consternation and debate. Unfortunately, its application over the past twenty-seven years has been so limited as to call into question whether these contentious ALI
proceedings were "much sound and fury signifying nothing." Nevertheless, the comments accompanying section 551(2) (e) make clear
that as the "customs and mores" of business evolve, so shall the effective reach of the section's duty to disclose.
F.

What Needs to be Disclosed-Six Views

The preceding subsections have demonstrated that the law increasingly has imposed standards of good faith and fair dealing in
both contract performance and formation. To the extent that the
law requires precontractual disclosures, many courts have recognized that contemporary standards of good faith and fair dealing
mandate these disclosures. The courts, for the most part, however,
have not set forth any clear standards or rationales for determining
what disclosures good faith and fair dealing require. Although the
lack of any clear standard or rationale, other than the rubric "good
faith and fair dealing," has some value because it allows disclosure
requirements to evolve with contemporary standards of morals and
business ethics, it is also useful to determine whether any guiding
450

1& at 721.
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principles or factors have been developed that can be applied generally to help determine what good faith and fair dealing requires.
In this subsection, six important views on the duty to disclose shall
be set forth and discussed. In addition, the interests or factors utilized to explain disclosure law will be examined.
1.

All material facts must be disclosed

Robert-Joseph Pothier, a French lawyer and judge who lived in
the 18th Century, espoused the most demanding position on the
duty of disclosure in business transactions.4"' Pothier argued that
in a sales contract, "good faith" required the divulgence of all material facts that the contracting parties would have an "interest in
knowing, touching the thing which is the object of the contract."" 2
Pothier thought that equity and justice required contracting parties to be equal. He believed that if one party had knowledge superior to the other, the party with more information had an unfair
advantage because the parties were no longer equal.45 3
Pothier also believed that the parties to a sales contract had an
obligation to reveal both intrinsic facts-those dealing with the
quality of the item itself-and extrinsic facts-those relating to the
environment or market in which the item is sold and which may
affect its value.4 54 Pothier rejected St. Thomas Aquinas's position
that a vendor could remain silent without incurring liability unless
the defect in the item sold could cause the vendee injury or unless
the vendor sold the item for more than it was worth. With regard
to this position, Pothier stated:
This decision appears to me to be unjust, since, as the vendor is
perfectly at liberty to sell or not to sell, he ought to leave the
vendee perfectly at liberty to buy or not to buy, even for a fair
price, if that price does not suit the buyer; it is, therefore, unjust
to lay a snare for this liberty which the vendee ought to enjoy by
concealing from him the vice of the thing, in order to induce
him to buy that which he may not have been willing to buy for
the price
for which it is sold to him, had he known of its
455
defects.

It does not appear that any American courts or other respected auSee supra note 193 for an example of Pothier's views.
452 Pothier,supranote 193, at 240, quoted also in Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.)
178, 185 n.2 (1817).
453 Id.
454 Id., quoted also in Laidlaw, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) at 185 n.2.
455 Id.
451
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thorities have adopted Pothier's views.4 56
2.

All material facts must be disclosed that affect the
common estimate which fixes the market price for
the item

Pothier's views have been considered "extravagant" and have
been rejected even by an American author who disagreed vehemently with caveat emptor, Gulian C. Verplank. In 1825, Verplank
wrote a book in which he not only criticized the Laidlaw decision,
but also criticized Pothier, the only authority relied on by the petitioner in Laidlaw.4 5 7
According to Verplank, the vendee's knowledge of the treaty
of Ghent in Laidlaw and his concealment of that fact from the vendor amounted to "the seizing [of] an advantage, where the contract
itself was formed upon the understanding that no such advantage
would be taken."45 s Verplank, however, did not believe there was
anything dishonest or unfair "in using superiorsagacity as to probabilities, or in applyinggreaterskill and better knowledge, as to thosefacts which
do not necessarily enter into the common calculations of those who fix the
current price, and concerning which no confidence, express or implied, is
reposed."4 59 Explaining that full disclosure would "destroy that fair
superiority which the industrious or the bold trader has earned 4by°
his labour or enterprise, over the careless and idly ignorant,"
Verblank therefore rejected Pothier's view. At the same time, however, Verplank also rejected the common law doctrine of caveat
neighbors
emptor because it required "all men ... to regard their
4 61
as sharpers, and to deal with them at arms' length."
Verplank argued instead that the same disclosure rules uti456 The views of Pothier, however, have been more influential in continental
Europe.
457 Gui.LAN C. VERi'AN, AN ESSAy ON THE DoCrIaN OF CoNracrs: BEING AN
INQUIRY How CoNTR&crs ARE AFFECTED IN LAW AND MORALs By CONCEALMENT, ERROR, OR INADEQUATE PRIcE 123-24, 128 (New York, G. & G. Carvill 1825). Verplank

set forth the following rule of disclosures in business transactions:
Whenever any advantage is taken in a purchase, or sale,from the suppression of
any fact, (not of an opinion or inference,) necessarily and materially affecting the common estimate which fixes the present market value of the thing sold," in
regard whereto, the sale alone conclusively proves, that it was presumed by the
losing party, that no advantage would be taken; such advantage is gained by
Fraud.

Id. at 125-26.
458 Id. at 124.
459 Id. at 127.
460 Id. at 128.
461 Id.
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lized in marine insurance cases, which Lord Mansfield set forth in
Carterv. Boehm, should be applied universally to determine the duty
to speak in business transactions.4 6 2 In support of this proposition,
Verplank expressed his belief that insurance law and its disclosure
requirements ought be applied in all contract cases because insurance law was wise, easy to understand, similar in all Western countries, and consistent with honesty and fair dealing. 463 Moreover,
Verplank asserted that an actionable concealment was "the suppression or reservation of some such fact, within the knowledge of
either party, and which the other has not the means of knowing, or
4
has presumed not to know." 1
Verplank explained that it is unfair to conceal or fail to disclose knowledge of material facts "concerning the terms or the subject of the contract, which necessarily and of course enter into all
calculations of price among those whose demand and supply, and
estimation of value, fix the market price of similar things ....
465
Verplank stated that material facts are those entering into the calculation of the market price and can relate to extrinsic circumstances which affect the terms of the contract or intrinsic
circumstances which relate to the quality and subject of the contract. 4 1 In addition, Verplank noted that the parties should have
the freedom "by the known usage of trade, or by express words," to
determine that the contract "is made at all risks," so that "neither
party is answerable except for positive and direct Fraud."4 67 Moreover, Verplank noted that the buyer must be presumed to have
known any defects apparent on inspection, although the buyer may
refute the presumption with positive contrary evidence. 4 "
3.

All material facts must be disclosed which the man of
ordinary moral sensibilities would have revealed
under the same or similar circumstances

Perhaps the most influential article on fraudulent concealment and non-disclosures is W. Page Keeton's 1936 work in the
Texas Law Review.4 69 In that article, after reviewing the law of
fraudulent concealment and non-disclosures, Professor Keeton
Id. at 175-98.
Id. at 177-79.
464 Id. at 180 (footnote omitted).
465 Id. at 227.
466 Id.
467 Id. at 229.
468 Id. at 230.
469 Keeton, supra note 15.
462
463
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suggested that a standard similar to that used in negligence cases
should be used to measure disclosure requirements.
In this connection it would seem that the conception of
negligence as the care of the ordinary prudent man would be a
benefit. It has been said that the standard man in his conduct
on the question of negligence evaluates interests in accordance
with the sentiment of the community. Why not employ the standard man in this connection? This would be, not the ordinary
man's views as to the ethical quality of the silence, but what the
man of ordinary moral sensibilities would have done; would he
have disclosed the information or would he have remained
47 0
silent?
Professor Keeton set forth at least nine factors that would be
helpful to a judge and a jury in determining whether the ordinary
ethical person should have disclosed a material fact under the circumstances of the transaction in question:
(1) "The difference in the degree of intelligence of the parties
to the transaction."471 A greater duty of disclosure is imposed
on the intelligent party if the opposing party is unusually
ignorant.
(2) "The relation that the parties bear to each other."4 72 If the
parties are in a confidential relationship or one party has reposed confidence and trust in the other, this supports a higher
duty of disclosure.
4 7
(3) "The manner in which the information is acquired." 1 If
the information subject to being disclosed has been discovered
by chance or by an illegal act, this favors disclosure of the information. However, if the information has been gained by extensive effort, "no one would contend that the duty of disclosure
" 474
should always exist.
(4) "The nature of the fact not disclosed." 47' There is a heightened duty of disclosure with regard to intrinsic facts and not as
high a duty of disclosure with regard to extrinsic facts.
(5) "The general class to which the person who is concealing
the information belongs."4 76 The buyer is not generally under
the same duty of disclosure as the seller.
(6) "The nature of the contract itself."4 77 Certain agreements,
470
471

Id. at 32.
Id. at 34.

472

Id.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.

473
474
475
476
477

Id.

Id at 36.
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such as releases, contracts of insurance, and contracts of suretyship, call for heightened disclosure of facts.
(7) "The materiality of the fact not disclosed." 47' The more important the fact is the more likely it should be disclosed.
(8) "The type of damage which the ignorant person will, or is
likely to, suffer from a non-disclosure."4 79 The duty to speak is
enhanced if non-disclosure may result in personal injury. There
is not as significant an interest in disclosure when silence only
results in economic loss.
(9) "[T] he conduct of the person with knowledge of the fact not
disclosed."48 ° There is a heightened duty of disclosure if the
person with knowledge of the material fact takes any affirmative
steps to conceal those facts.
Prosser and Keeton have, with the exception of number 8, repeated these same factors in their hornbook on the law of torts.48 1
Professor Keeton argued that the courts should address the above factors on a case-by-case basis to determine whether a duty to disclose
facts in good faith exists.48 2
4.

All material facts must be disclosed which are required
by a justifiable expectation of disclosure based on
contemporary societal standards of good faith

Professor Eric N. Holmes published a law review article 4 83 in
1978 that appeared to combine or borrow concepts from Verplank
and Keeton. Holmes, to the extent that he relied heavily upon the
concepts set forth by Lord Mansfield in Carter v. Boehm, borrowed
Verplank's analysis by suggesting that the disclosures traditionally
required in the formation of insurance contracts should also be
applied in all other contracts.

484

Holmes also appeared to borrow

from the concepts of Keeton insofar as he relied upon negligence
principles and the application of a series of factors to determine
whether disclosures were required. Specifically, Holmes wrote
that:
Just as negligence is a question of fair conduct, disclosure in
contract formation is a question of good faith and fair conduct
according to reasonable societal standards. It is the actual mores and expectations of society rather than its abstract ethical
478

Id.

479 Id.
480 Id.
481 PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note
482 Keeton, supra note 15, at 39-40.

483

Holmes, supra note 15.

484

Id. at 426-35.

8, at 739.
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views that control. Each contracting party is thus held to that
degree of responsibility regarding disclosure fit to the justifiable
expectations which each party knows or has reason to know.485
Holmes's analysis differed from Keeton's, however, in that
Holmes focused, not on what the reasonable man would have disclosed under the circumstances, but on what the justifiable expectations of the parties to the transaction are with regard to what should
be disclosed. As with Keeton, Holmes set forth a series of factors,
which were essentially the same as Keeton's, that should be considered by the trier of fact in determining whether disclosures were required.4 8 6 Using these factors as the criteria, Holmes concluded that
each contract should be evaluated in its "commercial context in terms
of good faith and fair conduct," and that the duty to disclose should
be tailored to fit the "expectations of the particular parties." 487
5.

All material facts should be disclosed that have been
casually acquired

Building on the third factor set forth by Professor Keeton
("the manner in which the information is acquired"48 8 ), Professor
485
486

Id. at 442.

See Holmes, supra note 15, at 443-47. According to Professor Holmes, the first
factor that should be considered when determining whether disclosure is required is:
(1) "The nature of the fact undisclosed." Id. at 443-44. Holmes argued that the distinction in the Restatements between "basic" and "material" facts is tenuous and that
the more important the fact is, the more likely it should be disclosed. Holmes wrote
that "the nature of the undisclosed fact should be one which would vitally influence a
party's basic assumptions in forming the contract and which does have a material
effect on the agreed exchange." Id. at 444 (footnote omitted). The second factor
that should be considered under Holmes' view is: (2) "Accessibility of knowledge." Id.
at 445. Holmes argued that "[a]nother factor to consider is the effect of superior
knowledge or means of acquiring knowledge by one party which creates an inequality
in contract formation." Id. Although Holmes indicated that it is impossible for the
law to put parties on an equal footing with regard to knowledge or experience, he
argued that there should be a duty of disclosure if "the superior knowledge of one is
not reasonably accessible to the other (and is not discoverable upon fair inquiry pursued with due diligence), or the means of acquiring knowledge are extremely and
unfairly unequal...." Id. Holmes argued on the other hand the one who is ignorant
or mistaken about the facts must bear the risk of "his ignorance or mistake if he does
not use due diligence and reasonable efforts to discover all relevant facts." Id. at 446.
The third factor that should be considered according to Holmes is: (3) "Objective
circumstances creating an expectation of and reliance on full disclosure." Id. Under
this heading, Holmes set forth four other factors relevant to determining a duty to
speak: (a) "the nature of the contract," (b) "trade customs and prior course of dealing," (c) "conduct of the party with knowledge," and (d) "status and relationship of
the parties." Id. at 446-69. All of those factors are taken from Keeton. Id. at 447
n.253. For a comparison, see Keeton, supra note 15, at 32, 34, 36-37.
487 Holmes, supra note 15, at 449.
488 Keeton, supra note 15, at 35.
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Anthony T. Kronman has argued that parties negotiating a contract must generally disclose only information casually acquired
and need not disclose information deliberately acquired.4s9
Kronman defined "deliberately acquired information" as "information whose acquisition entails costs which would not have been incurred but for the likelihood, however great, that the information
in question would actually be produced." 49° Kronman defined
"casually acquired" information as information which, if it involves
costs, "the costs incurred in acquiring the information.., would
have been incurred in any case ... ."491 Thus, Kronman focused
on economic efficiency and incentives to discover valuable information as the
key factors in determining disclosure
49 2
requirements.
Kronman argued that deliberately acquired information
should be considered a property right and that one way that the
legal system may recognize this property right is to permit the party
who has acquired the information to act upon it in entering into a
contract without divulging the information.4 9 3 Kronman argued
that, if courts do not permit deliberately acquired information to
be used without its disclosure, the incentive to produce such information will be reduced or curtailed, which is not in the best interests of our society.494 On the other hand, Kronman noted that
requiring the disclosure of casually acquired information will not
reduce the incentive to produce such information because that information would have been acquired independently regardless of
the cost involved in its production.4 9 5 With regard to casually acquired information, Kronman suggested that the party with this information ought to divulge it because that party was "likely to be a
better (cheaper) mistake-preventer than the mistaken party with
whom he deals, regardless of the fact that both parties initially had
equal access to the information in question. "496
489 Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, The Law Of Contracts, 7 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 33-34 (1978).
490 Id. at 13.
491 Id.

492 Another recent law review article also focuses on economic efficiency and the
maximization of societal wealth in developing a general theory on disclosure requirements. Christopher T. Wonnel, The Structure Of A General Theoy Of Nondisclosure,41
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 329, 333 (1991). Wonnel argued that Kronman "has moved the
discussion of nondisclosure in the right direction," but also expressed a belief that
Kronman's analysis is in some respects unsatisfactory. Id. at 342.
493 Kronman, supra note 489, at 15.
494 Id.
495 Id.

at 13-14.
at 14.

496 Id. at 16.
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Kronman's thesis has been picked up and followed in a series
of decisions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. in United States v. Dial,Judge Posner stated that liability was narrower for non-disclosure than for active
misrepresentation and indicated that "someone who bought land
from another thinking that it had oil under it would not be required to disclose the fact to the owner, because society wants to
encourage people to find out the true value of things, and it does
this by allowing them to profit from their knowledge."497 Shortly
after the Dial decision, Judge Easterbrook in Teamsters Local 282
Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, discussed disclosure requirements in
the context of a suit by the trustees of a pension trust fund against
the directors of a bank and a law firm representing the bank which
had borrowed money from the fund.4 98 The trustees argued that
the bank's directors and attorneys failed to disclose material adverse information about the bank. Citing Dial, the court indicated
that the law often imposes no obligation to disclose because such
information is commercially valuable and people must hide it in
order to exploit its value." 9 Otherwise, there would be no incentive to produce the information in the first place.5 °°
In FDIC v. W R. Grace & Co., Judge Posner again expounded
upon disclosure requirements in arm's length business transactions. 0 ' While the court recognized that an omission could be actionable as fraud, the court stressed that not every failure of
disclosure is actionable because that would turn "every bargaining
relationship into a fiduciary one."5" 2 The court stated that a blanket duty of disclosure would end arm's length bargaining and impede enterprise and commerce. 0 3 In addition, the court noted
that the seller, who had expended large sums of capital and time to
obtain information and expertise, was entitled to "take advantage,"
to a certain extent, of the buyer in an arm's length transaction.50 4
The court, however, explained further that a seller, who obtained
inexpensive, material information that would be extremely difficult
for a buyer to discover, was obligated to disclose such
information. °5
757 F.2d 163, 168 (7th Cir. 1985).
498 762 F.2d 522, 524 (7th Cir. 1985).
499 Id. at 528 (citing Dia/, 757 F.2d at 168).
500 Id.
501 877 F.2d 614 (7th Cir. 1989).
502 Id. at 619.
503 Id.
504 Id.
505 Id.
497
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There is no duty to disclose material information
outside of the generally recognized exceptions of
misrepresentation law

Perhaps the best known proponent of the position that there
should be no general duty of disclosure in arm's length business
transactions, beyond the generally recognized exceptions in the
area of the law of misrepresentation, is Professor E. Allen Farnsworth. Professor Farnsworth stated that the same duty of disclosure that, for example, exists between fiduciary and beneficiary,
would be inappropriate in ordinary contract negotiations. °6 Professor Farnsworth argued that there is little sense to impose a duty
on parties to ordinary contract negotiations to disclose material
facts unless the parties expressly assume disclosure obligations. 0 7
He noted that parties to negotiations may be competitors and,
even if they are not, there is frequently some concern that information disclosed during negotiations may fall into the hands of competitors.5 °8 In any event, Farnsworth questioned the necessity of
requiring extensive disclosure requirements when the parties can
and typically do deal with the matters themselves in their agreement. Professor Farnsworth explained:
Imposing a duty of disclosure on one party would raise the question of the scope of the concomitant duty of confidentiality of
the other party. Among the most common types of stop-gap
agreements are those providing for disclosure and confidentiality. Given the ease with which parties themselves can and do
deal with the matter of disclosure and related questions of confidentiality, there is scant reason for a court to impose such a requirement of disclosure, beyond that already imposed by the law
of misrepresentation. 5° 9
In Market St. Assocs. Ltd. Partnershipv. Frey, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in dicta, supported the proposition
that there is no general duty of candor based on good faith and fair
dealing in the precontractual stage involving contract negotiations.5 10
In Frey, the court addressed the disclosure duties of parties to a contract involving a commercial real estate lease with an option to
purchase the property under certain circumstances. In dicta, the
court also discussed the good faith duty of precontractual disclosure.
The court stated that the law contemplated that people will frequently
506

Farnsworth, supra note 55, at 278.

507 Id.
508 Id.

Id. at 278-79 (footnote omitted).
510 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
509
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take advantage of the ignorance of those with whom they contract
without thereby incurring liability, and that the precontractual duty of
good faith was "not a duty of candor."5 1 ' While taking advantage of
superior knowledge at the formation stage of a contract may not be
actionable, the court found that taking "deliberate advantage of an
oversight by your contract partner regarding his rights under the contract ... is sharp dealing," which may violate the duty of good faith
and give rise to remedies under contract law.5 1 The court explained
that the duty of good faith disclosure was heightened after the signing
of a contract. In the formation or negotiation stage of a contract,
however, "the duty is minimized."5 13
In addition, the court posited that disclosure duties differ depending upon whether a contract had been entered into before signing a contract, wherein parties are typically wary of one another and
neither party expects total disclosure from the other. Expectations of
disclosure change, however, after signing a contract because the relationship becomes cooperative. Nondisclosure after the contract is
signed, therefore, is more deceptive because the harmed party would
have been less cautious.5 14 Thus, although the court stated that the
duty of contractual good faith, "considered in all its variety," encompassed not only the performance and enforcement stages, but the formation stage as well, the duty of good faith disclosure in the formation
stage is minimal.51 5
V.

A.

DUTY OF GOOD FAITH TO DISCLOSURES
REQUIRES IN THE SALE OF A BusINEss

APPLICATION OF THE

Introduction

Most transactions involving the purchase and sale of a business
involve intelligent, capable businessmen, who are represented frequently by counsel and/or other experts. Such sales, as with most
business transactions, are generally said to be at arm's length. A
significant body of law follows the rule that there is no affirmative
duty to disclose information in an arm's length business transaction.5 16 That law has been applied even in states explicitly recogId. at 594.
Id.
Id. at 595.
514 Id. at 594.
515 Id. at 595.
516 E.g., American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Murray, 383 F.2d 81, 87 (5th Cir. 1967) ("Where
parties deal at arm's length, there is no duty of disclosure where the facts are equally
within the knowledge of both parties...."); Simpson Timber Co. v. Palmberg Constr.
511
512
513
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nizing that notions of good faith and fair dealing determine the
duty to speak during precontractual negotiations.5 17 This suggests
that at least some courts believe that our society's mores and business ethics permit the concealment (as long as it is not active),
suppression, or nondisclosure of material facts in arm's length
business transactions. Although some courts share in this sentiment, this belief is not a true reflection of what the law is or should
be in light of the continuing evolution of business ethics that has
occurred in the last few decades. In the following subsections this
Article will demonstrate that many recent cases involving business
transactions show a marked, though admittedly at times carefully
worded, movement away from caveat emptor and toward disclosure
of all material facts. Next, the Article will demonstrate that the
rationale or justifications behind good faith disclosures support
disclosure of all material facts by the seller of a business.
Co., 377 F.2d 380, 385 (9th Cir. 1967) (applying Washington law, the court ruled that
"businessmen dealing at arm's length are rarely under a duty to speak"); Bank of Red
Bay v. King, 482 So. 2d 274, 285 (Ala. 1985) ("When both parties are intelligent and
fully capable of taking care of themselves and dealing at arm's length, with no confidential relations, no duty to disclose exists when information is not requested, and
mere silence is then not a fraud. There must be active concealment or misrepresentation.") (citations omitted); Universal Inv. Co. v. Sahara Motor Inn, Inc., 619 P.2d 485,
487 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980) (ruling that in an arm's length transaction there is no special relationship that gives rise to a duty to disclose); Banks v. Salina, 413 So. 2d 851,
852 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (explaining that "there is no duty to disclose when
parties are dealing at arm's length") (citation omitted). Furthermore, in London v.
Gourduff, the court declared:
It is settled law in New York that the seller of real property is under no
duty to speak when the parties deal at arm's length. The mere silence of
the seller, without some act or conduct which deceived the purchasers,
does not amount to a concealment that is actionable as a fraud ....
The buyer has the duty to satisfy himself as to the quality of his bargain
pursuant to the doctrine of caveat emptor.
London v. Courduff, 529 N.Y.S.2d 874, 875 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (citations omitted);
see aso Blon v. Bank One, Akron, NA, 519 N.E.2d 363, 367 (Ohio 1988) ("Ordinarily
in business transactions where parties deal at arm's length, each party is presumed to
have an opportunity to ascertain relevant facts available to others similarly situated
and, therefore, neither party has a duty to disclose material information to the
other.") (citations omitted); Tokarz v. Frontier Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n., 656 P.2d
1089, 1094 (Wash. Ct. App. 1982) (stating that "[o]rdinarily, the duty to disclose a
material fact exists only where there is a fiduciary relationship and not where the
parties are dealing at arm's length") (citations omitted).
517 For example, relatively recent decisions from Alabama, Florida, New York,
Ohio, and Washington have all followed the traditional rule that there is no duty of
disclosure in arm's length business transactions. See supra note 516. Courts from all of
those states have, however, recognized on various other occasions that the duty of
good faith and fair dealing determines when a duty to speak arises. See supra section
IV. E. 1.
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B. Movement Away from Caveat Emptor Toward Disclosure
Recent cases dealing with non-disclosures in the context of the
sale of a business can be broken down roughly into three categories. The first category of cases appears to support the traditional
rule that allows sophisticated businessmen in an arm's length transaction to remain silent. Even in these cases, however, the courts
have suggested that the rule applies only when the facts are open
or available to both parties. A second category of cases gives lip
service to the traditional rule, but appears to apply more scrupulous moral and ethical standards by requiring disclosures in instances where a more traditional application of caveat emptor
would not have found an actionable wrong. A final category of
cases appear to dispense with caveat emptor entirely.
1. The modified traditional rule-there is no duty to
disclose when the facts are available to both parties
Two relatively recent cases from the Supreme Courts of South
Dakota and New Mexico follow the traditional rule of caveat
emptor. Neither of these jurisdictions had adopted the good faith
duty of disclosure standard. In Taggart v. Ford Motor Credit Co., the
South Dakota Supreme Court upheld a summary judgment that
concluded that neither Ford Motor Company (Ford) nor Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford Credit) owed a duty to reveal negative
financial information to a prospective dealer who purchased a
Ford farm machinery and implement dealership from the former
518
individual owners of the franchise with financing by Ford Credit.
The court held that even if Ford and Ford Credit knew of the unstable financial condition of the dealership during the negotiations
and declined to disclose that fact, there was no duty of disclosure
because "[t] his court has never imposed a duty to disclose information on parties to an arm's-length business transaction, absent an
employment or fiduciary relationship." 5 19

The Taggart court

stressed that the buyer of the dealership was "an experienced businessman capable of taking adequate precautions to protect himself
in his business transactions." 52 0 The court further emphasized that
the buyer hired able counsel to represent him in his negotiations.
Another important, and perhaps dispositive, fact was that Ford and
Ford Credit were not parties to the sales transaction; plaintiffs did
518

462 N.W.2d 493 (S.D. 1990).

519 Id. at 499 (citation omitted).
520 Id. at 500.
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not even request any information from Ford or Ford Credit.521
Plaintiffs bought the franchise from the former owners and engaged in only minimal contact with Ford and Ford Credit. Moreover, the court noted that plaintiff, independently of defendants,
had received extensive financial information about the dealership,
including a financial report prepared by accountants, showing that
the dealership had contingent liabilities of over $1,000,000.522

Consequently, the court found that Ford and Ford
Credit did not
523
owe the buyer a duty to protect his interests.
Similarly, in Wilburn v. Stewart, the New Mexico Supreme
Court refused to hold that the seller had a duty to disclose the true
value of the assets of the corporation being sold merely because of
the relative imbalance of knowledge between the parties.524 The
court stressed that sophisticated parties, with access to the records
of the corporation and an opportunity to conduct an independent
investigation, conducted an arm's length business transaction. 25
The court also noted the absence of allegations of any fraudulent
or willful activity, as well as the absence of any "special relationship
or trust that would create a duty" of disclosure. 526 Finally, the court
stated that the purchasers included an attorney who was given the
opportunity to inspect the books of the corporation. In fact, the
court pointed out, the purchasers conducted their own investigation and worked in the business for six weeks before the sale was
consummated.527
2.

Authority that ostensibly follows but which suggests
discomfort with caveat emptor

A number of cases continue to use the rubric of caveat
emptor, but evidence a movement away from that doctrine. Some
cases have applied the superior knowledge doctrine to the sale of a
Id.
Id. at 497.
Id. at 500.
794 P.2d 1197, 1200 n.2 (N.M. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1198, 1200 & n.2. Other cases apply the same law. See, e.g., Duke v.Jones,
514 So. 2d 981, 984 (Ala. 1987) (citing Trio Broadcasters, Inc. v. Ward, 495 So. 2d
621, 624 (Ala. 1986)) (finding that in negotiations involving the purchase of a business, there is no duty "to disclose [facts] where the parties to a transaction are knowledgeable and capable of handling their own affairs"); Lowder Realty, Inc. v. Odom,
495 So. 2d. 23, 26 (Ala. 1986) (ruling, in the context of a business merger, that there
is no duty of disclosure where the transaction is at arm's length and where each party
was astute in business matters and was equally capable of protecting its respective
business interests).
521
522
523
524
525
526
527
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business between apparently sophisticated parties. In Smith v. Peterson, for example, the sellers of a lounge business and real estate
were found guilty of fraud for failing to reveal to the purchaser that
a nearby road was going to be widened, which would cause a loss of
access to the lounge and presumably a loss of business.528 The
court held that even in an arm's length transaction, the sellers of a
business must reveal important matters relative to the business
where the seller has "superior knowledge of facts, resulting in an
inequality of condition or knowledge between the parties." 529
There was no indication in Smith that a reasonable investigation,
which could have been limited to public records, could not have
discovered the widening of the road.
Likewise, in Young v. Keith, the court held that a purchaser
stated a cause of action against the sellers of a mobile park for the
sellers' failure to reveal to the purchaser that the water and sewer
systems for the mobile park were in serious need of repair. 53 0 The
court noted that the purchasers had bought an on-going business
and that the sewer and water deficiencies required expensive reconstruction and posed a threat to the business's operating license.
In addition, the court also observed that the purchasers had alleged that they could not have discovered the deficiencies in the
sewer and water systems through a reasonable inspection. The
court held that there is a duty to disclose "when one party to a
contract has superior knowledge which is not available to both
parties."

5 31

Applying the superior knowledge doctrine to cases involving
arm's length transactions between sophisticated businessmen, particularly when the facts may be discovered in a reasonable investigation, which appears to have been the case in Smith, is tantamount
to a complete rejection of caveat emptor. After all, the only material facts that a seller could be liable for failing to disclose are ones
that are based on "superior knowledge." Saying that someone has
superior knowledge of material facts is simply stating an obvious
prerequisite in all nondisclosure cases-that the other party is unaware of the facts. And if that is coupled with the circumstance that
the facts are available to be discovered in a reasonable investigation, then a requirement to disclose such facts is a complete rejection of caveat emptor.
528
529
530

531

282 N.W.2d 761, 767 (Iowa Ct. App. 1979).
Id. (citations omitted).
492 N.Y.S.2d 489, 490-91 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
Id. at 491 (citation omitted).
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While the Young court noted that the facts were alleged to
have been available to both parties, even that case evidences a shift
away from caveat emptor. The most extreme formulation of caveat
emptor applied the doctrine regardless of whether the facts were
latent or discoverable. 3 2 Even when facts are not readily discoverable in an independent investigation, sophisticated businessmen
usually know what they ought to inquire about from the other
party and thereby have the wherewithal to learn of the facts. This
may be one reason why some courts have stated that there is no
duty to disclose facts in arm's length transactions regardless of the
discoverability of the facts. Young appears to reject this position
and certainly has moved away from the most extreme formulations
of caveat emptor.5"'
In White v. Pepin, the Supreme Court of Vermont ruled in
favor of a disappointed purchaser who had acquired a corporation
in a transaction consummated after only brief negotiations. 53 4 The
purchaser claimed that the seller had a duty to disclose his knowledge of certain problems that the purchaser did not encounter until after the sale. The court acknowledged that under Vermont law,
when facts are equally obtainable by both parties, neither party was
required to speak in the absence of inquiry. The court held that
where an appropriate relationship exists between the parties, however, a duty to disclose does arise.53 5
After noting that the trial court had correctly characterized
the sale in question as an arm's length transaction because the parties were two sophisticated businessmen with no previous relationship, the court nevertheless held that a duty of disclosure during
negotiations existed because the seller had asked the buyer to
532 E.g., Swinton v. Whitinsville Sav. Bank, 42 N.E.2d 808 (Mass. 1942) ("The law
has not yet, we believe, reached the point of imposing upon the frailties of human
nature [a duty to disclose a nonapparent material defect known to the seller] ....
The rule of nonliability for bare nondisclosure has been stated and followed by this
court .... ") (citations omitted).
533 Other cases have also applied the superior knowledge doctrine to cases involving arm's length transactions. Although these cases pay lip service to caveat emptor,
they cannot be reconciled with that doctrine. See supra Section IV. 5. and accompanying text for a discussion of these cases.
534 561 A.2d 94, 98 (Vt. 1989). The negotiations lasted only one weekend in duration. Id.
535 The court noted:
While there is no general duty to disclose facts absent inquiry, this
Court has consistently held that liability for non-disclosure will arise
when there is "some duty, legal or equitable, arising from the relations
of the parties, such as that of trust or confidence or superior knowledge
or means of knowledge."
Id. at 96 (quotation omitted).
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move rapidly. Referring to this accelerated process, the court asserted that "[i]t is precisely this kind of conduct which gives rise to
53 6
an equitable duty to disclose all material facts and information."
The court stressed that the purchaser had been placed in a position where it was impossible, if he wanted to make a deal, to make
any investigation other than what he did, which was to examine the
books and records of the corporation provided by the seller, to
tour the factory on two separate occasions, and to question the
seller and other company representatives as to the liability of the
business.53 7
The White case demonstrated that even in arm's length business transactions, courts are willing to bend the rules to require
disclosures when good faith and fair dealing require them.
Although the White court indicated that the seller of the business
placed the purchaser in a position where it was impossible to make
a satisfactory investigation, the court might with equal validity have
concluded that the purchaser voluntarily accepted the risk created
by the inability to investigate. After all, the purchaser did not have
to purchase the company or go forward with the sale under any
terms. Nothing was forced upon the purchaser; he acquiesced in
the timing of the transaction. Thus, it might be concluded that the
purchaser was just as responsible for the inability to investigate as
was the seller. Why then shouldn't the traditional caveat emptor
rules apply? It is submitted that the reason the traditional rules
were not applied in White was because the court did not believe it
was fair or reasonable to do so under the circumstances of the case.
White appears to be an attempt to draw away from the older rules
without admitting that this is what is happening.
Other cases have also appeared to bend or even break the
traditional rules in arm's length transactions without admitting
that this has occurred. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit, for instance, in American Family Service Corp. v.
Michelfelder, held that lawyers representing the sellers of a business
were guilty of fraud for not disclosing to the prospective purchaser
and/or its attorneys that the sellers were also negotiating with another firm in violation of a no-shop clause in a letter of intent that
the parties had signed. 3 ' The sellers' lawyers were faulted, among
other reasons, for not revealing a draft agreement the seller had
with another party when the prospective purchaser's lawyers had
536
537
538

Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
968 F.2d 667, 672-74 (8th Cir. 1992).
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requested all major acquisition agreements involving the business. 53 9 This case demonstrates that some courts are willing to upof good faith and fair dealing on parties to
hold a higher standard
540
business transactions.

In In rejogert, Inc., the United State Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit also went out of its way to find that a real estate agent
involved in the sale of a lumberyard was guilty of fraud under California law.54 ' In that case, plaintiff acquired all of the stock of the
lumberyard from its three shareholders.542 A real estate agent with
Coldwell Banker acted as the seller's broker.543 After the sale,
plaintiff alleged that the sellers and the real estate agent had misrepresented the lumberyard's financial condition. 5 4" The court
found that the real estate agent had misrepresented the profitability and cash flow of the lumberyard and rejected the agent's argument that any false representations were immaterial because
plaintiff had a duty to perform an investigation of the lumberyard's
finances on its own, which it performed with the assistance of experts, and was charged with knowing what a reasonable investigation would have revealed. 545 The agreement between the sellers
and plaintiff also had an integration clause and incorporated financial statements that contradicted the real estate agent's alleged
misrepresentations. 46
Nevertheless, the court held that the real estate agent could
not rely upon the integration clause of the purchase agreement
because he was not a party to that agreement.5417 In addition, while
the court acknowledged that plaintiff had conducted an extensive
eight month investigation with the help of a lawyer, broker and
financial advisor, the court still found that the real estate agent
539 Id. at 673.
540 The traditional

position is that lawyers and accountants do not have to reveal
the fraudulent conduct of their clients to opposing parties in arm's length sales transactions. E.g., Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d 485, 490 (4th Cir. 1991) (finding that the
lawyers representing the purchaser of a business had no obligation to reveal to the
seller that the purchaser was having financial difficulties which made it unlikely that
the purchaser could pay the seller on promissory notes given by the purchaser to the
seller for the business); LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932-33
(7th Cir. 1988) (finding that accountant had no obligation under the security laws to
reveal that its client, the seller of a business, had given to the purchaser allegedly
incorrect information about the inventory of the business).
541 In reJogert, Inc., 950 F.2d 1498, 1507 (9th Cir. 1991).
542 Id. at 1500.
543 Id.
544 Id.
545 Id. at 1505-07.
546 Id. at 1506.
547 Id.
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because the real estate agent had
could be held guilty of fraud
"mesmerized" the plaintiff.548 The court noted that even though
plaintiff had the books and records of the company, which showed
its true financial position, the agent had told plaintiff that the
books and records were flawed.54 9 The court noted that the agent
had held himself out as an expert with superior knowledge of the
lumberyard's financial condition.55 ° In any event, the court ruled
that even if a proper investigation on behalf of the plaintiff would
have revealed the truth, no defrauder should benefit because he
dealt with an ignorant and gullible person.551
The duty to disclose all material facts is required by
good faith and fair dealing
In Green SpringFarms v. Spring Green Farm Associates Ltd. Partnership, a court of appeals in Wisconsin decided that notions ofjustice,
equity and fair dealing should be used to determine when disclosures ought to be made.552 The case dealt with the arm's length
sale of a dairy farm to investors. The purchasers of the farm alleged that the sellers were guilty of fraud for failing to disclose an
outbreak of salmonella bacteria in the dairy livestock two years
before the sale. Although some of the court's analysis may have
been based on the real estate nature of the transaction, the court's
reasoning was not limited to that context, because the case also
involved the sale of a business. The court noted that strict application of the doctrine of caveat emptor was being abandoned in favor
of a more enlightened rule and that business ethics had changed
to follow "more stringent requirements of fair dealing."55 The
court abandoned caveat emptor and held that sellers of real estate
must disclose all material facts that the "purchaser is in a poor posi3.

tion to discover."

554

Another recent case also suggests that the buyer of a business
owes a duty of good faith and fair dealing to the seller to reveal all
material information concerning the transaction that fairness
would require. In Heineman v. S & S Machinery Corp., a United
Id. at 1505.
Id. at 1506-07.
Id. at 1507.
Id.
492 N.W.2d 392, 396-97 (Wis. CL App. 1992) (quotation and citations omitted).
553 Id. at 397 (citation omitted). The court stated that "[tihe doctrine of caveat
emptor no longer excuses real estate sellers from fully disclosing to potential purchasers the existence of conditions which may be material to the decision to purchase and
which the purchaser is in a poor position to discover." Id.
548
549
550
551
552

554 Id.
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States District Court dealt with the issue of whether the buyer of a
business had a duty of good faith and fair dealing to disclose material facts during negotiations, even when there may have been no
traditional, flagrant misrepresentation and no special fiduciary relationship between the parties.5 5 In Heineman, plaintiff, the former owner of a corporation, sued an acquiring corporation and its
individual officers for fraud and breach of contract. During the
course of negotiations, among other things, defendant company
promised that it would guarantee certain indebtedness of plaintiff's company. Shortly before the execution of a stock purchase
agreement, plaintiff learned that defendant company, which was
originally to purchase the stock, had decided that one of its subsidiaries, which had insubstantial assets, would do so. Plaintiff permitted the change and later sought recovery.
The Heineman plaintiff conceded that he had agreed to the
purchase of his company's stock without inquiring into the financial status of the subsidiary and without verifying its assets. Defendants argued that in an arm's length business transaction involving
no special relationship between the parties, there is no affirmative
duty of disclosure, and plaintiff could not base a fraud claim on
plaintiff's own failure to make a simple inquiry with regard to information that would have been made available upon request. In response to these arguments, the Heineman court noted the trend
toward imposing a duty of disclosure even when there is no fiduciary relationship between the parties. The court supported this assertion by quoting from Gaines Service Leasing Corp. v. Carmel Plastic
Corp.,55 6 wherein the court explained that:
We decline to endorse the "dubious business ethics of bargaining transactions with which deceit was first concerned."... It is
no longer acceptable, if it ever was, to conclude in knowing silence, a transaction damaging to a party who is mistaken about
its basic factual assumptions
when.., he "would reasonably ex55 7
pect a disclosure."
In addition, the Heineman court cited Professor Prosser for the
proposition that "the law appears to be working toward the ultimate
conclusion that full disclosure of all material facts must be made
whenever elementary fair conduct demands." 58 Although the court
suggested that it would have been difficult, if not impossible, for plain750 F. Supp. 1179 (E.D.N.Y. 1990).
432 N.Y.S.2d 760, 762-63 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1980), affd, 453 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1981).
557 Id. (citations omitted).
558 Id. (quoting WnIIAM PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 106, at 698
(4th ed. 1971)).
555
556
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tiff to verify independently the financial status of defendant's subsidiary, 559 the court seemed oblivious to the fact that a sophisticated,
intelligent businessman in plaintiff's position should have been wary
of the last minute decision by the purchaser to have its subsidiary buy
the company, and that plaintiff could have discovered the subsidiary's
financial condition by asking for its financial statements and capitalization. In light of the court's finding that defendants' conduct was
unreasonable and unfair, and that the traditional caveat emptor rules
would not apply, the court probably deemed the foregoing facts as
unimportant.
Subsequently, in Minpeco, S.A. v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., the
court cited Gaines Service Leasing Corp. with approval, and in addition
cited the same language from Professor Prosser's work that the Gaines
court had earlier relied upon. 6 ° Moreover, the Minpeco court referred to Justice Blackmun's dissent in Chiarella v. United States, 61 in
which the Justice wrote:
Even at common law.... there has been a trend away from strict
adherence to the harsh maxim caveat emptor and toward a more
flexible, less formalistic understanding of the duty to disclose.
Steps have been taken toward application of the "special facts"
doctrine in a broader array of contexts where one party's superior knowledge of essential 5facts
renders a transaction without
62
disclosure inherently unfair.
Cases citing Heineman and/or Minpeco, S.A. have not read either
case broadly to support the proposition that those engaged in a business transaction must disclose all material facts concerning the transaction that good faith and fair dealing would require. In Brass v.
American Film Technologies, for example, the court acknowledged, by
citing Heineman and Minpeco, S.A., that "New York courts appear to be
expanding the duty to disclose, even where no fiduciary relationship
can be established."5 63 The Brass court, however, suggested that this
duty of disclosure was especially likely to arise only "when the defendant engaged in conduct that deceived the plaintiff."56 4
Furthermore, in Congress FinancialCorp. v. John Morrell & Co., the
court suggested that the Heineman decision was simply an application
Id. at 1187.
560 552 F. Supp. 327, 337-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
561 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
562 Minpeco, S.A., 552 F. Supp. at 338 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248) (other
citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
563 No. 91-CIV-5395, 1992 WL 47982, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. March 2, 1992).
564 Id.
559
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of the "special facts" doctrine.5 6 5 The court explained that the "special facts" doctrine required that one party have superior knowledge
not readily available to the other party who is known to be mistaken as
to the facts.5 66 Applying that law, the court found that there could be
no recovery when the respective parties had access to all relevant information and failed to exercise diligence to discover allegedly omitted information. 6 7 Under such circumstances, the court explained,
there is no duty of disclosure.
It is not surprising that the recent cases dealing with arm's length
transactions involving the sale of a business seem to be split on the
duty to disclose. This split is understandable because notions of what
disclosures are required by good faith and fair dealing may differ and
because any precedent as ingrained as caveat emptor, particularly in
arm's length transactions, will be discarded gradually. There is, however, agreement on two points: (1) there is no duty to disclose obvious
facts, and (2) regardless of the expertise of the parties, a duty to disclose arises if the material facts cannot be reasonably discovered
under the circumstances of the negotiations in question. Some cases
go further and suggest that material facts should be disclosed even
though a diligent or reasonable inquiry may have led to the discovery
of those facts. In either case, it is noteworthy that recent cases are not
applying the strictest forms of caveat emptor, i.e., that silence is never
actionable, even with regard to nonapparent conditions, as long as
there are no affirmative misrepresentations or active concealment.
C.

Rationale of Good Faith Disclosures Supports Disclosure of all
MaterialIntrinsic Facts

The trend toward discarding caveat emptor, even in arm's
length business transactions involving the sale of a business, is supported by the various reasons set forth for requiring disclosures
reviewed in section IV above. To appreciate this point, it is first
helpful to understand the information that the typical buyer ought
to know before purchasing a business.
Businesses are acquired most frequently through an asset acquisition. 56 8 If the business is a corporation, the buyer may also
have the option of purchasing the company by acquiring all of its
stock, and if the buyer is also a corporation, a merger or consolida565 790 F. Supp. 459, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
566 Id. (citing Aaron Ferer & Sons, Ltd. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 731 F.2d
112, 123 (2d Cir. 1984)). See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
567 Id. at 474.

568 FRANK L. BRUNETrl & STANLEYJ. YELLIN, BusINESs ACQUISITIONS: TAX & LEGAL
GUnE [ 202 (1987) [hereinafter BRtNETn & YELLIN].
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tion may be possible. A stock purchase is often not the preferred
method of acquisition because it exposes the purchaser to "hidden,
contingent, or unknown liabilities."5 6 9 In any event, in either an
asset acquisition or stock purchase of a business, it is well recognized that the typical buyer ought to be informed of or know the
following information and facts about the business:
(1) The financial history of the business, including its past sta5 70
bility, growth, and diversity of operations;
(2) The5 7profit
and loss statements, balance sheets, and tax
1
returns;

72
(3) Tax and audit history;1
agreements; 573
(4) Contracts and5 other
74

(5) Credit history;

(6) Good will, including reputation or prestige of business and
5 75
ownership of trade or brand names.
In addition, the buyer should also be given a detailed description
of the assets that are to be purchased. 7 6 If a major part of the inventory of a business involves the sale of merchandise from inventory, the
seller will have to comply with the Bulk Sales Act, which requires the
seller to furnish a list of creditors and a schedule of property to be
transferred. 7 The buyer must give notice of a bulk sale to all
creditors.5 78
In a stock purchase, the buyer should also be aware or informed
of additional facts. The buyer should be informed of the corporation's history and should be given access to the corporation's minute
books, articles of incorporation, by-laws, certificate of incorporation
569 Id. 1 203. See also HOWARD L. WEINREICH, Contract of Sale, in Drafting Agreements For The Sale Of A Business, I 5,202A (1971).
570 BRUNET & YELLIN, supra note 568, 11 201.2, 201.4(A).
571 Id. I 201.2(B); Lawrence S. Bangser, Negotiations and Planning, in 1 Busm-Nss
AcQuIsrroNs: PLANNING AND PRACTICE § 1.202a (1971) [hereinafter BANGSER]; Willard
D. Horwick & Harry C. Sigman, Collecting Information, in DRAFrING AGREEEr S FOR
THE SALE OFA BusiNEss, §§ 1.19, 1.20, 1.21, 1.22, 1.23 (1971) (hereinafter Horwick &
Sigman); David A. Savner &Julia A. Foster, Preliminamy, CorporateLaw, and Contractual
Considerationsin the Purchaseand Sale of a Business, in BUYING AND SELLING BusiNESSES,
11 1.7, 1.8, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12 (1990) [hereinafter SAVNER & FOSTER].
572 BRUNETn & YELLIN, supra note 568,1 201.2(C); Savner & Foster, supranote 571,

§ 1.11, 1.12.

573 BRuNETrri & YELLIN, supra note 568, 1201.2 (D); Savner & Foster, supranote 571,
§ 1.13; Horwick & Sigman, supra note 571, § 1.61.
574 BRuNETrn & YELLIN, supra note 568, 1 201.2(E).
575 Id. I 201.4(E).
576

Id. I 202.2(A).
1 202.3; Savner & Foster, supra note 571, 1 1.65. See also UCC §§ 6-102, 6-104

577 Id.

(1991).
578

UCC § 6-105 (1991).
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and registrations to transact business.5 79 Additionally, in a stock
purchase, the buyer should be informed of other facts because the
buyer will be subject to all liabilities of the seller's company, whether
known or unknown. Thus, the buyer should be informed of all outstanding or threatened litigation, potential liabilities, debts, contracts,
58 0
leases, insurance, licenses, pension plans, and agreements.
In most instances, the foregoing information will be sought out
and discovered by the buyer or experts hired by the buyer, such as an
attorney or accountant, prior to the consummation of the sale of the
business. But what if the buyer has not discovered or made sufficient
inquiries to discover all of the material information related to the sale
of the business set forth above? In such a case, does the seller have
the duty to disclose such information even when the parties are dealing at arm's length? Do current business ethics allow the seller to take
advantage of the buyer's ignorance, mistakes and/or indolence? Does
it matter whether a reasonable investigation could have produced the
information?
As set forth in the preceding section, many courts still apply the
doctrine of caveat emptor in arm's length transactions involving the
sale of a business. There are, however, sound reasons why the doctrine should be discarded in the sale of a business. 58 '
First, when a business is purchased, the buyer is typically purchasing an ongoing commercial venture that may include a financial track
record, books and records, a product or products (or services), existing customers or business opportunities, debts and obligations and
other contracts and agreements. Because a buyer of a business is, in
effect, purchasing all relevant information and facts concerning the
business, including confidential information, if there is any, it follows
579 BRUNE=rI & YELLIN, supra note 568, 1 201.2, 201.2(A), 201.2(B); Horwick &
Sigman, supra note 571, § 1.33, 1.42 to 1.44; Savner & Foster, supra note 571, § 1.23.
580 BRuNm,mr& YEUJN, supranote 568,
203.1; Horwick & Sigman, supra note 571,
§ 1.15.
581 The focus of the discussion in the text is on the seller's obligation to disclose
material facts to the buyer, although it is recognized that, in certain circumstances, a
buyer may as well be subject to disclosure obligations. There are a number of reasons
for applying less stringent standards to the buyer's obligation of disclosure. First, it is
usually presumed that the seller of a business knows or should know about his own
business; therefore, there is no expectation that the buyer ought to disclose his knowledge of the business. Secondly, to the extent a buyer has ascertained information
about the business independent of the seller and of which the seller may be unaware,
the buyer will probably have expended time and money in discovering such information. Under Professor Kronman's analysis, the buyer should have a right to remain
silent about such facts.
A buyer may have, on the other hand, a duty to disclose information, e.g., about
his ability to pay. See the discussion of Heineman, supra Section V. B. 3.
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that the seller should provide all such facts and information to the
buyer prior to the sale. After all, such information and facts are the
subject matter of the sale.
Secondly, although most transactions involving the sale of a business may be at arm's length, the typical transaction involves a considerable amount of cooperation and the free and open exchange of
information before it can be consummated. Thus, it would be incorrect to believe that arm's length business transactions are adversarial
in nature, a notion that has led courts to suggest that the seller need
not disclose facts to the buyer, and to characterize the seller and the
buyer as "hostile" and "adversaries." Because this characterization of
the sale of a business is generally false, the courts ought to impose
heightened disclosure requirements in the sale of a business (at least
when the transaction can be characterized as involving cooperation
instead of adversity).
Third, even if only the exceptions to the general rule that one has
a right to remain silent are applied, it is the rare case in which a court
will not be able to find extensive disclosure requirements in the typical sale of a business. This is because in almost every sale of a business
the seller will volunteer some information about the business to encourage the sale and to justify the price the seller is requesting. It
does not take too much imagination to suggest that this scenario fits
within the exception that requires full disclosure of all material facts
when a partial disclosure is made. Thus, any information a seller gives
to the buyer about a business could be construed to be a partial disclosure requiring a full disclosure of all material facts.
Likewise, as set forth in the preceding subsection, the superior
knowledge or the "special facts" doctrine can be applied easily to the
sale of a business. The seller will almost always have superior or special knowledge about the business. This knowledge may not be readily available to the buyer without the seller's disclosure of the
information. And even if it might be considered available, some
courts seem to ignore this requirement, or are willing to find it satisfied in most cases. The most recent cases hold that disclosure of all
material facts must occur when there is superior knowledge on the
part of one party to a transaction unless the information in question is
equally available to the parties. The seller of a business will almost
always have better availability of facts about the business than a prospective purchaser, which means that disclosures will be required. To
the extent some courts require the seller to know that the buyer was
mistaken about the true facts, this may be found by a court merely on
the basis of what the buyer paid for the business. If it is obvious from
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the price that the business has been sold for an amount that a reasonable purchaser probably would not have paid had he been aware of all
of the facts, a court might find that the seller must have, or should
have, known of the mistake. Finally, to the extent that an undisclosed
fact concerns the ability of a business to continue to function, it is
likely that a court will almost always apply the superior knowledge or
special facts doctrine."8 2
Fourth, the principles of disclosure enunciated by Verplank support a duty on the part of the seller to reveal the material facts set
forth above that are relevant to the sale of a business. All of the above
facts are common ones that are widely recognized to fix the market
value of a business. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the authorities in the sale of a business all list or discuss most of the material facts
set forth above as the ones which should be examined in determining
whether a sale of a business should be consummated, and at what
price the business should be sold. This, of course, does not mean that
the individual seller or purchaser must reveal his own personal assessment or judgment with regard to how the business might be operated
or what it is worth. Rather, requiring disclosure of all material facts
simply means that the common factors that all parties have recognized
to be relevant to determining whether, and at what amount, a business should be sold, should be revealed or open to examination.
Fifth, Professor Kronman's argument that parties negotiating a
contract should, in general, disclose information that has been casually acquired, supports disclosure of all material facts relevant to the
seller's sale of a business. Of course, the seller may have acquired the
information material to a business deliberately and at a cost. The
seller, however, will generally acquire this information in the normal
course of the seller's business. In other words, the costs of acquiring
the information would have been incurred in any case. It is this type
of information that Professor Kronman believes should be divulged.
Disclosure of such information will not reduce the incentive to produce the information because the operation of the business itself
drives the incentive. Moreover, as Professor Kronman has suggested,
the seller ought to divulge all material information about a business
because the seller is in a better and cheaper position to reveal such
information. It does not make economic sense to require the purchaser to engage in a costly independent investigation of the seller's
business when the seller has the information and can divulge it at almost no cost.
Finally, at times a business sale involves a letter of intent, followed
582

See

RESrATEmENT (SEcoND)

OF TORTS § 551 cmt. k, illus. 10, 11, and 12 (1976).
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by a formal purchase agreement, with a postponed closing. Although
the absence of a letter of intent does not mean that there is no good
faith duty of disclosure in the sale of a business, certainly if there is a
letter of intent or other indication of a firm agreement to negotiate a
sale, which either requires or is construed to require the parties to
negotiate in good faith, then there should be no question that there is
also a heightened duty of good faith disclosure.583 One caveat is important to stress at this point. The duty of good faith negotiation that
may arise in the context of the sale of a business based on a letter of
intent, or similar agreement, is different from the duty of good faith
disclosure. The duty of good faith negotiation relates to actually concluding a sale. Some courts have, therefore, been reluctant to find
such a duty, or have circumscribed the duty of good faith in such contexts."8 4 This does not mean that the duty of good faith disclosure is
583 A number of cases have recognized that a duty of good faith and fair dealing to
consummate a deal applies to negotiations for the sale of a business. E.g., Arnold
Palmer Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1976) (determining
that there was a factual issue as to whether the parties had contractually bound themselves to prepare a definitive agreement consistent with a "Memorandum of Intent");
Thompson v. Liquichimica of Am., 481 F. Supp. 365, 366 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding
that while an "agreement to use best efforts" set forth in a letter does not require the
agreement sought to be achieved, it does require the parties in "good faith" to work to
achieve it); Pepsico, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 307 F. Supp. 713, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)
(noting, in dicta, that if the parties "agreement in principle" for the purchase by the
plaintiff of defendant's 53% stock ownership in the Miller Brewing Company was enforceable, then the "agreement in principle" carried with it the "obligation to negotiate the terms of a definitive agreement in good faith and to execute the contract on
the terms that had been agreed upon"); Itek Corp. v. Chicago Aerial Indus., 248 A.2d
625, 629 (Del. 1968) (ruling that a letter of intent "obligated each side to attempt in
good faith to reach final and formal agreement").
584 E.g., A/S Apothekernes Laboratorium v. I.M.C. Chem. Group, 873 F.2d 155, 158
(7th Cir. 1989) (ruling that while a letter of intent to purchase a business or the assets
of a business is generally not considered a binding contract requiring the parties to
consummate a transaction, the terms of a letter of intent may impose upon the parties
an obligation to negotiate in good faith); Runnemede Owners, Inc. v. Crest Mortgage
Corp., 861 F.2d 1053, 1056 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that a letter of intent merely provides "the initial framework from which the parties might later negotiate a final...
agreement, if the deal works out"); Reprosystem, B.V. v. SCM Corp., 727 F.2d 257, 264
(2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing that under some circumstances a party to a contract may
be bound by an implied agreement to negotiate in good faith to reach an agreement,
the court nevertheless found that the agreement in principle was "too indefinite to be
enforceable under New York law"); Dacourt Group, Inc. v. Babcock Indus., Inc., 747
F. Supp. 157, 160 (D. Conn. 1990) (ruling that no duty of good faith can be implied
absent an agreement between the parties); Ridgeway Coal Co. v. FMC Corp., 616 F.
Supp. 404, 407 (S.D. W. Va. 1985) (finding that although an employee of defendants
had sent a letter to plaintiffs specifying conditions that plaintiffs would have to satisfy
before a lease would be entered, and although plaintiffs allegedly met those conditions, the court ruled that the letter was simply an agreement to negotiate and that it
was not enforceable. Stressing that the alleged agreement was so vague and indefinite
that no remedy could be fashioned); Metromedia Broadcasting Corp. v. MGM/UA
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limited. The duty of good faith disclosure, of course, relates to the
revelation of information material to the sale. The reason why the
duty of good faith negotiation supports a heightened duty of good
faith disclosure is that the duty of good faith negotiation, when it is
applicable, puts the parties into a more cooperative and binding
framework in which one would more likely expect disclosure of all
material facts. 585
The above analysis does not mean that the seller of a business
must specifically remind the buyer of obvious facts, or facts that the
seller has every right to believe that the buyer ought to know because
of what has been disclosed or what is available through observation.
Entertainment Co., 611 F. Supp. 415, 420 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (finding a clause in the
parties' licensing agreement requiring the defendant to negotiate in good faith exclusively with plaintiff was unenforceable because the agreement to negotiate in good
faith was too vague); Carrols Corp. v. Canton Joint Venture, No. 88-2115-1, 1990 WL
99047, at *6-7 (Ohio Com. P1. June 27, 1990) (ruling that there is no implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing in the negotiation of a lease). Numerous other cases have
also recognized that the terms of a letter of intent may impose upon the parties an
obligation to negotiate in good faith, e.g., Channel Home Ctrs. v. Grossman, 795 F.2d
291, 299 (3d Cir. 1986); Chase v. Consol. Foods Corp., 744 F.2d 566, 571 (7th Cir.
1984); Reprosystem, 727 F.2d at 264; Teachers Ins., 670 F. Supp. at 499; Itek 248 A.2d at
629. In I.M.C. Chem., however, the Seventh Circuit explained, that what is required by
.good faith" depends solely upon the terms of the letter of intent. See I.M.C. Chem.,
873 F.2d at 158-59 & n.2 ("The full extent of a party's duty to negotiate in good faith
can only be determined, however, from the terms of the letter of intent itself."). The
Seventh Circuit further explained that the duty of good faith that a letter of intent
may impose upon parties negotiating the terms of a purchase agreement is not the
same as the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing that is read into almost all
contracts. I.M.C. Chem., 873 F.2d at 159-60 n.2; see also ChannelHome Ctrs., 795 F.2d at
299 n.8; Teachers Ins., 670 F.2d at 498. The contract duty of good faith and fair dealing in the performance of contracts requires the use of "reasonable efforts" in carrying out its terms, but the good faith duty imposed by a letter of intent only requires
the exercise of good faith as specifically set forth by the letter of intent. Most recently,
in First Nat'l Bank v. Atlantic Tele-Network, the Seventh Circuit stated that in general
there is "no duty to bargain in good faith over the terms of a contract." First Nat'l
Bank v. Ad. Tele-Network, 946 F.2d 516, 520 (7th Cir. 1991). The court also noted
that "the duty of good faith is weak in the formation stage, if indeed it can be said to
exist at all there." Id.
585 In an interesting recent English Case, Walford v. Miles [1992] All E.R 453, the
House of Lords disapproved Channel Home Centers v. Grossman, 795 F.2d 291 (3d
Cir. 1986), which recognized that a letter of intent may impose upon the parties a
duty to negotiate in good faith. Their Lordships stated that "[t] he concept of a duty to
carry on negotiations in good faith is inherently repugnant to the adversarial position
of the parties when involved in negotiations." This case does not deal with good faith
disclosures and does not recognize the cooperation between those negotiating the
sale of a business in terms of the exchange of information that is typically a necessary
part of such transactions. The parties may be adversarial in the sense that they both
want to obtain the best deal, and in most instances can terminate negotiations at any
time, but they are not adversarial in that both expect the other to act in good faith in
divulging material that is necessary to conclude the transaction.
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The seller may take into account the sophistication and intelligence of
the buyer in determining what is an "obvious fact," and what the buyer
ought to know. While the modem trend, which does not require a
duty of investigation before reliance on a misrepresentation or omission is justified, should be applied in the sale of a business, the seller
does not have to reveal facts that are obvious to a sophisticated buyer.
Professor Farnsworth has articulated one of the strongest objections to the notion that all material facts should be disclosed in the
sale of a business. According to Professor Farnsworth, parties involved
in negotiations are often competitors. Therefore, it might be inappropriate to reveal confidential information during negotiations.58 6
Professor Farnsworth also concluded that there was little necessity for
requiring extensive disclosure requirements when sophisticated parties can, and typically do, deal with these matters themselves. Of
course, Professor Farnsworth was correct in recognizing that sophisticated parties involved in the sale of a business do generally deal with
the issue of disclosures on their own. The issue is, however, how the
law should handle the situation when the parties do not expressly deal
with the issue.
For the reasons set forth above, when the parties to a transaction
do not privately determine disclosure standards, all material facts
should be revealed. Likewise, the issue of confidential information is
not a sufficient reason to permit parties to be silent with regard to
material information. First, depending on the circumstances, it may
be appropriate for the seller to withhold confidential information until it has become clear that the buyer is serious and that a deal will
probably be struck. Secondly, the parties will know whether they are
dealing with confidential information that should be protected. In
that case, the parties can enter into an enforceable confidentiality
agreement. Thus, the fact that there may be confidential information
should not be a basis to absolve a seller of a business from revealing all
material facts to the buyer.
VI.

CONCLUSION

For over 100 years, disclosures have been recognized in the
United States as being required in contract negotiations to the extent that one is bound by good faith and fair dealing to disclose
information material to the transaction. What disclosures are required by good faith, and the extent of required disclosures has
586

Farnsworth, supra note 55, at 278.
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been in flux, but the notion has expanded as society's understanding of the requirements of good faith has changed.
Late in the last century and earlier in this century, the courts
generally found that the dictates of good faith permitted parties to
remain silent, particularly in arm's length transactions (except in a
few circumstances). The exceptions to the rule permitting silence,
however, have expanded consistent with the recognition that all
parties to a contract owe each other a duty of good faith and fair
dealing, the increasing usage of moral and ethical standards to determine legal obligations and the decline of caveat emptor.
Although caveat emptor has been abandoned in many areas of
the law, its last stronghold has been in commercial transactions between sophisticated businessmen. Presumably, such businessmen
are savvy enough to look after their own interests. This Article,
however, has demonstrated that even in arm's length transactions,
the doctrine of caveat emptor has lost much of its efficacy. In particular, in the sale of a business, the courts have evinced an increasing discomfort with a harsh or doctrinaire application of caveat
emptor. There are sound reasons for this discomfort.
Generally, all material facts about a business should be disclosed during the negotiations for the sale of a business because:
(1) such facts are typically part of the business being sold; (2) modem business sales usually involve extensive cooperation between
the parties raising justified expectations of full disclosures; (3) almost all business sales involve the disclosure of some information
about the business indicating that all material information should
be, or has been, divulged; (4) the seller almost always has superior
knowledge about the business, which is often not as accessible to
the buyer; (5) the material facts related to a business sale are
widely recognized so that there is generally no confusion as to what
factors are relevant to the market value of the business; (6) the
seller is almost always in a cheaper and less costly position to reveal
material facts about the business and the disclosure of such information will not discourage its production; and (7) if a letter of intent is used or the parties enter a similar agreement to negotiate a
sale, a heightened duty of good faith and fair dealing arises that
supports disclosure of all material facts about the business.
There are no good reasons to support nondisclosure of material facts in the sale of a business. If confidential information is
involved, the information can be protected by agreement of the
parties. Implying a duty to disclose all material facts does not impede one's freedom of contract. Freedom is restricted, as was
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stated by Professor Corbin, to what "organized society both forbears and enforces, forbears to penalize him for making his bargain and enforces it for him after it is made." 58 7 The parties can
still by agreement disclaim specific individual disclosure requirements provided such disclaimers do not offend the overriding policy of honesty, trust and cooperation, necessary for ethical
commercial relationships. Ultimately, the issue boils down to what
kind of community we want to live in, and what kind of business
ethics should be imposed by law. This Article has endeavored to
demonstrate that the ethics of the business community have been
evolving to the point where the law should recognize a duty on the
parties to reveal all material facts, unless the facts are obvious.
As social understandings of what is commercially reasonable
trade develops so that the parties to the sale of a business expect
disclosures of all material facts during negotiations, the buyer will
buy, and the seller will sell, at a price commensurate with their
expectations. To allow nondisclosure of material information in
violation of such an understanding will create economic inefficiency. The law ought not require expensive defensive measures to
protect against bad faith, and it does not.
The cases reviewed herein, in a variety of factual contexts, suggest that our society as a whole has expanded its notions of good
faith and fair dealing. This is consistent with the civil law, and
clearly reflects a recognition of the societal benefits to be obtained
by the imposition of a duty of good faith and fair dealing.
VII.

APPENDIX: NOTES ON THE PRECONTRACTUAL DUTY
OF GOOD FAITH IN ITALIAN AND GERMAN LAW

A.

Italian Law

Article 1337 of the codice civile (c.c.) provides that the parties in
the process of negotiations and formation of the contract must behave according to good faith.5 88 Good faith is a limitation on priCoaRIN, supra note 27, at 1165.
588 Many articles, and several books, have been written in the last 40 years in Italy
on the precontractual duty of good faith, and of good faith disclosures, and there is a
wealth of court cases dealing with this issue. This brief appendix note addresses the
general precontractual good faith requirements and is not limited to the area of disclosures. The references are selective, and by no means exhaustive. See genera/ly Giuseppe Grisi, L'OBBUGO PREcowRATruALE Di INrno~muAzioNE, Napoli, 1990 (on good
faith requirements in the precontractual stage); Luca Nanni, LA BUONA FF.DE CONTRAr-ruALE, Padova, 1988, 1 - 143; Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, in CoNTR-rro E IMPREsA, 1987, 287 seq.; Francesco Benatti, LA RESPONSABILrrA' PRECoNTRATrUALE,
Milano, 1963. See also Vincenzo Cuffaro, voce "Responsabiliti precontrattuale" in EN587
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vate autonomy that restricts, during negotiation as well as in
execution of a contract, the freedom of the parties; private control
of legal transactions is not indiscriminate freedom to act, but freedom to act in good faith. The contracting parties owe each other a
duty to disclose all material information of which they have actual
or constructive knowledge. 89 Commercial practice shows that
CICLOPEDIA DEL

Dtrrro, XXXIX, Milano, 1988, 1265 seq.; Guido Ferrarini, Investment
banking prospettifalsie culpa in contrahendo, Giur. comm., 1988, II 585; Andrea Fusaro,
Fondamento e limiti della responsabilitdprecontrattuale, Giur. it., 1984, 1.1, 1199; M.-G. Loi
& F. Tessitore, BUONA FEDE E RESPONSABMrrA' PREcoNTRATruALE, Milano, 1975; Salvatore A. Rasi, La responsabilitdprecontrattuale,Riv. dir. civ., 1974, 496; Giovanna Visintini,
LA RETICENZA NELLA FORMAZIONE DEI Co'ur=xT-, Padova, 1972, 251 seq.; Mario Bessone, Rapporto precontrattualee doveri di corretteza, Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 1972, 962;
Luigi Mengoni, Sulla naturadella responsabilitdprecontrattuale,Riv. dir. comm., 1955, I,
360; Franco Carresi, Introduzione ad uno studio sistematico degli oneri e degli obblighi delle
patti nelprocesso diformazione del negozio guridico,Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 1949, 822. See
discussion of the topic in textbooks on the law of contracts: Pietro Trimarchi, IsTrruZiONi Di Dmrro PRIVATO, 7th ed., Milano, 1986, 312-315, 325; Andrea Torrente &
Piero Schlesinger, MAmuALE Di Dmrrro PRiVATO, 12th ed., Milano, 1986, 519-21; Rodolfo Sacco, IL CoNTRATro, in Trattato di Diritto Civile Italiano (Vassalli), IV.6, Torino, 1975, 674-77; Francesco Messineo, IL CoNrnarro IN GENERE, in Trattato di
Diritto Civile e Commerciale, XXI.1, Milano 1973, 360-367; Adriano De Cupis, IL
DANNO, Milano, 1946, 48 seq. and id. 2d ed., Milano, 1966, I, 95 seq. See comment on
art. 1337 c.c. in Angelo De Martini & Giovanni Ruoppolo, RASSEGNA Di GiURIsPRUDENZA SUL CODICE CILE, IV.2, Milano, 1972, 169 seq. Among the recent publications, seefurtherG. Patti, LA RESPONSABILrrA' PREcoNRcrATruALE, in Cod. civ. comm., a
cura di P. Schlesinger, Milano 1993 (cited by Benatti, unpublished note to Walford v.
Miles, infra note 595); C. Turco, INTRESSE NEGATIVO E RESPONSABILITA' CONTRATrUALE, Milano, 1990 (cited, e.g., by Carbone, infra note 605). Cass. 5.6.1948, n. 851,
Foro it. rep., 1948, voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 114: "The duty in negotiating a contract
is not different from the duty to perform it, which is always the duty of the reasonable
man (buon padre difamiglia);"App. Bologna 13.4.1950, Foro it., 1950, I, 582 (Annotation by Angelo De Martini, In tema di silenzio nella conclusione dei contrattO: "Articles
1175 and 1337 c.c. have transformed into legal duties what were before only social
duties." Santoro-Passarelli summarises:
In order to assure satisfaction of the interest to the contract on the side
of those who have conducted themselves in accordance with the other
party's behavior, our law establishes an equivalent for the missing or
incomplete intent, and this equivalent is in fact the risk for the other
party's unfaulty reliance.
Francesco Santoro-Passarelli, DoTrRINE GENEIRAi DEL Dirrro ClLE,6th ed., Napoli
1959, at 147. Specific code provisions on good faith in negotiations are contained in
art. 1338 c.c. (liability for damages of the party who knows of a cause of invalidity of
the contract but does not disclose this to the other who relies without negligence on
the validity of the contract), art. 1398 c.c. (similar provision in favor of the party that
has, without negligence, relied on an agent without powers or who has acted ultra
vires), and art. 1328 c.c. (damages in favor of the offeree who has in good faith initiated performance before receiving notice of the revocation of the offer).
589 Article 1337 c.c. protects, in first place, reliance of a party "in correct and serious negotiations," Cass. 28.1.1972, n. 199, Foro it., 1972, I, 2088 (also reprinted in
Nanni, supra note 588, at 15 seq.). On the duty of precontractual good faith disclosures see Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 295-96
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there is information that both parties can easily obtain using reasonable care. But there is other information that can be acquired
only (or, at least, much more easily) by one of the contracting parties. The duty to disclose this information to the other party is one
of the principles of good faith embodied in article 1337 (and 1338)
590

C. C.

The Relazione al codice civile explains that good faith is the basis
for the behavior of the parties during negotiations and formation
of the contract, meaning that the parties must deal in the precontractual phase with "a sense of probity ... having always in mind
the purpose which the contract is intended to satisfy, the harmony
of the interests of the parties, and the superior interests of the nation requiring productive cooperation."5 9 "In the precontractual
phase, the breach of this duty leads to a liability in contrahendo
when one party knows of, but does not reveal to the other, the
existence of a cause of invalidity of the contract."5 92 Failure to
[Riesta da affrontare il problema se vanno comunicate, oltre le circostanze che
un soggetto conosce, anche quelle che potrebbe conoscere con la normale diligenza,
semprech, beninteso, l'altraparte non avrebbe potuto conoscerle. La soluzione
positiva si deduce da un argomento di ordine sistematico. [Il legislatore del
1942 ha costantemente equiparato, ai fini del sorgere del dovere di comunicazione, la conoscenza delle circostanze da rendere note alla loro conoscibilitti (citations omitted), at 296. [The problem needs to be addressed whether
there is a need to disclose, in addition to the known circumstances,
those which could be known applying ordinary diligence, provided, of
course, that the other party could not have known them. The positive
answer derives from a systematic reasoning. The law of 1942 [the new
Civil Code] has constantly equated, with respect to the rise of the duty of
disclosure, knowledge of the circumstances to be disclosed to those that
could have been known.].
See also Grisi, supra note 588, at 11; Benatti, LA RESPONSABILITA' PRECONTRArrUALE,
supra note 588, at 35 seq. See Cass. 30.12.1969, n. 4059, in Nanni, supra note 588, at
117 (for an example of a less stringent standard in the case of disclosures on relevant
private and professional information by a prospective employee to the prospective
employer).
590 Art. 1337 c.c. may apply if a claim for nondisclosure cannot be based on fraudulent or negligent concealment when one party has concealed a fact which would have
prevented the other to go forward with the transaction, had such other party known
about it, Cass. 27.10.1961, n. 2425, Foro it. rep., 1961, voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 138.
The duty of precontractual good faith also applies to government contracts, Nanni,
supra note 588, at 23 seq.; Sacco, supranote 588, at 675; Cass. 8.2.1972, n. 330, Riv. dir.
comm., 1975, II, 22, with annotation of Giuseppe Stolfi, Sulla colpa "in contrahendo"
dell'amministrazionepubblica;Cass. 28.9.1968, n. 3008, Giur. it. rep., 1968, voce "Amm.
Pubbl.," n. 57, 58, 59; Cass. 30.1.1968, n. 297, Giust. civ., 1968, I, 839.
591 Relazione al codice civile, n. 638, cited in De Martini & Ruoppolo, supranote 588,
at 170. But see Benatti, LA RESPONSABrrA' PREcoNTRATruALE, supra note 588, at 11
(stating cautionary remarks with respect to the political background of the Relazione).
592 Relazione al codice civile, n. 638, cited in De Martini & Ruoppolo, supranote 588,
at 170.
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abide by this obligation results in "damages for expenses, lost opportunities to enter into a valid contract, and time wasted in the
negotiations which could have been spent in other useful
activities."5 9 3
The Corte di Cassazionehas thus attempted to describe the ethical ingredients of the duty of good faith:
The need for good faith, taken in its ethical sense, constitutes
one of the hinges of the legal discipline of obligations and establishes a legal duty in the true sense of the word .

..

which is

violated not only if one of the parties has acted maliciously to
the other party's detriment, but also when the conduct of saidparty
was not guided by openness, diligentfairness, and a sense of social solidarity, which are integral parts of good faith; thus, even if the
result of mere negligence, or even silence ...

such constitute a

transgression of the duty of good faith if suitable to induce reasonable reliance in the other party. .

..

"'

The traditional view is that any advance exemption from, or limitation of, liability from breach of the duty of good faith imposed
under art. 1337 c.c. would be against public policy and, therefore, not
permitted under art. 1229(2) c.c. It was noted by Professor Benatti
that the foregoing statement is too general and needs to be qualified
because only those exemptions which are unqualified or wholesale by
593 Id. n. 638. The Master of the Seal (the Minister of the Italian Department of
Justice, in his function as "Chancellor" or keeper of the official seal) said, in his Report regarding the preliminary draft of the new code:
Also new is art. 189 (corresponding to the new code articles 1337 and
1338) which imposes upon the parties, during negotiation and formation of the contract, the duty to deal in good faith. This duty could
hardly be derived from the existing law notwithstanding the fact that
the duty of good faith dominated the performance of contracts. To
have it specifically affirmed here is consistent with the concept of a
healthy legal system... which draws from the above mentioned principles the need for a minimum of loyalty and honesty even in the free
play of private interests. As a result, a party with knowledge of a cause of
invalidity of the contract has a duty to disclose this fact to the other: to
benefit from the invalid manifestation of the other party notwithstanding the fact that the cause of the invalidity is known is a contra bonos
mores act comparable to an intentional omission (dolo di omissione) since
the other party relies, because of lack of knowledge, on an expectation
which is bound to be wrong.
Id. Relazione del Guardasigilliall'art. 189 del Progrtopreliminare,n. 163, cited in De Martini & Ruoppolo, supra note 588, at 170. The reference to "existing law" is to art. 1124
Civil Code of 1865 ("I contratti debbono essere eseguiti di buonafede, ed obbligano non solo a
quanto i nei medesimi espresso, ma anche a tutte le conseguenze dhe secondo l'equitti, l'uso o la
legge ne derivano.").
594 Cass. 27.10.1961, n. 2425, Foro it. rep., 1961, voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 138
(emphasis added). See also Cass. 29.2.1960, n. 387, Foro it. rep., 1960, voce "Obblig. e
contr.," n. 114.
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classification would be void, as against public policy, under art.
1229(2) c.c. General or wholesale exemptions favor dishonesty and
are a serious impediment to the course of dealings in the marketplace
while specific exemptions and carefully drawn limitations from individual duties of disclosure should be permissible unless made intentionally or recklessly (con dolo o colpa grave), as prescribed by art.
1229(1) c.c. 595
Recently, the duty of good faith disclosures in the precontractual
phase has been applied in the context of the sale of securities.5 9 6 The
Court of Appeals of Milan held that an intermediary bank (even if not
itself the issuer of the prospectus), which had caused by its professional advice prospective clients to transfer their savings from one security to another, had incurred liability of a different type than the
one under the general precept in art. 2043 c.c. of neminem laedere (one
shall not injure another), because of reliance and trust. This liability,
the court said, is derived from art. 1337 c.c. because "culpa in contrahendo... is intended to assure, in the general interest, the functionbesides . . .
ality of the market, . . . and the overall flow of trade,
" 97

protecting the individual reliance of the other party.

5

595 For the traditional approach, see, e.g., Massimo Bianca, La nozione di buona fede

quale regola di comportamento contrattuale,Riv. dir. civ., 1983, I, 206; Stefano RodotA, ILE
FoN'i Di INTEGRAzioNE DEL CoNTRATro, Milano, 1969, 175 seq. (cited by Benatti,
Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 312). For the qualified approach, see Francesco Benatti, Sulla naturaed effiacia di alcuni accordiprecontrattuali,note to Walford v.
Miles [1992] All E.R. 453, unpublished at time of writing, page 6 of manuscript;
Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 308-09. Art. 1229 c.c. states:
(1) E' nullo qualsiasi patto che esclude o limita preventivamente la responsabili del debitoreper dolo o per colpa grave. (2) E' nullo altres 4ualsiasipatio
preventivo di esonero o di limitazione di responsabilitt per i casi in cui ilfatto del
debitore o dei suoi ausiliaricostituisca violazione di obblighi derivanti da norme
di ordinepubblico.(footnotes omitted). ((1) Any agreement that excludes
or limits in advance the liability of the debtor from intentional misrepresentation or gross negligence is void. (2) Any advance agreement that
exonerates or limits liability of the debtor or his agents from breach of
duties imposed under public policy is also void.).
It is generally accepted, in Italian law, that the requirement of good faith in all dealings (art. 1175 c.c.) and the requirement of good faith in the precontractual stage
(art. 1337 c.c.) are provisions imposed by public policy.
596 App. Milano 2.2.1990, Giur. comm., 1990, II, 755, with anonymous note and
further references, affirming, Trib. Milano 11.1.1988, Giur. comm., 1988, II, 585 (Annotation by Guido Ferrarini). See Giuseppe B. Portale, Informazione societaria e responsabilitti degli intermediar, Banca borsa, 1982, I, 3; Pietro Abbadessa, D/fisione
dell'informazionee doveri di informazione dell'intermediario,Banca borsa, 1982, I, 305.
597 App. Milano 2.2.1990, supranote 596, at 762. The court adopted the theory-as
had been suggested by several authors-that a person who is not a party to the future
contract, e.g., an intermediary, can be subject to the good faith precontractual re
quirements. See, e.g., Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 300-01. According to App. Milano, the liability is of contractual nature, and the recoverable lost
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Breach of the precontractual duty of good faith disclosures subjects one to liability for damages. In order to assess this liability, the
nature of the duty-contractual or extra-contractual-must first be
determined. The conditions to be met for obtaining damages are different depending on how the breach of the duty of good faith is characterized because different standards and rules of law apply to those
different regimes: requirements of good faith, 59 8 types of damages, 9 9
burden of proof,6 °° statute of limitation,6 "1 liability of minors,6 °2 and
others, will vary accordingly.
Most commentators view the nature of this duty as contractual
(art. 1218 c.c.). 6 It is argued that art. 1337 c.c. is an extension of the
profits are those that could have been obtained with reasonable alternate forms of
investment. Id. at 761, 765. See also supra note 37 and accompanying text.
598 An objective standard of good faith applies in contract; a subjective standard
applies to torts. See Mengoni, supra note 588, at 362; Benatti, LA RESPONSABIrrA'
PREco'RAxrAL, supra note 588, at 128.
599 In contract, the civil sanction is prescribed in art. 1218 c.c. (the debtor who does
not exactly perform is liable for damages unless he proves that the non-performance
or delay were due to impossibility caused by circumstances not attributable to him),
and unforeseeable damages would only be recoverable in case of intentional misrepresentation (dolo), art. 1225 c.c. (if the non-performance or delay is not caused by
intentional misrepresentation of the debtor, damages are limited to those that were
foreseeable at the time when the obligation was undertaken).
600 In contract, the burden of proving violation of article 1337 c.c. lies with the
plaintiff, art. 2697 c.c. (one who intends to pursue a right in court must prove the
underlying facts). See Benatti, LA REsPONSAB1LITA' PREcONTRAT'ruALE, supra note 588,
at 155. See Trib. Milano 11.1.1988, Giur. comm., 1988, II, at 600.
601 In contract, the right to sue is subject to the general limitation period sanctioned in art. 2946 c.c. (as opposed to the shorter periods in tort, see Cass. 19.4.1983,
n. 2705, Foro it. rep., 1983, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 143).
602 In contract, liability does not apply to a minor who has not disclosed such condition to the other party, Sacco, supra note 588, at 675. See also Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supranote 588, at 293; G. Stolfi, Sulla responsabilitdprecontrattualedel minor in
STUDI IN MEMORIA Di ANDREA ToRRENrr, Milano, 1968, 1181 and G. Stolfi, La responsabilitd precontrattualedel minore, in ScRrr GiuRmici, Milano, 1980, 436, both cited in
De Martini & Ruoppolo, supra note 588, at 190; Trib. Milano 3.4.1967, Mon. trib.,
1967, 607.
603 Ferrarini, supra note 588, at 597; Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supranote 588, at
303 seq.; Ferrarini, La responsabilitdda prospettodelle banche, Banca borsa, 1987, I, 437, at
477; Messineo, 11 contratto in gere, supra note 588, at 365; Visintini, supra note 588,
passim; Renato Scognamiglio, voce "ResponsabilitA contrattuale ed extracontrattuale"
in NovissiMo DxGrsro ITALIANo, XV, 1968, Torino, at 675; De Cupis, supra note 588,
at 50 (2d ed., at 98); Benatti, LA RESPONSAB=TrA' PREcoNTRAruALE, supra note 588,
at 115 seq., and 129 seq.; Francesco Messineo, voce "Contratto" in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL
Drarr-ro, IX, 1961, 892; Salvatore Romano, voce "Buona fede" in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL
DiRn-rro, V, 1959, 661, at 682 ("the truth is that we are not in a situation of 'no'
relationship as would be characteristic for the extra-contract as provided for in art.
2043 seq."); Giuseppe Stolfi, Annotation to Cass. 12.1.1954, n. 22, Foro it., 1955, I,
1108, with further references; Mengoni, supranote 588, at 360. App. Milano 2.2.1990,
Giur. comm., 1990, II, 755, affirning, Trib. Milano 11.1.1988, Giur. comm., 1988, II,
585; Trib. Milano 17.9.1973 (on precontractual responsibility of a bailee who had
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contractual good faith to the precontractual phase, and that it is,
therefore, appropriate "to have an identical characterization for the
liability arising from violation of the duty of good faith independently
of whether such duty is linked to the contractual relationship or is
based on the precontractual situation."6 "4 On the other hand, substantial case law characterizes culpa in contrahendo as extra-contractual.6,o Some authors have advanced the view that culpa in contrahendo
received goods "on sale or return"), reported by Nanni, supra note 588, at 113 seq.;
App. Venezia 11.4.1953, Foro pad., 1954, I, 1050. It is argued: culpa in contrahendo is
contractual because it is not an obligation erga omnes (i.e., of the type of neminem
/aedere) but rather an obligation to a defined party, as is typical for contracts; the
liability which stems from articles 1337 and 1338 c.c. is contractual because art. 1337
c.c. must be viewed as an extension of the principle of good faith in contractual relations (art. 1175 c.c.) and, the same as the general duty of good faith establishes a
contractual liability according to art. 1218 c.c., so must the duty arising from art. 1337
c.c.; the duties of trust and disclosure deriving from art. 1337 c.c. can easily be construed as "obligations," because they have a definite content corresponding to a definite behavior of the debtor that satisfies a particular interest of the beneficiary, and
this definite content would exclude its construction as a tort; moreover, the duties of
good faith prescribed in art. 1337 c.c. are intended to satisfy an expectation and thus
have a positive purpose, while the duties under art. 2043 c.c. have just a negative
purpose, i.e., the purpose to protect; the tacit compact arising from the negotiations
between the parties establishes liability in contrahendo that would either become part
of the ensuing contract or attain an autonomous life because, even if no contract
follows, the compact survives as the basis for contractual liability for damages.
604 "[AJppare coerente . .. attribuire identica natura alla responsabilitdper violazione del
dovere di buonafede sia che esso si ncolleghi al rapportocontrattualesia che sifondi sul rapporto
prenegoziale," Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 304.
605 Cass. 12.3.1993, n. 2973, Corr. giur., 5/1993, 560 (Annotation by Vincenzo Carbone); Cass. 11.5.1990, n. 4051, Corr. giur., 8/1990, 832 (Annotation by P. L. Carbone, Un 'occasioneperduta: la Cassazionericonferma la natura aquilianadella responsabilitti
precontrattuale);Cass. 18.6.1987, n. 5371, Giust. civ., 1988, I, 197; Cass. 19.4.1983, n.
2705, Foro it. rep., 1983, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 143; Cass., s.u., 6.3.1976, n.
749, Giust. civ., 1976, I, 1671, 1678; Cass. 7.8.1974, n. 2385, Foro it. rep., 1974, voce
"Contratto in genere," n. 106; Cass. 19.10.1972, n. 3129, Giust. civ., 1973, I, 818; Cass.
28.1.1972, n. 189, Foro it., 1972, I, 2088; Cass. 28.9.1967, n. 2224, Foro it. rep., 1967,
voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 115; Cass. 28.9.1956, n. 3299, Foro it., 1957, I, 1027; Cass.
5.5.1955, n. 1259, Riv. dir. comm., 1955, II, 360 (Annotation by Luigi Mengoni); Cass.
12.1.1954, n. 22, Foro it., 1954, I, 1108 (Annotation by Giuseppe Stolfi). The Cassazione said that "culpa in contrahendo is of extra-contractual nature and stems from the
action of the debtor who has reasonably authorized the other party to rely on his
performance," Cass. 20.7.1943, n. 1892, Foro it. rep., 1943-45, voce "Obblig. e contr.,"
n. 148. See discussion, in Nanni, supra note 588, at 94 seq. with numerous further
references; Benatti, Culpa in contrahendo, supra note 588, at 303 seq.; Benatti, LA
RESPONSAB=ILrA' PREcorrRATrUALE, supra note 588, at 120 seq. See also Torrente &
Schlesinger, supra note 588, at 520; Sacco, supra note 588, at 676; De Martini & Ruoppolo, supra note 588, at 171-72; Giuseppe Osti, voce"Contratto" in NovissrMo DIGEsTO
ITALIANo, IV, 1959, Torino, at 514-15; Vittorio E. Calusi, In tema di trattative e responsabilitdprecontrattuale,Riv. trim. dir. proc. civ., 1956, 470, at 485. The arguments are:
but for art. 1337 c.c., liability for breach of the duty of precontractual good faith
would be subject to art. 2043 c.c.; since no contract is yet in existence, there can be no
contractual effect, and no autonomous compact can come into existence without a

208

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

derives from an independent source of liability. 6

[Vol. 24:70
6

If one party has justifiably relied on precontractual dealings or
negotiations, which were seriously commenced and could have led to
the formation of a contract,6 7 and the other party withdraws from
such negotiations without cause (or in bad faith), and damage has
occurred, then damages representing the "negative interest", i.e., the
id quod interest contractum initum non fuisse, would be awarded. Such
"reliance" damages would normally be limited to expenses and lost
opportunities that the innocent party would not have suffered, had he
never entered into those negotiations. The concept of "negative intrerest" itself is controversial.6
specific separate manifestation of intent; if there is no contract, the source of liability
lies in tort; the source of the duty to deal in good faith is not established by mutual
consent of the parties; it is not uncommon for the law to establish relationships similar to contract-or also of a different nature than contract-but without the mediation of a contract, between two parties, in which rights and obligations derive from
the law and not from a contract. On the application of article 2043 c.c. rather than
article 1337 c.c., see Cass. 13.7.1968, n. 2521, Foro it., 1968, I, 2454 (also in Nanni,
supra note 588, at 18, 131 seq.).
606 Pietro Rescigno, voce "Obbligazioni (diritto privato)" in ENCICLOPEDIA DEL Dinrrro, XXIX, Milano, 1979, at 142, 160; Rodolfo Sacco, Culpa in contrahendo e colpa
aquilia; culpa in eligendo e apparenza, Riv. dir. comm., 1951, II, 82, at 86. See Cuffaro,
supra note 588, at 1270 (art. 1337 c.c. establishes a conceptually autonomous basis of
responsibility). This so-called "tertium genus" theory has not been widely followed. See
discussion in Benatti, LA RFSPONSABILITA' P.coNmTRATruALE, supra note 588, at 115.
607 The test for reliance is objective, Cass. 5.9.1952, n. 2843, Foro it. rep., 1952, voce

"Obblig. e contr.," n. 96, 97; App. Genova 17.2.1951, Foro pad., 1951, II, 45. Mere
negligence is sufficient. App. Firenze 29.3.1950, Foro it. rep., 1950, voce "Obblig. e
contr.," n. 114. Article 1337 c.c. specifically states that good faith is required during
formation and during negotiation of a contract, and reliance would be reasonable
and justified if serious negotiations have commenced, Cass. 11.9.1989, n. 3922, Foro
it. rep., 1989, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 255; Cass. 22.10.1982, n. 5492, Foro it.
rep., 1984, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 133; especially if the fundamental terms of
the prospective contract have been discussed and agreed upon. Cass. 25.2.1992, n.
2335, Foro it., 1992, I, 1766 (Annotation by F. Caringella): "In order for culpa in
contrahendo to occur, there must have been, even during negotiations, the discussion
of the fundamental terms of the prospective contract, because only in this case there
can be a reasonable reliance of the parties, or one of them, on the stipulation of the
transaction;" Cass. 18.1.1988, n. 340, Foro it. rep., 1988, voce"Contratto in genere," n.
267; Cass. 22.10.1982, n. 5492, Giur. it., 1984, I, 1, 1199, Annotation by Fusaro; Cass.
17.1.1981, n. 430, Foro it. rep., 1981, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 112; Cass.
13.7.1968, n. 2521, Foro it., 1968, I, 2454; Cass. 8.5.1963, n. 1142, Foro it. rep., 1963,
voce"Oblig. e contr.," n. 105; Trib. Piacenza 24.3.1949, Foro pad., 1950, I, 200 (Annotation by Fernando Quagliolo).
608 Cass. 12.3.1993, n. 2973, supra note 605; Cass. 25.1.1988, n. 582, Foro. it. rep.,
1988, voce "Contratto in genere," n. 266; Cass. 20.5.1977, n. 2083, cited (and partially
quoted) by V. Carbone, supra note 605, at 563; Cass. 28.1.1972, n. 199, Foro it., 1972,
I, 2088; Cass. 13.7.1968, n. 2521, Foro it., 1968, I, 2454; Cass. 6.4.1968, n. 1053, Giur.
it. rep., 1968, voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 116; Cass. 10.10.1962, n. 2919, Foro it. rep.,
1962, voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 105, 106; Cass. 9.12.1957, n. 4619, Foro it. rep., 1957,
voce "Obblig. e contr.," n. 92, 93; Cass. 11.12.1954, n. 4426, Foro it. mass., 1954, 893.
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The rule of article 1337 c.c. is applied to disclosures required in
the context of commitments to negotiate, 6°9 and to letters of comfort
or patronage6 10 because:
[T]he duty to say the truth during the phase of formation of the
contract... must be interpreted in a increasingly extensive way,
in order to satisfy the profound needs of most rigorous good
faith in the merchant dealings (which take place in a situation
of growing weakness
of the consumer . . ), and of maximum
6 11
social solidarity.

B.

German Law

The "legal relation stemming from contract negotiations"
(Rechtsverhdltnis der Vertragsverhandlungen)6 12 and the ensuing liability for culpa in contrahendo6P 3 are well established doctrines of Ger"Although article 1338 c.c. regulates a hypothesis of 'aquilian'negligence [torts], the
assessment of damages is not much dissimilar from damages assessed under contractual negligence, and thus, within the limits of the negative interest, lost profits and
actual damages are included," Cass. 5.5.1955, n. 1259, Foro it., 1956, I, 375 (also reported in Riv. dir. comm., 1955, I, 360, annotation by Luigi Mengoni). On the mea-

sure

of damages

as

negative

interest,

see Benatti,

LA

RESPONSABILFA'

supra note 588, at 139 seq.; Trimarchi, supra note 588, at 314-15;
Torrente & Schlesinger, supra note 588, at 520-21; Messineo, supra note 588, at 366.
Not included are damages for advantages that could have been obtained if the contract had been concluded, Cass. 5.6.1958, n. 1599, Foro it. mass., 1959, 386. The
Relazione, at n. 638, supra note 592, states that the negative interest includes damages
caused by expenses, lost opportunities to enter another valid contract, and the activity
wasted in negotiations and diverted from other useful applications. For a broader
approach, see Cass. 12.3.1993, n. 2973, supra note 605, where it was held that the
precontractual duty covers, within the limits of the negative interest, all immediate
and direct consequences of a breach of precontractual good faith, and includes damages for economic loss incurred as a result of the withdrawal from other negotiations
even if of a different content. See also the critical remarks by, e.g., Grisi, supra note
PEcoNrrTArruAJ.A,

588, at 338; Cuffaro, supranote 588, at 1274; Benatti, LA REsPoNsAILrT'

PREcoNTRAT-

supra note 588, at 151. An interesting case is Cass. 19.11.1983, n. 630, in
Nanni, supra note 588, at 73 seq., where the court awarded damages to workers who
had relied on being hired, and were not.
609 Trimarchi, supra note 588, at 325.
610 Fausto Severini, I patronagetra la promessa unilateraleatipicae la promessa delfatto
del tezo, in Giur. comm., 1991, I, 884, at 890.
611 "L'obbligo di dire la veritt neUafase di formazione del contratto,...
va interpretatoin
senso sempre pi estensivo per soddisfare le profonde esigenze di piti rgorosa corretWeza dei
traffici mercantili [svolgentisi in una situazione di crescente debolezza per il consumatore .. .], e di maggire solidarietd sociale." Osvaldo Prosperi, Lettre de patronage e
mendacio bancario, in Banca borsa, 1979, I, 152, at 172-73 (citations omitted). See also
App. Roma 17.10.1989, Giust. civ., 1989, I, 2652. Seea brief discussion on the possible
application of culpa in contrahendo in the area of advertizing, in Vincenzo Franceschelli, Pubblicitd ingannevole e culpa in contrahendo,Riv. dir. civ., 1983, II, 268, at 275 seq.
612 Stoll, Haftungfir das Verhalten wdhrend der Vertragverhandlungen,LZ 1923, 544.
613 See note 37 supra.
-ruAL,
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man law.6 14 Case law and legal writers have developed the doctrine
that, with the commencement of contract negotiations, or by entering into comparable business contacts, a relation of trust similar to
contract comes into being (vertragsdhnliches Vertrauensverhaltnis)
which commits the parties to the "duty of care of debtors" (Sorgfalt
von Schuldnern).615 The early cases explained that the liability stemming from culpa in contrahendo was due to the subsequently concluded contract. 616 It became a well established doctrine that,
before the conclusion of the contract between the parties, certain
duties arise based on the requirements of good faith disclosure and
information (Offenbarungs-und Mitteilungspflichten) 617 On occasion,
the German Supreme Court implied the existence of terms aimed
at specifically protecting this duty of good faith.6 18 Legal authorities have written of a tacit contract aimed at assuring these effects
of protection 61 9 or of an organic link with the ensuing contract. 620
Today's understanding is that a legal relationship springs from the
commencement of contractual negotiations and binds the parties
62 1
to reasonable diligence in their dealings.
The basis of liability is the same as in torts. Liability may be
based on intent or negligence, and includes liability for servants
and agents. 62 2 The breach of duty lies in the breach of a precontractual duty of disclosure, advice, protection, care or assistance
(Aulkiirung, Beratung Schutz, Obhut, Fiirsorge).621
614 BGH NJW 1979, 1983; Staudinger-Loewisch, BGB, Vor § 275 Bern. 39. The
BGB-the German Civil Code-does not contain a general provision that specifically
addresses nondisclosures during negotiations. The doctrine of culpa in contrahendois
based on § 242 BGB. There is also other statutory authority for culpa in contrahendoin
a number of sections of the BGB, e.g., §§ 122, 179, 307, 309, 463(2), 600, 663, 694.
615 RGZ 95, 58; 120, 251; 162, 156; BGHZ 6, 333; 66, 54.
616
617
618
619

RGZ 95, 60.
RGZ 107, 362.
RGZ 74, 125.

Planck-Siber, Vorb. I 4c vor § 276, and others cited in Soergel-Reimer Schmidt,
n. 4, at page 254.
620 Stoll, supra note 612, at 544.
621 BGHZ 6, 333. The duty of good faith imposes a host of implied supplementary
obligations ranging from affirmative requirements of disclosure to sharing of
hardship.
622 § 278 BGB. Modem theories of the law of obligations, as expounded by legal
writers and case law, have affirmed the applicability of negligence standards to
precontractual dealings. Soergel-Reimer Schmidt, supra note 619, at page 253.
623 Palandt-Heinrichs, BGB, 51st ed., § 276 Bem. 72 -91. Special provisions, such as
warranty liability in the law of sales, override the general liability from culpa in contrahendo. §§ 459 seq. However, liability ex culpa in contrahendowould still apply concurrently for misleading information regarding the object of sale since this information
would not fall within the scope of §§ 459 seq. BGB (BGH NJW-RR 1990, 79, 971). See,
e.g., BGH NJW 1980, 777 (leases) and BGH DB 1976, 958 (general contractors).

1993]

GOOD FAITH DISCLOSURES

Culpa in contrahendo presupposes that trust has been granted
during negotiations for a business transaction.624 By starting contractual negotiations, a "legal" relationship is established which creates duties similar to contract (vertragsihnliche Sorgfaltspflicht)
regardless of the parties' intent. A high standard of care is exacted,
independent of contract, commensurate with the trust advanced by
each party to the other long before the contract is fully formed
because the parties are bound, within the framework of their relationship, by imposed duties of "correctness and maintenance"
(Ricksichts- und Erhaltungspflichten).625 By entering into contractual
negotiations the parties expose their assets to a higher than normal
risk, and to this risk corresponds a higher standard of care (Einstandspflicht) on the side of each party.6 26 The "contacts" requiring
such special standard of care come into existence, by operation of
law, when the parties start negotiations, and the need for protection is present whether or not a contract will be eventually
concluded.627
Culpa in contrahendo is a liability imposed by law. It is characterized by the fact that it does not recognize primary duties of performance, but duties for reciprocal accommodation, care and
loyalty (gegenseitige Riicksichtnahme, Firsorge und Loyalitdt). According to modem view, liability for culpa in contrahendo is based on
"granting of trust taken advantage of" (Gewdhrung in Anspruch genommenen Vertrauens).628 Liability is based on the enhanced "social
contact."6 29 This "contact" does not suffice, by itself, to establish

liability, which is, in fact, established independently from any consideration of whether a contract is ever concluded. What counts is
conduct aimed at the conclusion of a contract or at commence624 Larenz, Culpa in contrahendo, Verkehrssicherungspflicht, und "sozialerKontakt, "MDR
1954, 515.
625 § 242 BGB, Bern. 35, 100 et seq., in Soergel-Siebert-Knopp, BGB (10th ed. 1967).
626 Vor § 275, n. 2, Soergel/Siebert id. Culpa in contrahendo also applies to the public administration (including lack of form): RGZ 162, 129, 158; BGHZ 6, 330; 21, 59,
65; Minchen MDR 1953, 165; BFH Betr. 1963, 1489. See references in Soergel-Siebert-Knopp, BGB, at § 242 n.91 (10th ed., 1967).
627 Traditional tort law would not be sufficient to adequately cover all breaches of
the precontractual duty of good faith. Culpa in contrahendo thus establishes, in addition to the liability stemming from the law of torts, a concurrent basis of liability
(liability in tort does not per se protect any and all kinds of property loss, and the law
of torts contains an exculpatory provision which allows a principal, under certain circumstances, to disclaim liability for his servants while no such provision exists under
the law of contracts). § 831 BGB.
628 Ballerstedt, ZurHaftungfirculpa in contrahendo, AcP 151, 501, at 507; BGHZ 60,
226; BGH NJW 1981, 1035 (Haftungfir 'enttduschtes' Vertrauen).
629 Dtlle, Aussergesetdiche Schuldpflichten, ZStaatsW 1943, 67.
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630

ment of business contacts.
With respect to the burden of proof, the German Supreme
Court has said that the plaintiff must show that he and his agents
applied all diligence necessary to avoid a condition in violation of
commercial course of dealings. 63 1 Negligent conduct has been
held to be present when the other party was induced to believe that
a contract had been reached causing such party to incur expenses
or forebear another favorable contract, a result that could have
been avoided with the required disclosure of the real factual background. 63 2 The duty of disclosure during precontractual negotiations may be of different intensity according to the type of contract
and the requirements of good faith and fair dealing (Treu und
Glauben im redlichen Verkehr).63 In this context, during contractual
negotiations there is a fundamental duty to disclose to the other
party circumstances that are capable of frustrating the scope of the
contract.
The remedy for breaches of the duty of good faith are generally damages in tort, but contractual damages are also awarded if
the imposed duty concurs with assumed duties. The damages are
calculated as the negative interest (Vertrauensschaden), that is the
other party is to be put in as good a position as he would have been
without the breach of the duty.6 " If, however, the conduct in
breach of good faith disclosures has caused the avoidance of the
conclusion of the contract, the interest in performance can be
claimed because in such case the interest in performance is
equivalent to the negative interest.6 3 However, the negative interest is not limited by the interest in performance.6 3 6 If, without the
culpable conduct of the party in breach, the other party could have
entered into another contract, the damages would include lost
profits from this other opportunity. 637 If the damages are based on
the establishment of a liability (for example, the claimant has entered the contract because of insufficient disclosures), then his
claim could be for release from the liability, and the claim from
630 See the example of a potential customer rather than a mere visitor in BGHZ 66,
54.
631 BGHZ 66, 54; 67, 387; BGH NJW 1962, 31; NJW 1987, 640.
632 RGZ 159, 55.
633 RGZ 97, 325.

634 BGH VersR 1962, 562; RGZ 103, 47; 132, 76; 147, 103; BGH NJW 1981, 167.
635 RGZ 151, 359; BGHZ 49, 82; 57, 193; 69, 56; BGH NJW 1977, 1538 seq.;
MONCHENER KoMMENrTaR-Emmerich Vor § 275 Rn. 175.
636 BGH NJW 1965, 812; BGH VersR 1962, 562. See Soergel-Reimer Schmidt, supra
note 619, Vor § 275 n. 18.
637 BGH NJW 1988, 2236.
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culpa in contrahendo could be brought as a defense to the other
party's claim for performance. 3 8 If, because of culpa in contrahendo, the contract has been concluded at unfavorable terms,
and if the party not in breach intends to maintain the contract,
then recent case law provides a claim for contract adjustment. The
claim can be for reduction of performance to an appropriate level,
and for restitution of excess payments already made.6 9 Additional
cost caused by the other party's conduct in breach of the duty of
good faith can also be claimed as damages. 640 Specific performance can be sought under certain circumstances. 64 1 In any event,
the claimant shall not be put in a better position than he would
have been had there been no breach.64 2
638 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR - Emmerich Vor § 275 Bern. 176.
639 BGHZ 69, 56; 111, 82; BGH NJW-RR 1988, 10; 1989, 151, 307;

1991, 1819.
640 BGH NJW-RR 1991, 600.
641 BGHZ 40, 22; BGH NJW 1965, 814; 1977, 1536.
642 MONCHENER KOMMENTAR - Emmerich Vor § 275 Bern. 178.

NJW 1990, 1661;

